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Chapter 1
Introduction
Risk is involved in almost all decision processes in real life. The riskiness may
be related to unswayable issues, as for example uncertain weather conditions,
or inﬂuenceable issues as for example the behavior of others. In economic
environments, the uncertainty may relate to risky asset returns, uncertain
production processes or innovations. The decision makers’ imperfect knowl-
edge plays a major role in determining the degree of uncertainty. Therefore,
decision making under risk is inherently connected to available information
at that point in time. Moreover, information might be more or less reliable,
it reduces risk to greater or lesser extent. For decades economists study the
impacts of information on economic behavior and economic outcomes.
The purpose of this work is to contribute to the understanding of ‘better
information’ and how this can be formalized in economic models. In par-
ticular, two new informativeness criteria are deﬁned and compared to some
criteria which are frequently used in economic theory. Build on this, the
work analyzes the demand for information and its impact on the equilib-
rium/economic outcomes.
In economic modeling it is distinguished between market risk and event
risk. Market risk is related to the limited knowledge about endogenous vari-
ables as for instance other market participants’ actions or risky equilibrium
prices. In contrast, event risk is characterized by a probability space. In
particular, this probability space consists of a set of states of the world and
1
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a corresponding state distribution. Each state fully and uniquely determines
the decision maker’s (economic) environment. The state distribution is often
also called belief and reﬂects the decision makers imperfect knowledge about
the state of the world. A belief may be objective or subjective, an individual
or common assignment of probabilities to each state of the world. Intuitively
it is clear that these assignments of probabilities to the states heavily de-
pend on available information. Most parts of this work will focus on event
risk rather than on market risk.
When deciding under risk, a decision maker cannot directly choose an
action with corresponding outcome. Instead she chooses a random variable
depending on the state of the world that maximizes her expected utility. Be-
fore choosing an action, the decision maker may reduce her uncertainty by
acquiring additional information. Information acquisition can, for instance,
be reading newspapers or asking an expert for advice. As mentioned above,
the decision maker’s belief depends on her available information. There-
fore, the acquisition of additional information changes the decision maker’s
belief. In economic theory, information acquisition is frequently modeled
by observing a signal. This signal is correlated to the state of the world
and, therefore, contains information about it. For a given (prior) belief, the
correlation of states and signals is determined by an information structure.
Formally, an information system speciﬁes for each state a conditional prob-
ability distribution on a set of possible signal realizations. After observing
a signal realization, the decision maker update her prior belief via Bayes’ rule.
Informativeness Criteria
Whether an information system is more precise than another one, i.e. in-
duces a greater reduction of risk, has been extensively discussed in economic
theory. Intuitively, the greater the correlation of states and signals the more
informative the underlying information system. In spite of this clear intu-
ition, up to today there is no clear answer how to compare informativeness
of diﬀerent information system. The reason for this is that informativeness
criteria should fulﬁll some desirable properties. These properties might be
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natural ones as, for instance, reﬂexivity and transitivity, or desirable ones as
for example robustness under certain state transformations.1 Additionally,
an information system might be quite precise for some signal realizations
while it might be vague for some others. Moreover, some notions of informa-
tiveness seems to be appropriate in some economic environment while their
applicability is questionable in others. Therefore, various informativeness
concepts for diﬀerent classes of information systems and economic situations
have been developed.
Blackwell (1951, 1953) deﬁned the possibly most famous informativeness
criterion. He calls an information system more informative than another one
if the former one can be stochastically transformed into the latter one in
Blackwell’s sense. Or put diﬀerently, an information system is more informa-
tive than another, if a signal observation of the latter is equal to a disturbed
signal observation of the former. Blackwell shows that, if the set of possible
actions is independent of the information revelation, every expected utility
maximizer prefers an information system to another one if and only if the
former is more informative than the latter.
Following the same intuition, Lehmann (1988)/Persico (1996) deﬁne an
informativeness criterion for a subset of information systems. In contrast
to Blackwell, for deﬁning accuracy they use a certain state dependent sig-
nal transformation which transforms signals of the less accurate system into
signals of the more accurate system.
Kim (1995) argue that Blackwell’s criterion is not applicable in principal-
agent models. Therefore, he deﬁned a new criterion for the analysis of those
problems: an information system is more reliable if its conditional signal
distribution reacts more sensitive to changes in the state.
All of the three criteria mentioned so far compare conditional signal distri-
butions in diﬀerent ways. By contrast Eckwert and Zilcha (2008) formalize
informativeness by looking at the updated distributions after a signal re-
alization. In particular, an information system is more informative, if its
posterior state distributions are more dispersed. Intuitively, the more the
1Of course, there are more natural and desirable properties for an informativeness
criterion, but for reasons of readability these are introduced later in this work.
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updated state distributions depent on the signal realizations, the more pre-
cise is the information system. Following the same idea, Ganuza and Penalva
(2010) compare the dispersion of conditional state expectations.
As mentioned earlier, it is desirable that an informativeness criterion is
invariant under certain state transformations. An example for such a trans-
formation is an ordinal relabeling of states. Since such a relabeling is a
one-to-one transformation of the states, the original state can be inferred
without noise from each transformed state and vice versa. Therefore, the
information about the transformed states that is revealed by an informa-
tion system, is exactly the same as the information that it reveals about
the original state. The informativeness criteria of Blackwell (1951, 1953),
Lehmann (1988) and Kim (1995) meet this property while the criteria of
Ganuza and Penalva (2010) does not.
Since the precision criteria of Ganuza and Penalva (2010) have other help-
ful properties, the ﬁrst objective of this work is to deﬁne new informativeness
criteria, weak and strong informativeness, that are invariant to ordinal rela-
belings of states and respect the informativeness criteria of Ganuza and Penalva
(2010). The intuition of both criteria is that the more informative an informa-
tion system the more spread out are the posterior conditional expectations.
Moreover, as the name suggest, weak informativeness is weaker than strong
informativeness in the sense that if an information system is strongly more
informative than an alternative one, then it is also weakly more informative
than the alternative one.
The Value of Information
Blackwell (1951) shows that all expected utility maximizers prefers ‘better
information’ (in the sense of Blackwell’s criterion) to ‘worse information’.
However, he assumes that the set decision maker’s set of feasible actions
does not vary with information revelation. Since signals may be observed by
many people, this is not the case in most economic circumstances.
Hirshleifer (1971) have shown that better information can hurt agents in a
pure exchange economy. Intuitively, better information destroys risk-sharing
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opportunities. In particular, Hirshleifer considers a pure exchange economy
with one good (wealth) and two states of the world. The agents’ are risk
averse and possess risky state dependent endowments. If the agents trade
state-contingent claims before the state is realized, they are able to share
some of the risk. However, if the agents were be perfectly informed about
the true state of the world before they start to trade with each other, then
each agent would prefer to consume in the same state and they would not
trade at all. Therefore, from ex ante perspective, each agent just consumes
her endowment which delivers less (ex ante) expected utility than the risk
sharing equilibrium without information.
In contrast, Eckwert and Zilcha (2000) examine conditions for restoring
Blackwell’s theorem in a production economy with productivity risk. The
intuition of their result is that better information may improve the input
allocation in the economy which may outweigh its negative eﬀects on risk
sharing. Nevertheless, they also show that in the presence of risk sharing
markets the value of information still might be negative.
The second objective of this work is to examine the value of information
if sets of feasible actions are not independent of the information system. This
is done in two diﬀerent economic environments.
First, the demand for costly private information is modeled. In this model
action sets are independent of the signal realization but, since information
is costly, depend on the choice of information system. The main results are
driven by two simple eﬀects. Each agent on the demand side plays a lot-
tery where she has to guess the right state of nature. If she is right, then
her resources will increase, otherwise they will remain constant. On the one
hand better information leads to higher (ex ante) welfare as the chances of
winning improve. But on the other hand better information leads to less
budget available for consumption as it exhibits a higher price. Under these
circumstances even risk neutral agents invest in information provided infor-
mation is not too expensive. Furthermore, and perhaps more surprisingly,
risk averse agents do not invest in information if their degree of risk aversion
is suﬃciently high. This is due to the fact that resources keep constant in
the case of not winning the lottery.
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And secondly, in a general equilibrium model which considers a many
commodity production economy with risky endowments and eﬃcient risk-
sharing. There are two diﬀerent types of agents, risk averse consumers and
risk neutral ﬁrms. Both types of agents possess a risky endowment of com-
modities (inputs as well as outputs). At date 0, after receiving information
but before observing the state of the world, the agents trade state-contingent
claims in a competitive market. After the state realization, at date 1, the
agents consume/produce according to their state-contingent claim. There-
fore, since state-contingent claims are traded after the signal realization, the
equilibrium prices, and therefore the sets of feasible actions, vary with the
signal realization. Within this framework it is shown that weakly more in-
formative (information) systems make every risk avers agent worse oﬀ. In
particular, parts of the result by Schlee (2001) are generalized to a many
commodity, production economy with complete risk sharing markets.
Asymmetric Information
Information is asymmetric if some market participants know more than
others. A situation with asymmetric information is the Stackelberg game
(Stackelberg (1934)). In his model Stackelberg describes a situation with
asymmetric informations in which two ﬁrms compete with each other in a
quantity competition. The information asymmetry is modeled by an infor-
mation advantage of one ﬁrm. In particular, one ﬁrm, the leader, decides at
ﬁrst about its optimal supply (quantity) and the follower observes this before
deciding about its own quantity. Therefore, given the action of the leader,
the follower reacts to this by setting her best reaction. There exist a huge
literature on these models for homogeneous as well as for horizontal diﬀer-
entiated commodities (see e.g., Amir and Jin (2001), Kreps and Scheinkman
(1983), Vives (1985) and Vives (2005)). It is well established in the eco-
nomic literature that for the commodities being perfect substitutes and the
ﬁrms being quantity setters (Cournot competition), the leader is better oﬀ
than the follower. The reason for this is that when deciding about her opti-
mal quantity, the leader can take the followers behavior, i.e. her best reply,
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into account. The opposite is true for the ﬁrms being price setter (Bertrand
competition).
Boyer and Moreaux (1987) studied the role of the strategy space under
these circumstances. In particular, they allow both agents to choose whether
to set a quantity or a price. Using a very restrictive demand structure they
showed that it is always more proﬁtable to be a quantity (price) setter if the
goods are substitutes (complements). Consequently, uncertainty concerning
the opponent’s strategy space (market uncertainty) does not have any impact
of a ﬁrms decision. Regarding total and consumers’ surpluses they proofed
that price competition is dominant for all degrees of product diﬀerentiation.
The third aim of this work is to generalize Boyer and Moreaux’s results
to a more general demand structure proposed by Dixit (1979) which allows
diﬀerent corss-eﬀects and reservation prices for the goods.
Organization of the Work
Chapter 2 introduces the reader to the basic framework of decision mak-
ing under risk. The concept of an information system and the information
processing are explained.
Chapter 3 reviews some classic informativeness concepts from the eco-
nomic literature, deﬁnes two new informativeness concepts, strong and weak
informativeness, and discusses some of their properties and implication. Fur-
thermore, these concepts are compared to some informativeness criteria used
in the economics literature.
Chapter 4 studies the value of information in two diﬀerent situations.
First, the demand for costly information in a partial equilibrium model is
analyzed. Furthermore, this model looks at the connection of the degree of
risk aversion and the demand for information. And secondly, the impact of
information on individual behavior and prices is studied in a general equilib-
rium model with production.
Chapter 5 then is a side step to industrial organization. This chapter
studies the role of the strategy space in a Stackelberg game, i.e. a game with
asymmetric information.
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Finally, Chapter 6 summarizes the main results and gives some concluding
remarks as well as some preview on further research.
All formal proofs have been relegated to the appendix.
Chapter 2
Information and Decision Making
under Risk
Normally, the prediction of a future state of the world is uncertain. In eco-
nomic theory this is often modeled by assuming that the state of the world
is unknown at time of decision making. It is usual to assume that deci-
sion making under risk is rational in the sense of the expected utility rule by
Morgenstern and von Neumann (1944). In particular, this means that agents
choose an alternative that maximizes expected utility with respect to their
belief about the future state of the world. Within the literature on economics
this kind of modelling decision making under risk is called expected utility
theory. Since these models play a major role later in this work, section 2.1
presents the basic framework of expected utility theory and introduces some
notation.
Now imagine that the decision maker might get some additional informa-
tion about the state of the world before the decision is to be made. Clearly,
these additional information might change the agent’s belief about the state
of the world. Hence, the agent chooses an alternative that is optimal accod-
ing to her new belief. In economic theory additional information are often
modeled through the observation of random signals. These signals are corre-
lated with the state of the world and, therefore, an signal observation reveals
some information about the state of the world. In particular, after a signal
9
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observation a decision maker updates her belief accoding to Bayes’ rule and
then chooses an action which maximized her expected utility accoding to the
updated belief. Hence, this behavior is called Baysian decision making and
will formally be introduced in section 2.2.
Next, suppose that a decision maker observes more than just one infor-
mation signal, say two of them. Then the decision maker will take both
observations into account when updating her belief according to Bayes’ rule.
An opportunity how this can be formalized and modelled in economic theory
will be given in section 2.3
For the comparison of diﬀerent information signals, it is sometimes nec-
essary to normalize them in a speciﬁc way. Therefore, section 2.4 shows how
information signals can be normalized and explains why this is without loss
of further generality.
2.1 Decision making under Risk
This section introduces the basic framework of decision making under risk.
In economic theory a risky economic environment is typically modeled by a
measurable space (Ω,F) consisting of a set of possible future states of the
world Ω and a σ-algebra (of subsets in Ω). In general, Ω could be ﬁnite
or inﬁnite. Even though most of the statements are also true for ﬁnite sets
of states, the following restricts attention to inﬁnite sets of states. This is
due to readability reasons. Therefore, unless explicitly mentioned otherwise,
let Ω = (ω
¯
, ω¯) be a convex subset of R and let F denote its (borelean) σ-
algebra of subsets in Ω. At the time of decision making the future state
of the world is unknown. In particular, the decision maker does not know
which state ω ∈ Ω will occur. Hence, the decision maker forms an subjective
or objective probability measure µΩ on F representing his belief about the
future state of the world. Consequently, (Ω,F , µΩ) becomes a probability
space. Throughout this work it is assumed that µΩ is characterized by an
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probability density function (or Lebesgue density)2
fΩ : Ω→ R, ω 7→ fΩ(ω)
with corresponding cumulative distribution function
FΩ : Ω→ [0, 1]; ω 7→ FΩ(ω) =
ω∫
ω
¯
fΩ(ω
′)dω′ = Prob (ω˜ ≤ ω) . (2.1)
Therefore, the term prior belief simultaneously denotes the agents belief
about the state of the world µΩ, the corresponding density function fΩ or cu-
mulative distribution function FΩ. Denote by ∆(Ω) the set of all probability
density functions fΩ : Ω→ R, i.e.
∆(Ω) =

fΩ : Ω→ R
∣∣∣∣∣∣fΩ(ω) ≥ 0 ∀ ω ∈ Ω and
∫
Ω
fΩ(ω)dω = 1

 .
In the following a measure µΩ always denotes the unique measure which is
deﬁned by the density function fΩ ∈ ∆(Ω).
The decision maker has to choose an alternative a from a set of possible
alternatives A. In principle, an alternative could be anything, for instance, it
could be an action or a consumption bundle. It is assumed that the decision
maker’s outcome depends on both, her action and the state of the world.
Formally this is represented by a µΩ-measurable function
o : A× Ω→ O, (a, ω) 7→ o(a, ω),
where O denotes the set of possible outcomes. A widespread example for such
a situation is a farmer. Her problem is to choose the right type of grain like
corn or wheat. The set of outcomes consists of the farmer’s possible incomes
in the next year. The unknown state of the world might be the precipitation
amount of the next year. Since the precipitation amount is essetial for the
2If Ω is finite, fΩ denotes the corresponding probability mass function.
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quantity and quality of the harvest in the next year, and therefore, for the
farmer’s income, the state of the world is relevant for the farmer’s optimal
decision.
The decision maker’s preferences on the set of outcomes O are represented
by an elementary utility function
u : O → R, o 7→ u(o).
Under certainty, i.e. when the state of the world is known, each alternative
implements a certain outcome and the decision maker can choose an autcome
which maximizes her utility. In contrast, under risk, the decision maker is
unable to choose directly an outcome (through the choice of an action).
Instead, each alternative a ∈ A induces a lottery on the set of outcomes.
In particular this means, that choosing an alternative a ∈ A is the same as
choosing a lottery o(a, ω˜) on O. Following Morgenstern and von Neumann
(1944) it is assumed the decision maker now chooses an action for which the
induced lottery o(a, ω˜) maximizes her expected utility. This induces that the
decision maker’s preferences on the set of alternatives can be derived from
her direct preferences on the set of outcomes O in the following way: the
valuation of an alternative is determined as expected elementary utility of
the lottery implemented by that alternative. Therefore, it is assumed that
u(o(a, ·)) is µΩ-integrable for all a ∈ A. Then the decision maker’s preferences
on A are represented by
U : A → R, a 7→ EΩ [u(o(a, ω˜))] :=
∫
Ω
u(o(a, ω))fΩ(ω)dω.
In order to simplify notation, denote by v the indirect elementary utility
from a combination of an action and a state of the world. In particular, the
indirect elementary utility is deﬁned by
v : A× Ω→ R, (a, ω) 7→ u(o(a, ω)). (2.2)
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The formal problem of a decision maker then is
max
a∈A
U(a) = max
a∈A
EΩ [u(o(a, ω˜))] = max
a∈A
EΩ [v(a, ω˜)] . (2.3)
The decision maker’s behavior and her decision heavily depends on her
attitude towards risk. A risk averse decision maker dislikes risks. Therefore,
a decision maker is called risk averse if she prefers the expected outcome of
an lottery over the lottery itsself.
Definition 2.1. A decision maker is called
risk


averse
neutral
affine

 if and only if u (EO [o˜])
>
=
<
EO [u (o˜)]
for all lotteries o˜ on the set of outcomes.
From Jensens’ inequality immediately follows that a decision maker with
elementary utility function u is risk averse (neutral, aﬃne) if and only if u is
concave (linear, convex).
2.2 Decisions and Information
Decision making under risk is characterized by an unknown future state of
the world. This state is determined by nature before anything else happens
in the model. Therefore, this point in time represents the starting point
of the model and is called "ex ante" stage. As argued above, the decision
maker forms a probability distribution on the set of all possible states. At
the next point in time, the "interim" stage which is placed after the ex ante
stage and before the state of the world becomes observable, the decision
maker can observe a random signal that is correlated to the state variable.
If the signal is correlated to the state variable then it contains information
about it. In particular, if the agent knows the common distribution of states
and signals she can infer information about the future state and update her
prior belief using Bayes’ rule. Based on this updated belief the decision
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maker then choose an alternative which maximizes her expected utility. The
last point in time is the "ex post" stage. At this stage the state variable
becomes observable and the decision maker’s gets her payoﬀ according to her
alternative and the state realization.
State of the world becomes
known and the decision
maker’s outcome realize.
Nature determines
unobservable state
of the world.
Signal realization, up-
date of prior belief and
choice of alternative.
ex ante interim ex post
Figure 2.1: Timing of events.
2.2.1 Information Systems
In the traditional literature on information, the prior state distribution is
typically kept ﬁxed, and an information system is deﬁned as a proﬁle of sig-
nal distributions conditional on the state. In order to analyze the impact
of the prior belief on the quality of information, the present study proceeds
from a more general notion of informativeness by allowing for diﬀerent pri-
ors and distinguishing between an information structure and an information
system. For each state of the world ω ∈ Ω, an information structure deﬁnes
conditional signal distributions on the set of signals S. An information sys-
tem is a tuple consisting of an information structure and a prior belief. In
order to deﬁne information structures and information systems formally, let
ω˜ denote the state variable. Denote by S the set of possible signals and by S
the corresponding σ-algebra of subsets in S, i.e. (S,S) is a measurable space.
In principle, S can be ﬁnite or inﬁnite but for readability reasons, attention
is restricted to the case of inﬁnite signal sets which are convex subsets of the
real line, i.e. S = [s
¯
, s¯]. The discrete case will be presented in examples.
Definition 2.2. (i) An information structure with corresponding state space
Ω and signal space S is a family of conditional signal densities fS|Ω =
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{
fS|Ω(s|ω)
}
s∈S,ω∈Ω
.3
(ii) An information system with corresponding state space Ω and signal
space S is a tuple (fS|Ω, fΩ), where fS|Ω is an information structure
and fΩ ∈ ∆(Ω) is a probability density function on Ω.
An information structure is a family of conditional signal distributions
characterized by a family of conditional signal densities. Analogue to section
2.1 the conditional cumulative distribution function of the signals is
FS|Ω : S × Ω→ [0, 1], s 7→
s∫
s
¯
fS|Ω(s
′|ω)ds′.
For simplicity, the following example 1 presents a ﬁnite version of the
formulations above.
Example 1. Suppose Ω = {ω1, ω2} and S = {s1, s2} with ω1 < ω2 and
s1 < s2, respectively. Moreover, let the prior belief be given by the probability
mass function fΩ(ω1) = Prob (ω˜ = ω1) = 1/2 = Prob (ω˜ = ω2) = fΩ(ω2).
Then the cumulative distribution is equal to
FΩ(ω) =
{
1/2 if ω = ω1
1 else.
Moreover, the signal’s conditional probability mass function is deﬁned through
the Markov-Matrix
fS|Ω =
(
f(s1|ω1) f(s2|ω1)
f(s1|ω2) f(s2|ω2)
)
=
(
1 0
1/4 3/4
)
. (2.4)
Then fS|Ω deﬁnes an information structure. If the true state is ω1 signal s1
occurs with probability 1, while the signal s2 will never occur. If the true
state is ω2, this information structure generates s2 with probability 3/4 and
3In particular, this means that FS|Ω(s|ω) :=
s∫
s
¯
fS|Ω(s
′|ω)ds′ is a cumulative distribution
function and FS|Ω(C|·) =
∫
C
fS|Ω(s|·)ds is F -measurable for all C ⊆ S.
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while s1 occurs with probability 1/4. Last, (fS|Ω, fΩ) deﬁnes an information
system.
There are two extreme types of information structures: the fully unin-
formative one and the fully informative one. Following Nermuth (1982) an
information structure is fully uninformative if the set of signals contains only
one signal, say s0, i.e. S0 = {s0}. This information structure is informa-
tionally equivalent to an information structure which conditional signal dis-
tributions are state independent, i.e. f 0S|Ω(·|ω) = f
0
S|Ω(·|ω
′) for all ω, ω′ ∈ Ω.
Intuitively it is clear that the observation of a signal produced by this struc-
ture is equal to no observation at all, because no additional information can
be inferred from a signal observation s. Denote all these fully uninfomative
information structures by f 0S0|Ω where S
0 might be any convex subset of R.
It should be clear that the corresponding information systems (f 0S0|Ω, fΩ) are
fully uninformative for all prior distributions fΩ on Ω.
On the other extreme, an information system is called fully informative if
the observation of an signal reveals the state with certainty. This means that
every signal s ∈ S1 there is a state ω ∈ Ω such that the probability of observ-
ing s conditional on ω is strictly positive while this probability conditional on
any other state ω′ 6= ω is zero. Denote such information structures by f 1S1|Ω.
Clearly, the corresponding information systems (f 1S1|Ω, fΩ) are fully informa-
tive for all prior distributions fΩ ∈ ∆(Ω). Unfortunately, conditional signal
distributions as described above are not representable by density functions
f 1S1|Ω(·|ω). Hence, a fully informative information structure is not feasible in
a setting, where attention is restricted to continuous information structures
(i.e. to information structures which are deﬁned by a family of conditional
signal densities). However, for Ω ﬁnite, say Ω = {ω1, . . . , ωn} with n ∈ N,
an fully informative information structure can be constructed by deﬁning
S1 = Ω and
f 1Ω|Ω(s|ω) =
{
1 if s = ω
0 else.
If the true state is ω, this structure produces the signal s = ω with probability
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one while any other signal will occur with probability zero. Hence, after the
observation of an signal s the true state must be ω = s, hence, the signal
observation reveals the state with certainty.
In order to give an more concrete example consider Ω = {ω1, ω2} and S =
{s1, s2}. The completely uninformative and the fully informative information
structures are characterized by the Markov-Matrices
f 0S0|Ω =
(
1
1
)
and f 1S1|Ω =
(
1 0
0 1
)
.
2.2.2 Update of the Prior Belief
It is assumed that the decision maker knows the information system. Thus,
the observation of a signal realization allows her to update her prior belief
using Bayes’ rule. Then the revised belief is used for the maximization of her
expected utility. In particular, this means that the decision maker’s problem,
formally stated in equation (2.3), after a signal realization s becomes
max
a∈A
EΩ [v(a, ω˜)|s] = max
a∈A
EΩ [u(o(a, ω˜))|s] =
∫
Ω
u(o(a, ω))fΩ|S(ω|s)dω, (2.5)
where fΩ|S(ω|s) denotes the posterior state distribution after a signal real-
ization equal to s. The posterior state distribution is determined as follows:
Consider an information system (fS|Ω, fΩ). The joint probability density
function of signals and states is given by
fS,Ω : S × Ω→ R, (s, ω) 7→ fS|Ω(s|ω)fΩ(ω)
while the joint cumulative distribution function is
FS,Ω : S × Ω→ [0, 1], (s, ω) 7→
ω∫
ω
¯
s∫
s
¯
fS,Ω(s
′, ω′)ds′dω′ = Prob(s˜ ≤ s, ω˜ ≤ ω).
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The marginal distribution of the signals is characterized by the probability
distribution function
fS : S → R, s 7→
∫
Ω
fS,Ω(s, ω)dω = EΩ
[
fS|Ω(s|ω˜)
]
with corresponding cumulative distribution function
FS : S → [0, 1], s 7→
s∫
s
¯
fS(s
′)ds′ = Prob(s˜ ≤ s). (2.6)
Any signal with fS(s) = 0 will never occur and, therefore, can be neglected in
the revision of the prior belief. In particular, the posterior state distribution
conditional on a redundant signal, (i.e. fS(s) = 0) is not well deﬁned and
will not be computed. Of course, the marginal signal distribution depends
on the prior belief. Therefore, for a ﬁxed information structure but diﬀerent
prior, the corresponding information systems might have diﬀerent redundant
signals. Deﬁne the set of non-redundant signals of an information system
(fS|Ω, fΩ) by S(fS|Ω, fΩ) := {s ∈ S|fS(s) > 0}. An example for this can be
found at the end of this subsection. Applying Bayes’ rule for densities to
non-redundant signals yields the posterior state (probability) distribution
function after a signal realization equal to s ∈ S(fS|Ω, fΩ)
fΩ|S : Ω× S(fS|Ω, fΩ), (ω, s) 7→
fS,Ω(s, ω)
fS(s)
=
fS|Ω(s|ω)fΩ(ω)
fS(s)
.
The corresponding posterior cumulative distribution function is
FΩ|S : Ω× S(fS|Ω, fΩ)→ [0, 1], (ω, s) =
ω∫
ω
¯
fΩ|S(ω
′|s)dω′ = Prob(ω˜ ≤ ω|s).
If Ω and S are ﬁnite, the procedure keeps the same, the only thing to
change is to substitute all integrals by sums over the same sets. In order to
make this more clear consider the continuation of example 1 below.
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Example 1 (Continued). Consider again (fS|Ω, fΩ) as given in example 1
above. The joint probability distribution of signals and states is
fS,Ω =
(
fS,Ω(s1, ω1) fS,Ω(s2, ω1)
fS,Ω(s1, ω2) fS,Ω(s2, ω2)
)
=
(
1/2 0
1/8 3/8
)
Therefore, the corresponding cumulative distribution function is
FS,Ω =
(∑
s′≤s
∑
ω′≤ω
fS,Ω(s
′, ω′)
)
s∈S,ω∈Ω
=
(
1/2 1/2
5/8 1
)
while the marginal signal distribution is equal to
fS : S → [0, 1], s 7→
∑
ω∈Ω
fS,Ω(s, ω) =
{
5/8 if s = s1
3/8 if s = s2.
Hence, the set of non-redundant signals is equal to the whole signal set, i.e.
S(fS|Ω, fΩ) = S. Clearly, the corresponding cdf is
FS : S → [0, 1], s 7→
∑
s′≤s
fS(s
′) =
{
5/8 if s = s1
1 if s = s2.
Applying Bayes’ rule yields the posterior state distribution as
fΩ|S =
(
fΩ|S(ω1|s1) fΩ|S(ω2|s1)
fΩ|S(ω1|s2) fΩ|S(ω2|s2)
)
=
(
4/5 1/5
0 1
)
.
If s1 is observed the updated probability for the state being ω1 is 4/5 while
with probability 1/5 the second state ω2 is the true state. Signal s2 is only
observed if the true state is ω2. Therefore, after observing s2, the updated
probability for the state being ω1 is zero while ω2 is the true state with
probability 1. Consequently, the corresponding posterior cdf is
FΩ|S =
(∑
ω′≤ω
fΩ|S(ω
′|s)
)
ω∈Ω,s∈S(fS|Ω,fΩ)
=
(
4/5 1
0 1
)
.
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Theoretically also mixed forms with an inﬁnite state space and a ﬁnite
signal space or conversely are possible. For reasons of tractability these will
be omitted here. Instead, an example for an information system with inﬁnite
signal space and ﬁnite state space can be found in the following section.
2.3 Combining Various Information Structures
If more than one information structure is available, a decision maker might
decide to use multiple structures. That is, instead of observing a single signal
from one structure, she might observe multiple signals of various information
structures. An example for this would be the reading of various newspa-
pers. If the conditional signals are perfectly correlated, the observation of
an additional signal conveys no additional information about the state of
the world (as an example consider newspapers which always publish equal
articles). However, since one of the signals could be ignored, such a sys-
tem never transmits less information than only one of the structures. If, in
contrast, the signals are not perfectly correlated, then the observation of an
additional signal conveys additional information about the state. For illus-
tration of this idea, it is assumed that for any pair of information structures,
fS|Ω and f¯S¯|Ω, the conditional signals distribution are independent, i.e. s˜|ω
and ˜¯s|ω are independent for all ω ∈ Ω. Therefore, for information structures
f 1S1|Ω, . . . , f
N
SN |Ω
, N ∈ N, the joint conditional distribution of (s˜1, . . . , s˜N) is
given by
f(S1,...,SN )|Ω :
N⊗
i=1
Si × Ω→ R+, (s1, . . . , sN , ω) 7→
N∏
i=1
fSi|Ω(si|ω). (2.7)
Then the family of conditional signal distributions
{
f(S1,...,SN )|Ω(s|ω)
}
s∈
N⊗
i=1
Si,ω∈Ω
deﬁnes an information structure f(S1,...,SN )|Ω with signal space
n⊗
i=1
Si.
4 After
4Remark: In case of infinite signal spaces, this work restricted attention to signal spaces
which are convex subsets of the real line. Clearly, this assumption has to be relaxed in
order to allow for multiple signals. Therefore, it is assumed that signal spaces are convex
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the observation of a signal s ∈
N⊗
i=1
Si, the revision of the prior belief is done
along the same lines as described in the previous section 2.2.2. For a more
concrete illustration consider Example 2 below.
Example 2. Consider again fS|Ω as given in Example 1. Moreover, as-
sume that this structure describes an experiment which is independently
done twice. Therefore, two signals are observed, i.e. N = 2. Then the infor-
mation structure f(S,S)|Ω is deﬁned through the joint conditional distribution
of the two signals:
f(S,S)|Ω =
(
f(S,S)|Ω(s1, s1|ω1) f(S,S)|Ω(s1, s2|ω1) f(S,S)|Ω(s2, s1|ω1) f(S,S)|Ω(s2, s2|ω1)
f(S,S)|Ω(s1, s1|ω1) f(S,S)|Ω(s1, s2|ω1) f(S,S)|Ω(s2, s1|ω1) f(S,S)|Ω(s2, s2|ω1)
)
=
(
1 0 0 0
1/16 3/16 3/16 9/16
)
.
The joint distribution of signals and states is
fS,S,Ω =
(
fS,S,Ω(s1, s2, ω1) fS,S,Ω(s1, s2, ω1) fS,S,Ω(s2, s1, ω1) fS,S,Ω(s2, s2, ω1)
fS,S,Ω(s1, s1, ω2) fS,S,Ω(s1, s2, ω2) fS,S,Ω(s2, s1, ω2) fS,S,Ω(s2, s2, ω2)
)
=
(
1/2 0 0 0
1/32 3/32 3/32 9/32
)
.
Using Bayes’ rule leads to the posterior state distribution:
fΩ|(S,S) =


fΩ|(S,S)(ω1|(s1, s1)) fΩ|(S,S)(ω2|(s1, s1))
fΩ|(S,S)(ω1|(s1, s2)) fΩ|(S,S)(ω2|(s1, s2))
fΩ|(S,S)(ω1|(s2, s1)) fΩ|(S,S)(ω2|(s2, s1))
fΩ|(S,S)(ω1|(s2, s2)) fΩ|(S,S)(ω2|(s2, s2))

 =


16/17 1/17
0 1
0 1
0 1

 .
2.4 Normalization of the Signal Space
For some informativeness criteria and for graphical characterizations it is
useful to normalize the signal space. This section shows that it is without
further loss of generality to assume that the signals (ex ante) are uniformly
subsets of Rn, whenever multiple signals are considered.
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distributed on [0, 1]. Consider an information system (fS|Ω, fΩ). First, sup-
pose S = [s
¯
, s¯] and S(fS|Ω, fΩ) = S. Therefore, the marginal density of
the (ex ante) signal distribution fS(s) is strictly positive on S. This implies
that the corresponding cdf FS(s) is strictly increasing in s. Now consider
the random variable s˜n := FS(s˜) where FS is the cdf of the marginal signal
distribution. Since S = S(fS|Ω, fΩ) and since FS is continuous and strictly
increasing, s˜n is uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. Moreover, since the transfor-
mation FS : S → [0, 1] is one-to-one, s˜
n = FS(s˜) fully reveals the realizations
of the original signal s˜ in terms of quantiles and, therefore, conveys exactly
the same information as s˜. More precisely, the normalized information sys-
tem (fSn|Ω, fΩ) deﬁned by
fSn|Ω =
{
fSn|Ω(s|ω)
}
s∈Sn=[0,1],ω∈Ω
=
{
fS|Ω(F
−1
S (s)|ω)
fS(F
−1
S (s))
}
s∈Sn=[0,1],ω∈Ω
(2.8)
has ex ante uniformly distributed signals and is informationally equivalent
to (fS|Ω, fΩ). To see this, ﬁrst compute the marginal probability distribution
of s˜n as given by
fSn(s) =
ω¯∫
ω
¯
fnSn|Ω(s|ω)fΩ(ω)dω =
ω¯∫
ω
¯
fS|Ω(F
−1
S (s)|ω)fΩ(ω)dω
fS(F
−1
S (s))
=
fS(F
−1
S (s))
fS(F
−1
S (s))
= 1.
I.e. s˜n is (ex ante) uniform on [0, 1]. Next, to see the ‘informationally equiv-
alence’ of (fS|Ω, fΩ) and (fSn|Ω, fΩ), have a closer look at Bayes’ updating
rule: The posterior conditional distribution after a signal realization sˆ of
information system (fSn|Ω, fΩ) is represented by the function
fΩ|Sn : Ω× [0, 1], (ω, sˆ) 7→
fSn(sˆ|ω)fΩ(ω)
fSn(sˆ)
fn
Sn
(sˆ)=1 for all sˆ
=
fS|Ω(F
−1
S (sˆ)|ω)fΩ(ω)
fS(F
−1
S (sˆ))
.
Therefore, the observation of sˆ when using (fSn|Ω, fΩ) implements exactly the
same posterior conditional state distribution as the observation of s = F−1S (sˆ)
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when using (fS|Ω, fΩ), i.e.
fΩ|Sn(ω|sˆ) = fΩ|S(ω|F
−1
S (sˆ)) for all (sˆ, ω) ∈ [0, 1]× Ω.
Moreover, since F−1S (s˜
n) and s˜ are stochastically equal (i.e. have the same dis-
tributions), this implies that the random variables fΩ|Sn(ω|s˜
n) and fΩ|S(ω|s˜)
are stochastically equal. Hence, (fS|Ω, fΩ) and (fSn|Ω, fΩ) convey exactly the
same information about ω˜ and, therefore, they are called informationally
equivalent.
However, even if the marginal cdf FS is not continuous or strictly in-
creasing, as for example in case of ﬁnite S or S(fS|Ω, fΩ) ( S, Lehmann
(1988) shows that it is always possible to deﬁne an informationally equiva-
lent information system such that the corresponding marginal distribution is
continuous and strictly increasing. This result by Lehmann (1988) implies
that, even if the original signal set is ﬁnite, it is without loss of further gen-
erality to assume that the marginal distribution of the signals is uniform on
[0, 1]. Or in other words, for all information systems (fS|Ω, fΩ) considered in
this work, there is an informationally equivalent system (fSn|Ω, fΩ) such that
ex ante the signals are uniform on [0, 1], i.e. fSn(s) = 1 for all s ∈ [0, 1] =: S
n.
The following example explains how an normalized information system
can be achieved from an non-normalized one.
Example 1 (Continued). Consider again (fS|Ω, fΩ) as given above. Following
Lehmann (1988), deﬁne the random variable s˜n by
s˜n = sn(s˜) =
{
fS(s1)u˜ =
5
8
u˜ if s˜ = s1
fS(s1) + fS(s2)u˜ =
5
8
+ 3
8
u˜ if s˜ = s2
where u˜ is uniform on [0, 1] and independent of s˜. Then s˜n is a random
variable on [0, 1]. Moreover, if the realization s ∈ [0, fS(s1)], then
s = fS(s1)u ≤ s
′ ⇐⇒ u ≤
s′
fS(s1)
.
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Therefore, for s ∈ [0, fS(s1)]
FSn(s) = Prob(s˜
n ≤ s) =Prob(s˜ = s1)Prob
(
u˜ ≤
s
fS(s1)
)
=fS(s1)
s
fS(s1)
= s. (2.9)
For a realization s ∈ (fS(s1), 1], then
s = fS(s1) + fS(s2)u ≤ s
′ ⇐⇒ u ≤
s′ − fS(s1)
fS(s2)
and, therefore,
FSn(s) = Prob(s˜
n ≤ s) =Prob(s˜n ≤ fS(s1)) + Prob (fS(s1) < s˜
n ≤ s)
(2.9)
= fS(s1) + Prob(s˜ = s2)Prob
(
u˜ ≤
s− fS(s1)
fS(s2)
)
=fS(s1) + fS(s2)
s− fS(s1)
fS(s2)
= s (2.10)
for s ∈ (fS(s1), 1]. Equations (2.9) and (2.10) imply that s˜
n is uniform on
[0, 1]. Last, the normalized system (fSn|Ω, fΩ) is given by
fnSn|Ω =
{
f(F−1S (s)|ω)
fS(F
−1
S (s))
}
s∈[0,1],ω∈{ω1,ω2}
=


8
5
if (s, ω) ∈ [0, 5/8]× {ω1}
0 if (s, ω) ∈ (5/8, 1]× {ω1}
2
5
if (s, ω) ∈ [0, 5/8]× {ω2}
2 if (s, ω) ∈ (5/8, 1]× {ω2} .
2.5 Concluding Remarks
This chapter introduces the reader to the basic framework of decision making
under risk. A formalization of a decision maker’s attitude towards risk and
two concepts to measure this are introduced. The concept of an information
system formalizes the generation of random signals that contain information
about the state of the world. The following chapter 3 deals with ordering of
information systems in terms of informativeness.
Chapter 3
Information and Informativeness
The concept of an information system was introduced in the previous sec-
tion. In contrast to the traditional literature on information, where the prior
belief is typically kept ﬁxed, this work considers a more general notion of an
information system by allowing for diﬀerent priors. Assume that a decision
maker can choose between diﬀerent information systems. What criterion
can she use to order them in terms of informativeness? The purpose of this
chapter is to provide various approaches, including two novel ones, to an-
swer this question. As starting point, section 3.1 discusses natural requests
and desirable properties of informativeness criteria. Building on this, sec-
tion 3.2 presents Blackwell’s informativeness criterion and the weaker infor-
mativeness concepts by Lehmann/Persico and Kim. Section 3.3 introduces
two new informativeness criteria deﬁned by Eckwert and Zilcha (2008) and
Brandt et al. (2013, 2014).
Intuitively, the informativeness of an information system can be viewed
as the statistical relatedness of the signals and the states. Increasing infor-
mativeness means ‘adding correlation’ between signals and states. Since an
information system consists of an information structure fS|Ω and a prior be-
lief fΩ, this can be achieved by modifying either the information structure
or the prior. Thus, in such a setting, the informativeness of the system is
jointly determined by the prior and the information structure.
In order to give an answer to the question above for ﬁxed prior beliefs,
25
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Blackwell formalizes the intuitive idea that an information structure fS|Ω is
more informative than/suﬃcient for f¯S¯|Ω (regardless of the prior belief), if
the observation of signal s¯ of the letter one is the same as a noisy observa-
tion of a signal s from the former one. Blackwell showed that every Bayesian
decision maker prefers an information structure fS|Ω to another structure
f¯S¯|Ω if and only if s˜ is more informative/suﬃcient for ˜¯s. This strong equiva-
lence connects inforamtiveness (in the sense of Blackwell) with its value for
the decision makers. Unfortunately, the strengh of Blackwell’s theorem also
shows that Blackell’s criterion is quite restrictive (i.e. there are only a few
information structures that are comparable with this criterion), because an
information structure can only be more informative than another one, if it
delivers higher ex ante expected utility for all expected utility maximizers.
Since then various papers have proposed weaker criteria that can be applied
to a broader set of information systems.
Lehmann (1988) and Persico (2000) use a criterion according to which
all decision makers in a restricted class (those with single-crossing indirect
utilities) prefer an information structure. This criterion has been successfully
applied in auction theory.
Following similar lines, Kim (1995) proposes a criterion that is particu-
larly useful for ranking information systems in an agency framework.
Following a diﬀerent idea, namely that ‘better’ information implies more
‘aggressive’ Bayesian updating, Ganuza and Penalva (2010) equate more in-
formativeness with (various kinds of) higher dispersion of posterior expec-
tation. They show that an auctioneer provides too little information, and
that both the socially eﬃcient amount and the auctioneer’s optimal choice
of information increase with the number of bidders.
Similary, Li (2012) studies the eﬀect of information and bias on NIH grant
allocations. Reviewers who are related to applicants through citations are
assumed to be better informed about the grant quality of a grant proposal.
When estimating the model, her identifying assumption is that this diﬀerence
in information ranks the dispersion of the reviewers’ conditional expectations
of quality.
Finally, Eckwert and Zilcha (2008) study screening mechanisms of indi-
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vidual skills in systems of higher education. Measuring the precision of a
screening mechanism by a dispersion concept for conditional expectations,
they show that better screening leads to more inequality in the distribution
of actual incomes, but less inequality in the distribution of income opportu-
nities.
3.1 Desirable Properties of Informativeness Cri-
teria
Concerning the properties of an informativeness ranking, consider as a ﬁrst
step the two extreme information systems (f 0S0|Ω, fΩ) and (f
1
S1|Ω, fΩ). No
matter what the true state of the world is and regardless of the prior, the
signals generated by the information system (f 0S0|Ω, fΩ) and the state variable
are not correlated at all. Consequently, these signals do not contain any
additional information about the state of the world. I.e. the application of
(f 0S0|Ω, fΩ) is equivalent to applying of no information system at all, i.e. it
is fully uninformative. Hence, no system (fS|Ω, fΩ) should be ranked strictly
smaller than (f 0S0|Ω, fΩ). On the other extreme, the observation of a signal
generated by a fully informative system (f 1S1|Ω, fΩ) fully reveals the true state.
Therefore, no system (fS|Ω, fΩ) should be ranked strictly higher in terms
of informativeness than (f 1S1|Ω, fΩ). In order to formulate these properties
formally, the following notation is used for any informativeness ranking %inf :
• (fS|Ω, fΩ) %
inf
(f¯S¯|Ω, f¯Ω) that means (fS|Ω, fΩ) is more informative than
(f¯S¯|Ω, f¯Ω).
• (fS|Ω, fΩ) ≻
inf
(f¯S¯|Ω, f¯Ω) means that (fS|Ω, fΩ) is strictly more informa-
tive than (f¯S¯|Ω, f¯Ω),i.e. (fS|Ω, fΩ) %
inf
(f¯S¯|Ω, f¯Ω) and (f¯S¯|Ω, f¯Ω) 6%
inf
(fS|Ω, fΩ).
• (fS|Ω, fΩ) ∼
inf
(f¯S¯|Ω, f¯Ω) means that (fS|Ω, fΩ) and (f¯S¯|Ω, fΩ) are equally
informative, i.e. (fS|Ω, fΩ) %
inf
(f¯S¯|Ω, f¯Ω) and (f¯S¯|Ω, f¯Ω) %
inf
(fS|Ω, fΩ).
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With this notation, the two natural, minimal properties for any informative-
ness ranking %inf can be formalized as follows:
(f 0S0|Ω, f¯Ω) 6≻
inf
(fS|Ω, fΩ) (P0)
(fS|Ω, fΩ) 6≻
inf
(f 1S1|Ω, f¯Ω) (P1)
for any information system (fS|Ω, fΩ) and priors f¯Ω, fΩ ∈ ∆(Ω). Property
(P0) means that an informativeness ranking should not rank any informa-
tion system (fS|Ω, fΩ) strictly smaller than the completely uninformative sys-
tem (f 0S0|Ω, f¯Ω) while (P1) means that no system fS|Ω, fΩ) should be ranked
strictly higher than the fully informative (f 1S1|Ω, f¯Ω). Clearly, these minimal
requests can be tightend: desirable properties of an informativeness ranking
are that (f 0S0|Ω, f¯Ω) should be ranked weakly smaller than any information
system (fS|Ω, fΩ) and that (f
1
S1|Ω, f¯Ω) should be ranked weakly higher than
any system (fS|Ω, fΩ). I.e.
(fS|Ω, fΩ) %
inf
(f 0S0|Ω, f¯Ω) (P0
′)
and (f 1S1|Ω, f¯Ω) %
inf
(fS|Ω, fΩ) (P1
′)
for any information system (fS|Ω, fΩ) and priors f¯Ω, fΩ ∈ ∆(Ω). Observe that
(P0′) implies (P0) and that (P1′) implies (P1).
Further natural requests of an information ranking are transitivity and
reﬂexivity, i.e.
Transitivity: If (fS|Ω, fΩ) %
inf
(fˆSˆ|Ω, fˆΩ) and (f¯S¯|Ω, f¯Ω) %
inf
(fS|Ω, fΩ)
then (f¯S¯|Ω, f¯Ω) %
inf
(fˆSˆ|Ω, fˆΩ), (P2)
Reﬂexivity: (fS|Ω, fΩ) %
inf
(fS|Ω, fΩ), (P3)
for all information systems (fS|Ω, fΩ), (fˆSˆ|Ω, fˆΩ) and (f¯S¯|Ω, f¯Ω). In particular
this means, that an information ranking should deﬁne a preorder on the set
of information systems.
Moreover, an information criterion should be invariant to injective trans-
formations of the state space t : Ω → Ω′. Since such transformations
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are one-to-one, each state ω can be inferred from t(ω) without noise, and
vice versa. Hence, the information revealed by (fS|Ω, fΩ) about Ω is the
same as the information revealed by (fS|t(Ω), ft(Ω)) about t(Ω), with fS|t(Ω) ={
fS|t(Ω)(s|ω
′)
}
s∈S,ω′∈t(Ω)
deﬁned by
fS|t(Ω) : S × t(Ω)→ R, (s, ω
′) 7→ fS|Ω(s|t
−1(ω′)) (3.1)
and ft(Ω) by
ft(Ω) : t(Ω)→ [0, 1], ω
′ 7→
fΩ(t
−1(ω′))
|t′(t−1(ω′))|
, (3.2)
where t−1 : Ω′ → Ω denotes the inverse function of t and t′ its derivative
with respect to ω (which is assumed to exist because of technical reason).
Since the state space is ordered,5 it is possible (and sometimes also needed) to
weakening this property to a condition called ordinality of states. A ranking
with this property is invariant to strictly increasing, F -measurable transfor-
mations t : Ω → Ω′ of the state space. Since such transformations are also
one-to-one from Ω to t(Ω), the intuition keeps the same as for injective, F -
measurable transformation: the information revealed by (fS|Ω, fΩ) about Ω
is the same as the information revealed by (fS|t(Ω), ft(Ω)) about t(Ω), where
ft(Ω) and fS|t(Ω) are deﬁned as above.
Definition 3.1. (i) An information criterion %inf satisfies the indepen-
dence of state space property (IS), if
(fS|Ω, fΩ) %
inf
(f¯S¯|Ω, f¯Ω)⇒ (fS|t(Ω), ft(Ω)) %
inf
(f¯S¯|t(Ω), f¯t(Ω)) (IS)
for all injective t : Ω → Ω′, fΩ, f¯Ω ∈ ∆(Ω) and all information struc-
tures fS|Ω, f¯S¯|Ω.
(ii) An information criterion %inf satisfies the ordinality of states property
5Remember: Ω = [ω
¯
, ω¯] ⊆ R. Moreover, if Ω would be finite, it is w.o.l.g. to assume
that it is ordered.
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(OS) if
(fS|Ω, fΩ) %
inf
(f¯S¯|Ω, f¯Ω)⇒ (fS|t(Ω), ft(Ω)) %
inf
(f¯S¯|t(Ω), f¯t(Ω)) (OS)
for all strictly increasing functions t : Ω→ Ω′, fΩ, f¯Ω ∈ ∆(Ω) and all
information structures fS|Ω, f¯S¯|Ω.
The independence of state space property implies that the distance and
the order of the states can be changed without changing informativeness
ranking. Since any utility function u : Ω → R could be viewed as state
transformation, the IS property additionally has the implication that all de-
cision makers with diﬀerent, injective vNM-prefecrences share a common
view on the informativeness of a set of considered information systems. Un-
fortunately, IS is quite restrictive. Therefore, it is reasonable to impose the
weaker condition of ordinality of states in some economic environments. Con-
sider for instance an environment where the state space is a subset of the
real line and diﬀerent states represent diﬀerent wealth levels. In such a set-
ting one could argue that it suﬃces to restrict attention to strictly increasing
state transformations as any other does not respect the fundamental under-
lying ranking of the state space. Moreover, in economic theory attention
is frequently restricted to strictly increasing utility functions on the state
space. Those utility functions constitute increasing state transformations.
Thus, the OS property of information orders has the important implication
that expected utility maximizers who have diﬀerent strictly increasing vNM-
preferences will share a common view on the informativeness of a set of
considered information systems.
By the deﬁnitions of IS and OS it is clear that OS is weaker than IS, i.e.
IS implies OS.
A decision maker cares about information only in so far as her wellbe-
ing is aﬀected. Hence, a rational decision maker will always choose that
information system that delivers her the highest expected welfare. Hence,
Bonnenblust et al. (1949) call an information system more valuable if it in-
duces higher ex ante expected utility for all decision makers. In order to
introduce the term ‘more valuable’ formally, deﬁne the optimal action after
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a signal observation equal to s by
a∗ : S → A, s 7→ argmax
a∈A
EΩ [v(a, ω˜)|s] . (3.3)
Building on Bonnenblust et al. (1949), the value of information is deﬁned as
follows:
Definition 3.2. For an arbitrary strategy a : S → A, s 7→ a(s), an informa-
tion system (fS|Ω, fΩ) and an indirect utility function v : A× Ω → R define
the ex ante expected utility by
V ((fS|Ω, fΩ), a, v) := ES [EΩ [v(a(s), ω˜)|s˜]] .
An information system (fS|Ω, fΩ) is more valuable than the information sys-
tem (f¯S¯|Ω, fΩ) if for every expected utility maximizer with prior fΩ holds that
V ((fS|Ω, fΩ), a
∗, v) ≥ V ((f¯S¯|Ω, fΩ), a¯
∗, v). (3.4)
This concept induces a preorder on the set of information systems. It is
unclear how this ordering relates to information orders. This will be studied
in the following sections.
3.2 Blackwell’s Sufficiency Criterion
Blackwell (1951) deﬁnes an criterion for the comparison of two information
structures regardless of the prior. As already mentioned, Blackwell’s criterion
formalizes the intuitive idea that an information structure fS|Ω is more infor-
mative than f¯S¯|Ω regardless of the prior belief, if the observation of an signal
s¯ of the latter one is the same as an noisy observation of an signal s from the
former. In particular, this means the following: Suppose the decision maker
is not able to observe the signal s directly anymore and that there is a ran-
dom transformation fˆS¯|S that randomly transforms an unobservable signal
s ∈ S into an observable signal s¯ ∈ S¯. Therefore, fˆS|S¯ can be interpreted
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as information structure with state space S and signal space S¯.6 Intuitively
it is clear that the observation of the signal s¯ is not more informative than
the direct observation of s. The following deﬁnition etablishes Blackwell’s
suﬃciency criterion for inﬁnite signal spaces which easily can be modiﬁed for
the case of a ﬁnite sets of signals. In contrast, whether Ω is ﬁnite or inﬁnite
does not play any role in the deﬁnition of Blackwell’s criterion.
Definition 3.3 (Blackwell’s Suﬃciency Criterion). An information structure
fS|Ω is sufficient for the structure f¯S¯|Ω, fS|Ω %
b
f¯S¯|Ω, if and only if there exists
an information structure fˆS¯|S such that FˆS¯|S(C|·) =
∫
S¯
1C(s¯)f¯S¯|S(s¯|·)ds¯ is S-
measurable for all C ∈ S¯7 and
f¯S¯|Ω(s¯|ω) = ES
[
fˆS¯|S(s¯|s˜)|ω
]
=
∫
S
fˆS¯|S(s¯|s)fS|Ω(s|ω)ds for all ω ∈ Ω.
Important is that the information structure fˆSˆ|S is independent of the
state ω. This independence implies that fˆS¯|S is an information structure
which convey information about s˜. Therefore, an observation of a signal from
f¯S¯|Ω does not contain more information about the state than a direct obser-
vation of an signal from fS|Ω. Additionally, this implies that if an information
structure is more informative than another one, then the corresponding in-
formation systems are ranked in the same way for all prior distributions,
i.e.
(fS|Ω, fΩ) %
b
(f¯S¯|Ω, fΩ) :⇔ fS|Ω %
b
f¯S¯|Ω,
for all prior beliefs fΩ ∈ ∆(Ω). Hence, an information system (fS|Ω, fΩ) is
more informative than the system (f¯S¯|Ω, fΩ) if and only if underlying infor-
mation structure fS|Ω is more informative than f¯S¯|Ω.
Next, observe that Blackwell’s suﬃciency criterion fulﬁll all natural re-
quests and desirable properties of informativeness criteria stated in section
6Compare chapter 2.
7In particular, since fˆS¯|S(·|s) is a probability distribution on (S¯, S¯) this means that
FˆS¯|S is a stochastic kernel.
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3.1.
Lemma 3.1. Blackwell’s sufficiency criterion satisfies the basic properties
(P0′), (P1′), (P2), (P3) and (IS).
The properties (P2) and (P3) imply that Blackwell’s suﬃciency criterion
deﬁnes a (partial) preorder on the set of information structures. Addition-
ally, (P0′) and (P1′) imply that for any prior fΩ ∈ ∆(Ω), the minimal ele-
ment of this preorder is the system (f 0S0|Ω, fΩ) while the maximal element is
(f 1S1|Ω, fΩ).
Moreover, Blackwell’s criterion allows to compare information systems
which signal spaces have diﬀerent dimensions. This in turn allows for the
comparison of combinations of independent information structures. As men-
tioned above, intuitively it is clear that the observation of additional signals
reveal additional information about the state.
Proposition 3.1. For all independent information structures fS|Ω and f¯S¯|Ω,
the information structure f(S,S¯)|Ω with f(S,S¯)|Ω(s, s¯|ω) := fS|Ω(s|ω)f¯S¯|Ω(s¯|ω) is
sufficient for fS|Ω and f¯S¯|Ω, respectively.
The combination of two information structures is always more informa-
tive than the underlying structures itsself. This observation is useful for
the construction of information structures and systems with parametrized
informativeness, which on their part are useful by modeling the demand and
supply of information (compare chapter 4). As an example consider a frame-
work in which only one (kind of) information structure is available, but it is
possible to use several of these technologies simultaneously (compare Exam-
ple 2). Proposition 3.1 implies that the informational content is increasing
in the number of simultaneously used technologies. Therefore, this number
parametrizes informational content.
As mentioned above, it is not so clear how informativeness criteria relate
to individual ex ante expected utilities. However, Blackwell (1951, 1953)
proofed that the preorder induced by his suﬃcency criterion is equivalent to
the preorder induced by the ‘more valuable’ criterion by Bonnenblust et al.
(1949).
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Theorem 3.1 (Blackwell’s theorem). For any fixed prior belief fΩ ∈ ∆(Ω) is
an information system (fS|Ω, fΩ) more informative than a system (f¯S¯|Ω, fΩ)
if and only if it is more valuable all for expected utility maximizers.
A more informative information system is always valuable for a single
decision maker. Crucial for this result is, that the set of possible actions
is independent of the signal realization. In most economic circumstances,
as for example in a general equilibrium framework, this might not be the
case. Hirshleifer (1971) was the ﬁrst who demonstrated that in equilibrium
information might make everybody worse oﬀ. He considers a small exchange
economy with a single consumption good, risk avers agents and complete
markets for state-contingent claims. Each agent is endowed with a risky en-
dowment of the consumption good. The agents can share risks by trading
state-contingent claims in complete markets before the state of the world is
realized. If they were perfectly informed about the state before the mar-
kets for state-contingent claims are open, no trade at all will take place and
the agents consume according to their endowments. Therefore, from an ex
ante perspective, perfect information make the agents worse oﬀ by breaking
down the risk sharing markets. A more detailed discussion of the value of
information in equilibrium models will be provided in chapter 4.
3.2.1 Weaker criteria
Up to now this section studied Blackwell’s suﬃciency criterion. For ﬁxed
prior, an information system is suﬃcient for another one if and only if it
delivers higher ex ante expected utility for all expected utility maximizers.
In particular, a system is suﬃcient for another one if and only if it is more
valuable in the sense of Deﬁnition 3.2. This powerful equivalence has the cost
that only a few systems are comparable in terms of Blackwell’s criterion. In
order to relax this problem and to be able to compare more information
systems with respect to their value, various information concepts has been
developed which are applicable in diﬀerent economic scenarios. This section
will brieﬂy introduce the deﬁnitions of two such criteria and relate them to
the value of information for particular classes of decision makers.
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The criterion by Lehmann and Persico
Lehmann (1988) and Persico (1996, 2000) deﬁne an information ranking, in
this work reﬀered as accuracy, based on the intuition that the more infor-
mative a system, the more correlated are signals and states. By deﬁning
accuracy, they restrict attention to information structures with the mono-
tone likelihood ratio property (MLRP). In order to avoid confusion, remem-
ber that attention is restricted to state and signals spaces which are convex
subsets of the real line. Under these assumptions the MLRP is deﬁned as
follows:
Definition 3.4 (Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property). An information struc-
ture fS|Ω has a monotone likelihood ratio if and only if fS|Ω(s|ω)/fS|Ω(s|ω′) is
decreasing in s for all ω, ω′ ∈ Ω such that ω′ ≥ ω.
Milgrom (1981) relates this property of information structures with the
slope of posterior conditional expectation (as a function of the signals real-
ization s). He calls an information system (fS|Ω, fΩ) monotone (in s) if for
any s, s′ ∈ S with s′ ≥ s it follows that FΩ|S(·|s
′) ﬁrst order stochastically
dominates FΩ|S(·|s).
8 Then Milgrom (1981) shows that an information sys-
tem (fS|Ω, fΩ) is monotone regardless of the prior if and only if the underlying
structure, fS|Ω, has the MLRP:
Proposition 3.2. An information system (fS|Ω, fΩ) is monotone (in s) for
all prior fΩ ∈ ∆(Ω) if and only if fS|Ω have the MLRP.
Denote by M the set of information structures with MLRP. In order to
give the deﬁnition of accuracy, deﬁne the quantile function of an conditional
signal cdf, FS|Ω, by
F−1S|Ω : [0, 1]× Ω→ S, (p, ω) 7→ inf
{
s ∈ S|FS|Ω(s|ω) ≥ p
}
.
For ﬁxed prior belief, Lehmann (1988) and Persico (1996) deﬁne accuracy
as follows:
8Let FΩ and F¯Ω denote two distributions of Ω. FΩ first order stochastically dominates
F¯Ω if and only if FΩ(ω) ≤ F¯Ω(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω.
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Definition 3.5. Let fS|Ω, f¯S¯|Ω ∈ M. Information structure fS|Ω is more
accurate than the structure f¯S¯|Ω, fS|Ω %
a
f¯S¯|Ω, if and only if
T : S¯ × Ω→ S, (s¯, ω) 7→ F−1S|Ω(F¯S¯|Ω(s¯|ω)|ω)
is nondecreasing in ω for all s¯ ∈ S¯.
The function T (·, ω) : S¯ → S is a state dependent transformation of
signals in S¯ into signals in S. In order to get an intuition for this deﬁnition
suppose for the moment S = S¯. Since T (s¯, ω) is nondecreasing in ω it adds
correlation to the signal s¯ in the following sense: If ω is low the transformed
signal is lower than the original one and vice versa if ω is high. Hence, at least
intuitively, the more accurate an information system, the more correlated are
signals and states.
Similar to Blackwell’s criterion, accuracy was originally deﬁned for the
comparison of information structures, however, throughout this work, an
information system (fS|Ω, fΩ) is more accurate than the system (f¯S¯|Ω, fΩ) if
and only of the underlying information structure fS|Ω is more accurate then
f¯S¯|Ω. Formally,
(fS|Ω, fΩ) %
a
(f¯S¯|Ω, fΩ) :⇔ fS|Ω %
a
f¯S¯|Ω
for all fΩ ∈ ∆(Ω). Moreover, since the transformation T : S¯ × Ω → S has
to be increasing in ω for ﬁxed s¯ ∈ S¯ it follows that underlying ranking of
the states (i.e. the ranking of the reals) is important for deﬁning accuracy.
Hence, it is obvious that accuracy cannot fulﬁll the independence of state
property. However, it is easy to check that it has the ordinality of states
property.
Proposition 3.3. The accuracy ranking by Lehmann (1988) and Persico
(1996) satisfies the basic properties (P0′), (P1′), (P2), (P3) and (OS).
Within class of information structures with MLRP and for ﬁxed prior
belief Persico (1996, 2000) proofed that increasing accuracy is equivalent to
increasing ex ante expected utility for all decision makers with single-crossing
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preferences. In order to formulate this result formally, it is necessary to deﬁne
single crossing-preferences:
Definition 3.6 (Single-crossing preferences). Suppose the set of possible ac-
tions is a subset of the real line, i.e. A ⊆ R. A decision maker posses
single crossing preferences if and only if her indirect elementary utility has
the single-crossing property. That is, for all a, a′ ∈ A such that a′ ≥ a and
for all ω, ω′ ∈ Ω such that ω′ ≥ ω it holds that
v(a, ω)− v(a′, ω) > 0 ⇒ v(a, ω′)− v(a′, ω′) > 0.
The single crossing property implies that diﬀerence v(a, ·)−v(a′, ·) crosses
0 at most once and if so, it crosses from below. Therefore, loosely speaking
a decision maker with single-crossing preferences want to coordinate small
actions with small states and high actions with high states. For this class of
decision problems Athey (2002) showed that the optimal action a∗(s) is non-
decreasing in the signal realization s if the underlying information structure
posses the MLRP. The following theorem by Persico (1996, 2000) etablishes,
as already mentioned above, a tight relationship between accuracy and the
value of information for decision makers with single-crossing preferences.
Theorem 3.2. Let fS|Ω, f¯S¯|Ω ∈ M, fΩ ∈ ∆(Ω) and A ⊆ R compact. The
information structure fS|Ω is more accurate than the structure f¯S¯|Ω if and
only if V ((fS|Ω, fΩ), a
∗, v) ≥ V ((f¯S¯|Ω, fΩ), a¯
∗, v) for all decision makers with
single-crossing preferences.
Similar to Blackwell’s theorem which characterizes the ex ante expected
utility for all decision makers in terms of suﬃciency, theorem 3.2 character-
izes the ex ante expected utility for all decision makers with single-crossing
preferences in terms of accuracy. Of course, since the set of decsision makers
with single-crossing preferences is a subset of all decision makers, the theo-
rems 3.1 and 3.2 imply that if attention is restricted to information structures
with MLRP, then accuracy is weaker than suﬃciency.
Cororally 3.1. Let fS|Ω, f¯S¯|Ω ∈M. Then, fS|Ω %
b
f¯S¯|Ω ⇒ fS|Ω %
a
f¯S¯|Ω.
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Kim’s Criterion
As mentioned above, Blackwell’s suﬃciency criterion is quite restrictive. Ad-
ditionally, Kim (1995) argues that it is not appropriate for the use in a
principal-agent framework. As reason for this Kim mentions that suﬃciency
is based on forecasting the unobservable variable rather than on controlling it
which is the objective in a principal-agent framework. Therefore, the crucial
point is the (local) sensitivity of the signals with respect to a change in the
state of the world rather than the correlation of signals and states. Kim intro-
duces a new criterion which takes this objective into account. Kim’s criterion
measures the sensitivity of the conditional signal distribution, fS|Ω(·|ω), for
marginal changes in ω. In particular, the basic idea of Kim’s criterion is the
more sensitive the conditional signal distribution (for marginal changes in ω),
the more informative is the corresponding information structure. In order to
make this more clear, consider the fully uninformative information structure.
Its conditional signal distributions are independent of the state variable and,
hence, its sensitivity to marginal changes in ω is zero. If an information
structure is partially informative, then the conditional signal distribution is
not independent of the state and, hence, the sensitivity is diﬀerent than zero.
Again, let Ω and S be convex subsets of the real line and assume that
information structures are given by a family of conditional signal densities,{
fS|Ω(·|ω)
}
ω∈Ω
, which are (twice) continuously diﬀerentiable. Denote the set
of those information structure by D. Kim measures the relative sensitivity
of the conditional signal distribution by using the likelihood ratio
∂fS|Ω/∂ω
fS|Ω
(s|ω) :=
∂fS|Ω(s|ω)/∂ω
fS|Ω(s|ω)
.
This ratio measures the relative change of the conditional signal density
caused by a marginal change in the state variable. Deﬁne the cdf of the
likelihood ratio as
LfS|Ω(x, ω) := Prob
(
∂fS|Ω/∂ω
fS|Ω
(s˜|ω) ≤ x
)
.
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This function determines the conditional probability that, given state ω, the
information structure produces a signal which is less sensitive than x.
Kim compares the sensitivities of two information structures in terms of
their likelihood ratio distributions by using the concept of a mean preserving
spread (MPS).9
Definition 3.7. Let fS|Ω, f¯S¯|Ω ∈ D. The information structure fS|Ω is locally
more informative than the structure f¯S¯|Ω, denoted by fS|Ω %
l-inf
f¯S¯|Ω, if and
only if the likelihood ratio distribution LfS|Ω(·, ω) is a MPS of the likelihood
ratio distribution Lf¯S¯|Ω(·, ω) for all ω ∈ Ω.
Intuitively, if the distribution LfS|Ω(·, ω) is a MPS of the distribution
Lf¯S¯|Ω(·, ω), then extremely sensitive signals (positive or negative) are more
likeli to occur under fS|Ω than under f¯S¯|Ω.
As for the criterea deﬁned above, an information system (fS|Ω, fΩ) is
called locally more informative than the system (f¯S¯|Ω, fΩ) if and only if the
underlying information structures are ordered in the same way. I.e. for any
fΩ ∈ ∆(Ω) and fS|Ω, f¯S¯|Ω ∈ D set
(fS|Ω, fΩ) %
l-inf
(f¯S¯|Ω, fΩ) :⇔ fS|Ω %
l-inf
f¯S¯|Ω.
Concerning the basic properties observe that, since the fully informative
information structure is never continuously diﬀerentiable, it is not necessary
(and not possible) to prove whether property (P1) holds or not. Secondly,
since fS|t(Ω) has to be diﬀerentiable in ω, it suﬃces to show independence to
increasing, diﬀerentiable state transformations.
Definition 3.8. Let fS|Ω ∈ D. An informativeness criterion %
inf
satisfies
9Let x˜ and y˜ be random variables with cumulative distribution functions FX and
FY , respectively. x˜ is a mean preserving spread (MPS) of y˜ iff EX [x˜] = EY [y˜] and
x∫
−∞
FX(x
′)dx′ ≥
x∫
−∞
FY (x
′)dx′ for all x ∈ R. This is equivalent to the convex order
for random variable with equal mean. For more details on this consider for instance
Shaked and Shantbikumar (2007).
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the weak ordinality of states property (wOS) if and only if
fS|Ω %
inf
f¯S¯|Ω ⇒ fS|t(Ω) %
inf
f¯S¯|t(Ω)
for all strictly increasing, differentiable state transformations t : Ω→ R.
The following proposition summarizes the basic properties of information
ranking which are respected by Kim’s criterion.
Proposition 3.4. Local informativeness has the basic properties (P0), (P2),
(P3) and (wOS).
In order to relate local informativeness with the ex ante expected utility,
consider a principal-agent framework. Assume that the principal is risk neu-
tral while the agent is assumed to be risk avers. The agent chooses a level of
eﬀort ω ∈ Ω which is unobservable for the principal. Instead, she observes a
signal s ∈ S, e.g. the outcome of a production process, which is correlated to
the agent’s choice. The statistical dependence (or correlation) of signals and
states is determined by an information structure fS|Ω. The conditional signal
densities of this information structure are assumed to be twice continuously
diﬀerentiable, i.e. fS|Ω ∈ D. In order to implement a certain level of eﬀort,
the principal provides a bonus payment scheme b : S → R. In particular,
this means that if s is observed, the agents gets a payoﬀ in amount of b(s).
Moreover, assume that the agent’s preferences for wealth and eﬀort are addi-
tively separabel, increasing in wealth and decreasing in the eﬀort level. More
precisely, the agent’s preferences are represented by v(b, ω) = u(b) − w(ω)
with v′ > 0, v′′ < 0 and w′ > 0. Moreover, the reservation utility or outside
option of the agent is u¯ which is her utility in case of not signing a contract
with the principal. Then, if the principal want to implement an eﬀort level
ω ∈ Ω at minimum expected costs, she has to solve the following problem:
min
s(·)≥k
s¯∫
s
¯
b(s)fS|Ω(s|ω)ds
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s. t.
s¯∫
s
¯
u(b(s))fS|Ω(s|ω)dω − w(ω) ≥ v¯ (PC)
s¯∫
s
¯
u(b(s))∂fS|Ω(s|ω)/∂ω(s|ω)ds− w′(ω) = 0 (IC)
Condition (PC) is called participation constraint which assures that the
agents gets at least her reservation utility u¯ and, hence, assures that the
agent is willing to sign the contract. (IC) is called incentive compatibility
constraint. In particular, (IC) is equal to the ﬁrst order condition (FOC) in
the agents optimization problem and, hence, it guarantees that ω is in fact
the optimal choice for the agent.10 The lower bound of the agent’s bonus
payment k assures the existence of a solution to the principals problem, i.e.
the existence of an optimal payment scheme b∗ : S → R. Let
B : Ω×D, (ω, fS|Ω) 7→
∫
S
b∗(s)fS|Ω(s|ω)ds
denote the principal’s ex ante expected cost for implementing ω under in-
formation structure fS|Ω. The following theorem, which was proven by Kim
(1995) and Jewitt (1997), relates local informativeness with the ex ante ex-
pected implementing costs of some action ω.
Theorem 3.3. Let fΩ ∈ ∆(Ω) and fS|Ω, f¯S¯|Ω ∈ D. Information struc-
ture fS|Ω is locally more informative than the structure f¯S¯|Ω if and only if
B(ω, fS|Ω) ≤ B(ω, f¯S¯|Ω) for all ω ∈ Ω.
An information structure fS|Ω is locally more informative than another,
f¯S¯|Ω, if and only if the ex ante expected costs for implementing ω under the
ﬁrst system, (fS|Ω, fΩ) are less or equal to those under the second system,
(f¯S¯|Ω, fΩ).
Since Grossman and Hart (1983) prove that the necessary part of Black-
10Given a payment scheme b : S → R the agents optimization problem is:
max
ω∈Ω
s¯∫
s
¯
u(b(s), ω)ds with corresponding FOC:
s¯∫
s
¯
u(b(s))∂fS|Ω(s|ω)/∂ω(s|ω)ds− w′(ω) = 0.
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well’s Theorem holds also in the principal-agent framework (i.e. fS|Ω %
b
f¯S¯|Ω ⇒
B(ω, fS|Ω) ≤ B(ω, f¯S|Ω)). Together with Theorem 3.3 this imply that local
informativeness is weaker than suﬃciency.
Cororally 3.2. Let fS|Ω, f¯S¯|Ω ∈ D. If fS|Ω %
b
f¯S¯|Ω then fS|Ω %
l-inf
f¯S¯|Ω.
3.3 Information and the Dispersion of Poste-
rior Expectations
Most parts of this section are based on Brandt et al. (2013)
and Brandt et al. (2014). I am grateful to Prof. Dr. Bern-
hard Eckwert, Dr. Burkhard Drees and Dr. Felix Várdy for
these collaborations.
The previous section discussed Blackwell’s suﬃciency criterion. Its intuition
is than an information structure is more informative than another one, if a
signal observation of the latter one is equal to an disturbed signal observation
of the ﬁrst one. Therefore, Blackwell’s criterion is by deﬁnition independent
of the prior belief.
This subsection introduces two diﬀerent notions of informativeness, weak
and strong informativeness, that follow a diﬀerent intuition: the more in-
formative an information system, the more ‘aggressive’ Bayesian updating
and, hence, the more disperse the conditional expectations. Indeed, when
signals are completely uninformative, beliefs are not updated at all. In that
case, the posterior is equal to the prior, and the dispersion of the conditional
expectation is zero. At the other extreme, perfectly informative signals fully
reveal the state of the world. Thus, they induce ‘complete’ updating, which
makes the dispersion of the posterior equal to the dispersion of the underly-
ing states. In between, intermediate levels of informativeness lead to partial
updating and, hence, tend to lead to intermediate levels of dispersion of
posterior beliefs about the expected underlying state.
On the basis of this observation, some recent papers equate informa-
tiveness with the dispersion of conditional expectations. That is, they use
dispersion orderings as full-ﬂedged information concepts (compare Li (2012),
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Ganuza and Penalva (2010) and Eckwert and Zilcha (2008)). These appli-
cations illustrate the usefulness of dispersion orderings of conditional expec-
tations as means to do economic analysis and, in particular, comparative
statics excercises. However, an important question is whether these disper-
sion orderings really qualify as meaningful information criteria. As mentioned
above, a desirable property for any information ranking is the ordinality of
states property (OS).11 Injective (increasing) transformations of the state
space should not aﬀect the informativeness and ranking of information sys-
tems, because the systems reveal the exact same information before and after
the transformation. As shown above, the information concepts of Blackwell
(1951), Lehmann (1988)/Persico (1996) and Kim (1995) satisfy this invari-
ance property. However, the dispersion orders used by Ganuza and Penalva
(2010) and others do not. A second problem with using dispersion orders as
information criteria is that it is not clear what they mean in terms of the
primitives of the model, i.e. the joint distribution of states and signals.
To remedy this problem and better understand the connection between
information and the dispersion of conditional expectations, in this section,
the weakest information criteria inducing some dispersion orders used in the
literature will be derived. The starting points are the two dispersion con-
cepts for conditional expectations of the state studied in Ganuza and Penalva
(2010): supermodular dispersion and mean-preserving spread (MPS) disper-
sion. Then two information criteria are derived, each being compatible with
one of these dispersion orders. The stronger criterion, which is compatible
with supermodular dispersion, is denoted by ‘strong informativeness’ while
the weaker criterion, which is compatible with MPS dispersion, is denoted
by ‘weak informativeness’.
More broadly, this section relates to the extensive literature on the ef-
fects of risk on individual behavior (see, e.g., Leland (1968); Sandmo (1971);
Levhari and Weiss (1974)). In this context, Baker (2006) compares the eﬀect
of higher prior uncertainty versus a more informative signal on optimal de-
11The desirable, but more restrictive property of independence of states (IS), is not
appropriate in this framework, since any non-monotone state transformation does not
respect the underlying order of the state space. Hence, the monotonicity of information
systems, a primitive of the model, gets lost under non-monotone state transformations.
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cisions. For sequential decision problems, she identiﬁes conditions such that
the comparative statics of increasing informativeness are the same as those
of increasing ex ante risk (dispersion of the prior). While Baker establishes
a comparative statics similarity between higher risk and better information,
she does not address the question whether risk and information are system-
atically related. Thus, both her focus and set-up are diﬀerent from this work,
even though the analyses are clearly related.
Closest to this section are the works by Ganuza and Penalva (2010) and
by Eckwert and Zilcha (2008) suggesting that informativeness can simply be
measured by the impact of (normalized) signals on the distribution of condi-
tional expectations. This idea has also been applied in a recent paper by Li
(2012) which tries to identify the eﬀects of information and bias (relatedness
between reviewer and applicant) on expert evaluations in the context of de-
cisions about medical research grants. To separate these eﬀects, one of her
identifying assumptions ranks the variance of the expectations of posterior
beliefs between ‘unrelated’ reviewers and ‘related’ reviewers.
The remainder of the subsection proceeds as follows: section 3.2.1 deﬁnes
and discusses the two dispersion concepts for the expectations of posterior
beliefs that are used as information orders by Ganuza and Penalva (2010).
In section 3.2.2, two informativeness criteria are deﬁned and graphically il-
lustrated. Section 3.2.3 the information orders in section 3.2.2 are related to
the dispersion orders in Section 3.2.1. In section 3.2.4 disentangles the eﬀects
of the prior and the information structure on informativeness and dispersion
of posterior beliefs. Finally, section 3.2.5 concludes.
3.3.1 Supermodular- and MPS-Precision
Ganuza and Penalva (2010) deﬁne informativeness concepts for the class of
information systems with monotone signals. They follow the intuition, that
the more informative an information system, the more aggressive Bayesian
updating and formalize this idea by equating informativeness with the disper-
sion of posterior state expectations. If, in addition, the information systems
are monotone, a greater dispersion of posterior conditional expectation at
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least intuitively implies that signals and states are more correlated, i.e. small
(high) signals are more likeli to co-occur in the state is small (high). it is
meaningful to restrict attention to information systems which are monotone
regardless of the prior (in the sense of Milgrom (1981)), i.e. to information
systems with the MLRP. Moreover, since otherwise a comparison in terms of
dispersion of posterior expectations is not senseful, the signal space as well
as the marginal signal distributions must be equal across the set of informa-
tion systems in consideration. Hence, attention is restricted to normalized
information systems as introduced in section 2.4. Summing up, let Γ(fΩ)
denote the set of information structures with the monotone likelihood ratio
property and normalized signals given the prior belief fΩ ∈ ∆(Ω), i.e.
Γ(fΩ) :=

fS|Ω : [0, 1] × Ω→ R+
∣∣∣∣∣∣
fS|Ω ∈ M with
fS(s) =
∫
Ω
fS|Ω(s|ω)fΩ(ω)dω = 1 ∀ s ∈ [0, 1]

 .
Moreover, deﬁne the set of all normalized information systems with MLRP
by
Γ :=
{
(fS|Ω, fΩ)|fΩ ∈ ∆(Ω) and fS|Ω ∈ Γ(fΩ)
}
. (3.5)
Since signals are normalized, i.e. S = S¯ = [0, 1] for all (fS|Ω, fΩ), (f¯S¯|Ω, f¯Ω) ∈
Γ, notation can be simpliﬁed: the signal set of an normalized information
system is always denoted by S := [0, 1].
Building on Ganuza and Penalva (2010), supermodular- and mean pre-
serving spread (MPS)-precision are deﬁned as follows:
Definition 3.9. Let (fS|Ω, fΩ), (f¯S|Ω, f¯Ω) ∈ Γ.
(i) Information system (fS|Ω, fΩ) is more supermodular (SM) precise than
(f¯S|Ω, f¯Ω), denoted by (fS|Ω, fΩ) %
sm
(f¯S|Ω, f¯Ω), iff EΩ [ω˜|s]− E¯Ω [ω˜|s] is
non-decreasing in s for all s ∈ [0, 1].
(ii) Information system (fS|Ω, fΩ) is more mean preserving spread (MPS)
precise than (f¯S|Ω, fΩ), denoted by (fS|Ω, fΩ) %
mps
(fˆS|Ω, fΩ), iff EΩ [ω˜|s˜]−
EΩ [ω˜] is a MPS of E¯Ω [ω˜|s˜]− E¯Ω [ω˜].
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Note that higher SM-dispersion uniformly raises the slope of the posterior
state expectation as a function of the signal s. Therefore, SM precision
implies MPS precision.
The dispersion of posterior expectations is related to informativeness in
an intuitive sense: the greater the dispersion of posterior expectations the
greater the correlation of signals and states. Indeed, Ganuza and Penalva
(2010) use supermodular dispersion and MPS-dispersion as information con-
cepts. Yet, while these concepts often provide convenient tools of analysis,
they have two major shortcomings. First, the dispersion concepts are not
based on primitives of the model, because they impose restrictions on the ex-
pectations of the posterior state distributions rather than on the information
systems (i.e., the conditional signal distributions or the joint distribution of
states and signals). And secondly, these concepts do not satisfy ordinality of
states property. Even more problematic, a (ordinal) relabeling of the states
that leaves all conditional signal distributions unchanged can turn around
the ordering of information systems. This will be shown in the following
example.
Example 2. Let Ω = [0, 1] and fΩ(ω) = 2ω for all ω ∈ [0, 1]. Consider
the information systems (fS|Ω, fΩ) and (f¯S|Ω, fΩ) given by fS|Ω(s|ω) = 1 +
1
2
(1 − 2s)(1 − 2ω2) and f¯S|Ω(s|ω) = 1 + (1 − 2s)(1 − ω
2)(1 − 3ω2) for all
(s, ω) ∈ [0, 1]2 = S × Ω, respectively. Both information structures have
the monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP). Hence, by Milgrom (1981),
(fS|Ω, fΩ) and (f¯S|Ω, fΩ) are monotone for all prior fΩ on Ω. Moreover, since
fS(s) =
1∫
0
fS|Ω(s|ω)fΩ(ω)dω = 1 =
1∫
0
f¯S|Ω(s|ω)fΩ(ω)dω = f¯S(s)
for all s ∈ [0, 1], follows (fS|Ω, fΩ), (f¯S|Ω, fΩ) ∈ Γ. Computing the conditional
state expectations yields that the diﬀerence of posterior, conditional state
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expectations,
E¯Ω [ω˜|s]− EΩ [ω˜|s] =
1∫
0
ω2(6ω4 − 6ω2 + 1)(1− 2s)dω
=
1− 2s
105
[
(90ω4 − 126ω2 + 35)ω3
]1
ω=0
=
2s− 1
105
,
is (strictly) increasing in s. This implies (f¯S|Ω, fΩ) ≻
sm
(fS|Ω, fΩ) and (f¯S|Ω, fΩ)
≻
mps
(fS|Ω, fΩ).
Now consider the ordinal relabeling of states t : [0, 1] → [0, 1], ω 7→ ω4
and deﬁne x˜ := t(ω˜). Then,
E¯X [x˜|s]− EX [x˜|s] = E¯Ω [t(ω˜)|s]− EΩ [t(ω˜)|s] =
1∫
0
ω5(6ω4 − 6ω2 + 1)(1 − 2s)dω
=
1− 2s
60
[
(36ω4 − 45ω2 + 10)ω6
]1
ω=0
=
1− 2s
60
is (strictly) decreasing in s. Therefore, (fS|t(Ω), ft(Ω)) ≻
sm
(f¯S|t(Ω), ft(Ω)) and
(fS|t(Ω), ft(Ω)) ≻
mps
(f¯S|t(Ω), ft(Ω)).
s s
1 10 0
R R
EX [x˜|s]
E¯X [x˜|s]
EΩ [ω˜|s]
E¯Ω [ω˜|s]
Figure 3.1: Conditional Expectations of ω˜ and x˜ = t(ω˜).
The following proposition compares SM- and MPS-precision with the ear-
lier approaches by Blackwell, Lehmann/Persico and Kim for the case of ﬁxed
priors. In particular, if the prior is ﬁxed and the information structure has
the MLRP, then MPS-precision is weaker than any other informativeness
notion considered above. In contrast, sm-dispersion is neither weaker nor
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stronger than the informativeness concepts by Blackwell, Lehmann/Persico
and Kim.
Proposition 3.5. (i) Let fΩ ∈ ∆(Ω). If the prior belief is fixed accross
information systems, then MPS-precision is strictly weaker than suffi-
ciency, accuracy and local informativeness. Formally,
(fS|Ω, fΩ) %
x
(f¯S|Ω, fΩ) ⇒ (fS|Ω, fΩ) %
mps
(f¯S|Ω, fΩ)
and
(fS|Ω, fΩ) %
mps
(f¯S|Ω, fΩ) 6⇒ (fS|Ω, fΩ) %
x
(f¯S|Ω, fΩ)
for all fS|Ω, f¯S|Ω ∈ Γ(fΩ) if x ∈ {a, b} and for all fS|Ω, f¯S|Ω ∈ Γ(fΩ)∩D
if x = l-inf.
(ii) Let fΩ ∈ ∆(Ω). Even if the prior is fixed accross information systems
is SM-precision neither stronger nor weaker than sufficiency, accuracy
and local informativeness. Formally,
(fS|Ω, fΩ) %
x
(f¯S|Ω, fΩ) 6⇒ (fS|Ω, fΩ) %
sm
(f¯S|Ω, fΩ)
and
(fS|Ω, fΩ) %
sm
(f¯S|Ω, fΩ) 6⇒ (fS|Ω, fΩ) %
x
(f¯S|Ω, fΩ)
for all fS|Ω, f¯S|Ω ∈ Γ if x ∈ {a, b} and for all fS|Ω, f¯S|Ω ∈ Γ ∩ D if
x = li.
This proposition is a combination of existing results.12 Therefore, the
proof is also a combination of those results: First, Ganuza and Penalva
(2006) show that accuracy implies MPS-precision but does not imply SM-
precision. Since suﬃciency implies accuracy (see Cororally 3.1) and since
accuracy and local informativeness are equivalent for information structures
with MLRP (see Jewitt (1997)), this implies that both concepts, suﬃciency
12See Hermelingmeier (2010) and below.
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and local informativeness, imply MPS-precision. This in turn implies that
the information structures in Example 2 are neither ordered in terms of
suﬃciency nor in terms of accuracy/local informativeness,13 Consequently,
neither MPS- nor SM-precision imply any of the other three information
orders.
3.3.2 Strong and Weak Informativeness
In this section two information orders, strong and weak informativeness, are
deﬁned that satisfy the ordinality of states property. Additionally, they are
linked to the dispersion orders of Deﬁnition 3.9. The approach to ranking
the informational content about ω builds on the idea of Ganuza and Penalva
(2010): the greater the dispersion of posterior conditional (state) expectation,
the more correltated are signals and states and ,hence, the more informative is
the information system. As mentioned above, the starting points are the two
dispersion concepts studied in Ganuza and Penalva (2010): supermodular-
and MPS-dispersion. As argued in the previous section 3.1, these concepts
do not satisfy the OS property which causes problems when using them as
informativeness criteria. This problem is solved by the following deﬁnition
of weak and strong informativeness:
Definition 3.10 (Strong andWeak Informativeness). Let (fS|Ω, fΩ), (f¯S|Ω, f¯Ω) ∈
Γ.
(i) Information system (fS|Ω, fΩ) is strongly more informative than (f¯S|Ω, f¯Ω),
denoted by (fS|Ω, fΩ) %
s-inf
(f¯S|Ω, f¯Ω), iff
ω∫
ω
¯
fS,Ω(s, ω
′)− f¯S,Ω(s, ω
′)dω′
13This follows from the fact that sufficiency and accuracy/local informativeness all imply
MPS-precision for fixed but arbitrary prior belief (i.e. the prior is arbitrary but the same
in both information systems). Since the systems considered in example 3 have equal prior
and since their ordering in terms of MPS-precision depends on this prior belief it follows
immediately that those systems cannot be ordered in terms of sufficiency or accuracy/local
informativeness.
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is non-increasing in s ∈ [0, 1] for all ω ∈ Ω.
(ii) Information system (fS|Ω, fΩ) is weakly more informative than (f¯S|Ω, f¯Ω),
denoted by (fS|Ω, fΩ) %
w-inf
(f¯S|Ω, f¯Ω), iff
FS,Ω(s, ω)− sFΩ(ω) ≥ F¯S,Ω(s, ω)− sF¯Ω(ω)
for all (s, ω) ∈ [0, 1]× Ω.
The intuition for the weak informativeness criterion is as follows: Let the
set Ls := [0, s] corresponds to the information that the signal is smaller than
s. According to Milgrom (1981) such information always represent bad news.
Indeed, the conditional state distribution conditional on the information Ls is
dominated by the prior state distribution, because s
[
FΩ|S(ω|Ls)− FΩ(ω)
]
=
FS,Ω(s, ω) − sFΩ(ω) ≥ 0.
14 In the same spirit, Ls is said to be better news
under (fS,Ω, fΩ) than under (f¯S,Ω, f¯Ω), if
FΩ|S(ω|Ls)− FΩ(ω) ≤ F¯Ω|S(ω|Ls)− F¯Ω(ω) ∀ ω ∈ Ω
⇔FS,Ω(s, ω)− sFΩ(ω) ≤ F¯S,Ω(s, ω)− sF¯Ω(ω) ∀ ω ∈ Ω
Hence, deﬁnition 3.10(ii) says that an information system (fS|Ω, fΩ) is weakly
more informative than (f¯S|Ω, f¯Ω), iﬀ any set of small signals, Ls, is worse news
under the former system than under the latter one. Equivalently, all sets of
high signals, S\Ls, are better news under a weakly more informative systems.
To intuitively understand the strong informativeness criterion, notice that
signal s is better news under (fS|Ω, fΩ) than under (f¯S|Ω, f¯Ω), iﬀ FΩ|S(ω|s)−
F¯Ω|S(ω|s) ≤ 0 ∀ ω ∈ Ω. Likewise, an increase in s is a greater improvement
of news under (fS|Ω, fΩ) than under (f¯S|Ω, f¯Ω), iﬀ FΩ|S(ω|s) − F¯Ω|S(ω|s) is
non-increasing in s ∀ ω ∈ Ω. Now observe that FΩ|S(ω|s) − F¯Ω|S(ω|s) =
ω∫
ω
¯
fS,Ω(s, ω
′) − f¯S,Ω(s, ω
′)dω′, because signals are uniformly distributed on
14The inequality FS,Ω(s, ω) − sFΩ(ω) ≥ 0 is implied by the MLRP: if FS|Ω has the
MLRP, then FS,Ω(s, ω) is a concave in s all ω ∈ Ω. Since FS,Ω(s, ω) = sFΩ(ω) for s = 0
and s = 1 this implies FS,Ω(s, ω) ≥ sFΩ(ω) for all (s, ω) ∈ S × Ω.
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[0,1]. Hence, deﬁnition 3(i) says that an information system (fS|Ω, fΩ) is
strongly more informative than (f¯S|Ω, f¯Ω), if and only if a rise in s consti-
tutes a greater improvement of news under (fS|Ω, fΩ) than under (f¯S|Ω, f¯Ω).
As their names suggest, the strong criterion implies the weak criterion.
This follows from the deﬁnition of (fS|Ω, fΩ) %
s-inf
(f¯S|Ω, f¯Ω) and the fact that
1∫
0
ω∫
ω
¯
[fS,Ω(s, ω
′)− fΩ(ω)]−
[
f¯S,Ω(s, ω
′)− f¯Ω(ω
′)
]
dω′ds = 0.
For an illustration of weak and strong informativeness consider the fol-
lowing example which highlights their diﬀerences.
Example 3. Suppose Ω = [0, 1] and ﬁx fΩ(ω) = 1 ∀ ω.
(i) First, consider the family of information systems (f θS|Ω, fΩ)θ∈[0,1] de-
ﬁned by
f θS|Ω(s|ω) = 1 + θ(1− 2s)(1− 2ω).
Then, (s˜, ω˜)θ∈[0,1] is distributed according to the Farlie-Gumbel-Morgenstern
copula F θS,Ω(s, ω) = Cθ(s, ω) = sω + θsω(1 − s)(1 − ω). In particular,
this implies f θS(s) = 1 for all s ∈ [0, 1] and θ ∈ [0, 1]. Moreover, since
∂/∂s
(
fθ
S|Ω
(s|ω)/fθ
S|Ω
(s|ω′)
)
= 4θ(ω−ω′)/(fθ
S|Ω
(s|ω′))2 ≤ 0 for all ω′ ≥ ω, f θS|Ω has the
MLRP and, hence, (f θS|Ω, fΩ) ∈ Γ.
Next, observe that an increase in θ uniformly raises (lowers) the slope of
f θS|Ω in s for ω high (low). Since f
θ
S|Ω(s|ω) is linear in s for all ω ∈ Ω, this
implies for θ ≥ θ¯ that f θS|Ω(s|ω) − f
θ¯
S|Ω(s, ω) is increasing (decreasing) in s
for ω high (low). Consequently, (f θS|Ω, fΩ) %
s-inf
(f θ¯S|Ω, fΩ). Formally,
Dω(s) :=
ω∫
0
f θS,Ω(s, ω
′)− f θ¯S,Ω(s, ω
′)dω′ = (θ − θ¯)(1− 2s)(ω − ω2)
is decreasing in s whenever θ ≥ θ¯. Hence, the family (f θS|Ω, fΩ)θ∈[0,1] is ordered
in terms of strong informativeness: (f θS|Ω, fΩ) %
s-inf
(f θ¯S|Ω, fΩ) ⇔ θ ≥ θ¯.
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1
0
R
(θ − θ¯)(ω − ω2)
Dω(s) =
ω∫
0
f θS,Ω(s, ω
′)− f θ¯S,Ω(s, ω
′)dω′
s′ s
F θS,Ω(s
′, ω)− F θ¯S,Ω(s
′, ω) =
s′∫
0
Dω(s)ds ≥ 0
(θ¯ − θ)(ω − ω2)
Figure 3.2: Farlie-Gumbel-Morgenstern Copula.
(ii) Now consider the family of information systems ((fϑS|Ω,Ω, S), fΩ)ϑ∈[0,1]
with
fϑS|Ω(s|ω) = [1 + ϑ(ϑ ln(s) ln(1− ω)− ln(s(1− ω))− 1)] e
−ϑ ln(s) ln(1−ω).
Then, (s˜, ω˜)ϑ are distributed according to the Gumbel-Barnett copula F
ϑ
S,Ω(s, ω) =
Cϑ(s, ω) = s − s(1 − ω)e
−ϑ ln(s) ln(1−ω). This implies that fϑS (s) = 1 for all
s ∈ [0, 1] and ϑ ∈ [0, 1]. In order to proof that fS|Ω has the MLRP consider
fϑS|Ω(s|ω)
fϑS|Ω(s|ω
′)
=
1 + ϑ(ϑ ln(s) ln(1− ω)− ln(s(1− ω))− 1)
1 + ϑ(ϑ ln(s) ln(1− ω′)− ln(s(1− ω′))− 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:k(s,ω,ω′)
e−ϑ ln(s) ln(1−ω)
e−ϑ ln(s) ln(1−ω′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:l(s,ω,ω′)
.
Observe that for ω′ ≥ ω it follows that
∂k(s, ω, ω′)
∂s
=
ϑ3 [ln(1− ω′)− ln(1− ω)]
[1 + ϑ(ϑ ln(s) ln(1− ω′)− ln(s(1− ω′))− 1)]2 s
≤ 0
and that
∂l(s, ω, ω′)
∂s
=
ϑ [ln(1− ω′)− ln(1− ω)]
s
l(s, ω, ω′) ≤ 0.
Since l(s, ω, ω′) ≥ 0 and k(s, ω, ω′) ≥ 0 for all (s, ω, ω′) ∈ S × Ω2,15 these
15Since ex ≥ 0 for all x ∈ R, it is obvious that l(s, ω, ω′) ≥ 0 for all (s, ω, ω′) ∈ S × Ω2.
Then, k(s, ω, ω′) ≥ 0 for all (s, ω, ω′) ∈ S ×Ω2 follows from the fact that k(s, ω, ω′) is the
product of the likelihood ratio f
ϑ
S|Ω(s|ω)/fϑ
S|Ω(s|ω
′) ≥ 0 and 1/l(s,ω,ω′) ≥ 0.
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observations imply
∂fϑS|Ω(s|ω)/fϑ
S|Ω
(s|ω′)
∂s
= k(s, ω, ω′)
∂l(s, ω, ω′)
∂s
+ l(s, ω, ω′)
∂k(s, ω, ω′)
∂s
≤ 0
which shows that fϑS|Ω has the MLRP and, hence, (f
ϑ
S|Ω, fΩ) ∈ Γ.
Concerning informativeness, observe that Cϑ(s, ω) is increasing in ϑ and,
hence, (fϑS|Ω, fΩ) %
w-inf
(f ϑ¯S|Ω, fΩ) ⇔ ϑ ≥ ϑ¯. However, in constrast to the
information system considered in (i), fϑS|Ω(s|ω) is not linear in s or ω and,
hence, it depends on ω and s whether an increase in ϑ increases or decreases
the slope of fϑS|Ω(s|ω). Consequently, (f
ϑ
S|Ω, fΩ)ϑ∈[0,1] can not be ordered by
strong informativeness.16
0
R
Dω(s) =
ω∫
0
fϑS,Ω(s, ω
′)− f ϑ¯S,Ω(s, ω
′)dω′
s
sˆ
FϑS,Ω(s
′, ω)− F ϑ¯S,Ω(s
′, ω) =
s′∫
0
Dω(s)ds ≥ 0
s′ 1
Figure 3.3: Gumbel-Barnett-Copula.
The following proposition establishes that none of the two information
criteria rank an information system above the fully informative system or
below the fully uninformative one.
Proposition 3.6. The weak and the strong informativeness criterion satisfy
(P0′), (P1)-(P3) and OS.
Suppose for the moment that fΩ = f¯Ω. Since signals are already nor-
malized, this implies that the marginal distributions of states and signals
are identical across information systems. Hence, the strong and weak in-
formation criteria can be expressed in terms of properties of the copulas
16For a formal treatment consider the continuation of this example below.
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associated with (s˜, ω˜), CS,Ω(s, v) = FS,Ω(s, F
−1
Ω (v)), (s, v) ∈ [0, 1] × [0, 1].
Since CS,Ω(s, FΩ(ω)) = FS,Ω(s, ω), deﬁnition 3.10 implies
(fS|Ω, fΩ) %
w-inf
(f¯S|Ω, f¯Ω)⇔ CS,Ω(s, FΩ(ω)) ≥ C¯S,Ω(s, F¯Ω(ω)) for all (s, ω) ∈ [0, 1]× Ω,
while
(fS|Ω, fΩ) %
s-inf
(f¯S|Ω, f¯Ω)⇔ CS,Ω(s, FΩ(ω))− C¯S,Ω(s, F¯Ω(ω)) is concave in s ∀ ω ∈ Ω.
As examples for these characterizations of weak and strong informativeness in
terms of properties of copulas consider again the Farlie-Gumbel-Morgenstern
copula and the Gumbel-Barnett-Copula.
Example 4 (Continued). (i) Again, consider the family of information sys-
tems (f θS|Ω, fΩ)θ∈[0,1] as deﬁned in Example 3. From the ﬁrst part of Exam-
ple 3 it is (f θS|Ω, fΩ) %
s-inf
(f θ¯S|Ω, fΩ) ⇔ θ ≥ θ¯ ⇔
∂2
∂s2
[Cθ(s, ω)− Cθ¯(s, ω)] =
−2ω(1− ω)(θ − θ¯) ≥ 0.
(ii) Next, consider again the family ((fϑS|Ω,Ω, S), fΩ)ϑ∈[0,1] as deﬁned above.
From the ﬁrst part of this example it is known that (fϑS|Ω, fΩ) %
w-inf
(f ϑ¯S|Ω, fΩ)
⇔ ϑ ≥ ϑ¯. Moreover, without a formal proof, it was claimed the ϑ ≥ ϑ¯ 6⇒
(fϑS|Ω, fΩ) %
s-inf
(f ϑ¯, fΩ). With the characterization of strong informativeness
in terms of copulas, the formal proof of the statement is quite easy: For ϑ > ϑ¯
it is ∂
2
∂s2
(Cϑ(s, ω)−Cϑ¯(s, ω))
>
≤ 0⇔ s
<
≥ sˆ :=
(
ϑ¯(ϑ¯ ln(1−ω)−1)
ϑ(ϑ ln(1−ω)−1)
)− 1
(ϑ−ϑ¯) ln(1−ω)
≥ 0.
And hence, (fϑS|Ω, fΩ) 6%
s-inf
(f ϑ¯S|Ω, fΩ).
Relating strong and weak informativeness with the dispersion of
posterior expectations
Deﬁnition 3.9 introduced two dispersion concepts for the comparison of pos-
terior conditional (state) expectations. The next proposition characterizes
the relationship between strong and weak informativeness and these disper-
sion concepts.
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Proposition 3.7. Let fS|Ω ∈ Γ(fΩ) and f¯S|Ω ∈ Γ(f¯Ω).
(i) (fS|Ω, fΩ) %
s-inf
(f¯S|Ω, f¯Ω) ⇔ (fS|t(Ω), ft(Ω)) %
sm
(f¯S|t(Ω), f¯t(Ω)) for all strictly
increasing t : Ω→ R.
(ii) (fS|Ω, fΩ) %
w-inf
(f¯S|Ω, f¯Ω) ⇔ (fS|t(Ω), ft(Ω)) %
mps
(f¯S|t(Ω), f¯t(Ω)) for all
strictly increasing t : Ω→ R.
Proposition 3.7 establishes a tight relationship between information or-
ders and dispersion orders of conditional expectations. Broadly speaking,
under a more informative structure the posterior state densities react more
sensitively to changes of signals and, hence, the conditional expectation of
the state (or monotone function thereof) is more dispersed. In other words,
conditional expectations are more dispersed when systems are more informa-
tive.
One may of a relabeling of states as a strictly increasing utility function
deﬁned on the state space. With this interpretaation in mind, Proposition
3.7 has the important implication that even when expected utility maximiz-
ers have diﬀerent increasing vNM-preferences and diﬀerent priors, they will
nevertheless share a common view on dispersion comparisons with respect
to conditional expected state utilities if the information systems in question
can be ordered by strong or weak informativeness. Even stronger, regardless
of preferences and priors,
• an information system becomes strongly more informative if and only
if a higher signal induces a larger gain in expected utility.
• an information system becomes weakly more informative if and only if
(normalized) conditional expected utilities become more MPS-dispered.
Comparison with other informativeness concepts
This part deals with the question how strong and weak informativeness relate
to the other informativeness concepts considered in this work. Since all
informativeness concepts in section 3.2 satisﬁes at least OS, the Propositions
3.5 and 3.7 imply that for equal but arbitrary prior, weak informativeness is
weaker than the criteria by Blackwell, Lehmann/Persico and Kim.
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Cororally 3.3. Let fΩ ∈ ∆(Ω).
(i) (fS|Ω, fΩ) %
x
(f¯S|Ω, fΩ) ⇒ (fS|Ω, fΩ) %
w-inf
(f¯S|Ω, fΩ) for all fS|Ω, f¯S|Ω ∈
Γ(fΩ) and x ∈ {s-inf, a, b}.
(ii) (fS|Ω, fΩ) %
l-inf
(f¯S|Ω, fΩ) ⇒ (fS|Ω, fΩ) %
w-inf
(f¯S|Ω, fΩ) for all fS|Ω, f¯S|Ω ∈
Γ(fΩ) ∩ D.
In contrast, for strong informativeness the same arguments (Propositions
3.5 and 3.7 plus OS of the informativeness concpets by Blackwell, Lehmann/
Persico and Kim) implies that it is neither stronger nor weaker than the
criteria by Blackwell, Lehmann/Persico and Kim.
The value of strong and weak informativeness
The next natural question is how weak and strong informativeness relate to a
decision maker’s ex ante expected utility. Indeed, weak informativeness plus
equal priors characterizes higher ex ante expected welfare for all supermod-
ular decision problems. In order to deﬁne supermodular decision problems,
assume for the moment A ⊆ R. Then, a decsision problem is supermodular
if the indirect elementary utility function v(a, ω) = u(o(a, ω)) is supermod-
ular in (a, ω). An indirect elementary utility function v : A × Ω → R is
supermodular in (a, ω) if and only if the incremental returns
r(ω) := v(a′, ω)− v(a, ω)
is non-decreasing in ω for all a′, a ∈ A with a′ ≥ a.17 Denote the class
of supermodular indirect utility functions by R. Simple examples for su-
permodular objective functions are the proﬁt function of a ﬁrm with risky
output or a coordination game in which one player is nature which randomly
chooses an action. More examples can for instance be found in the books by
Topkis (1998) and Cooper (1999).
17Remark: If v : A×Ω→ R is twice differentiable in both arguments, supermodularity
is also characterized by a positive cross-derivative, i.e. ∂
2v(a,ω)
∂a∂ω
≥ 0.
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Theorem 3.4. Let fS|Ω ∈ Γ(fΩ) and f¯S|Ω ∈ Γ(f¯Ω). The information system
(fS|Ω, fΩ) is more valuable than the system (f¯S|Ω, f¯Ω) for all decision makers
with supermodular utility functions if and only if (fS|Ω, fΩ) %
w-inf
(f¯S|Ω, f¯Ω)
and FΩ(ω) = F¯Ω(ω) ∀ ω ∈ Ω. Formally,[
V ((fS|Ω, fΩ), a
∗, v) ≥ V ((f¯S|Ω, f¯Ω), a¯
∗, v)
for all supermodular v : A× Ω→ R
]
⇔
[
(fS|Ω, fΩ) %
w-inf
(f¯S|Ω, f¯Ω)
and FΩ(ω) = F¯Ω(ω) ∀ ω ∈ Ω
]
.
An increase in weak informativeness plus equal priors increases the joint
probability of signals smaller (greater) than s and states smaller (greater)
than ω, FS,Ω(s, ω) (1− FS(s)− FΩ(ω) + FS,Ω(s, ω)). Hence, the ability to
coordinate small (high) actions with small (high) states increases as weak
informativeness increases and the prior keeps constant. If the indirect utility
is supermodular in (a, ω), exactly this coordination of actions and states is
the goal of the decision maker. Hence, weak informativeness plus equal priors
characterize more valuable for all decision makers with supermodular payoﬀ
functions.
Remark. If the prior is fixed the weak information criterion simplifies to
FS,Ω(s, ω) ≥ F¯S,Ω(s, ω) for all (s, ω) ∈ S×Ω. This is equivalent to the MIO-
ND condition in the theorem by Athey and Levin (2001). For fixed priors,
their result is slightly more general than proposition 3.4. They characterize
‘more valuable’ for utility functions with various types of incremental returns
(i.e. different curvatures of r(ω) = v(a, ω) − v(a′, ω), a, a′ ∈ A, a ≥ a′)
in terms of their MIO condition. In particular, for the utility functions with
non-decreasing incremental returns, i.e. supermodular utility functions, their
MIO-ND condition is equal to weak informativeness for fixed priors.
Now consider strong informativeness. Since weak informativeness is im-
plied by strong informativeness, a direct consequence of Theorem 3.4 is that
strong informativeness is suﬃcient to guarantee higher ex ante expected wel-
fare for all decision makers with supermodular preferences. In contrast to
this, the next Proposition is an impossibility result which shows that, if the
prior is ﬁxed, there exists no class of utility functions such that the strong
information criterion is necessary for a comparison of information systems in
terms of their ex ante value for this class of utilities. Formally,
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Proposition 3.8. Let fΩ ∈ ∆(Ω) and fS|Ω, f¯S|Ω ∈ Γ(fΩ). There exists no
class of payoff functions U such that:
V ((fS|Ω, fΩ), a
∗, u) ≥ V ((f¯S|Ω, fΩ), a¯
∗, u) ∀ u ∈ U ⇒ (fS|Ω, fΩ) %
s-inf
(f¯S,Ω, fΩ). (3.6)
There is no class of utility functions such that the strong informativeness
criterion is a necessary condition for an order of information systems with re-
spect to their ex ante value. The reason is that strong informativeness is not
weaker than suﬃciency, which in turn is equivalent to an order of information
systems in terms of their ex ante value for all expected utility maximizers.
In other words, strong informativeness is too restrictive for being necessary
for an order of information systems in terms of their ex ante value.
The Role of the Prior and the Information Structure
The informativeness and dispersion properties of an information system are
determined jointly by the prior and the structure of an information system.
In particular, the informativeness of an information system with a ﬁxed struc-
ture typically varies under diﬀerent priors. Informativeness depends on the
statistical correlation between signals and states of nature which changes
with the prior even when the information structure remains the same. Con-
sider, for example, an information structure fS|Ω that associates with all
states ω ≤ ω0 the same conditional signal distribution, while it associates
diﬀerent conditional signal distributions with states ω ≥ ω0. If the prior
fΩ is concentrated on [ω
¯
, ω0] then the information system (fS|Ω, fΩ) is fully
uninformative, while it becomes (partially) informative otherwise. Hence, it
is important look at both - the impact of the prior on the informativeness of
an information system while the structure is ﬁxed (testing the structure for
diﬀerent prior) and, conversely, the impact of the structure on the informa-
tiveness of the system while keeping the prior ﬁxed. For this purpose, the
analysis ﬁrst looks at the impact of a change in the prior while the informa-
tion structure is ﬁxed. Next, the prior is ﬁxed and the analysis disentangles
the impact of the information structure on the informativeness of the system.
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Keeping the Information Structure ﬁxed
Intuitively, if the prior becomes more dispersed, e.g., in the sense of a
mean-preserving spread or fatter tails, then a high signal constitutes better
news due to the greater upward potential oﬀered by the prior distribution.
Similarly, as the downward potential of the prior has also increased, a low
signal constitutes worse news. If this intuition is correct, then a more dis-
persed prior should lead to higher dispersion of the information system. This
can, however, be quite misleading, as is demonstrated by the following ex-
ample. The example illustrates that under a ﬁxed information structure,
fS|Ω, a robust relationship between the dispersion of the prior, fΩ, and the
informativeness of the associated information system, (fS|Ω, fΩ), does not ex-
ist. More precisely, a more dispersed prior does not necessarily lead to more
dispersion of the conditional expectation, or higher informativeness of the
system. Indeed, it will be shown that, for suitably chosen (fS|Ω, fΩ), a mean
preserving spread (MPS) of the prior raises the expectation of any monotone
increasing transformation t : Ω → R of ω˜ conditional on the lowest signal
s = 0. This implies, of course, that an information system with structure
fS|Ω does not become more MPS-disperse or weakly more informative under
a more MPS dispersed prior. A fortiori, the system does not become strongly
more informative.
Example 5. Let fΩ, f¯Ω ∈ ∆Ω and assume that f¯Ω diﬀers from fΩ by a MPS,
i.e. EΩ [ω˜] = E¯Ω [ω˜] and
ω∫
ω
¯
FΩ(ω
′)dω′ ≤
ω∫
ω
¯
F¯Ω(ω
′)dω′ for all ω ∈ Ω. Further
assume that there exists ωˆ ∈ (ω
¯
, ω¯) such that FΩ : Ω→ R is strictly concave
and F¯Ω is strictly convex on [ω
¯
, ωˆ] (cf. Figure 3.4 below).
Deﬁne ρ(ω) := FΩ(ω)/FΩ(ωˆ) and ρ¯(ω) := F¯Ω(ω)/F¯Ω(ωˆ). Clearly, ρ(ω
¯
) = ρ¯(ω
¯
) = 0
and ρ(ωˆ) = ρ¯(ωˆ) = 1. Since ρ(ω) is strictly concave and ρ¯(ω) is strictly
convex on [ω
¯
, ωˆ] this implies
ρ(ω) > ρ¯(ω) ∀ ω ∈ (ω
¯
, ωˆ).
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ω
¯
ω¯ωˆ
FΩ
F¯Ω
Figure 3.4: FΩ and F¯Ω.
The information structure is deﬁned as follows: Let ζ : Ω→ [0, 1] with
ζ(ω) =
{
0 if ω ∈ [ω
¯
, ωˆ]
1 if ω ∈ (ωˆ, ω¯].
Then the information structure is given by
fS|Ω(s|ω) = 1 + ζ(ω)β(s), (3.7)
where β : [0, 1]→ [−1, 1] is an increasing function with β(0) = −1, β(1) = 1,
and
1∫
0
β(s)ds = 0. Therefore, the ratio
fS|Ω(s|ω)
fS|Ω(s|ω′)
=
1 + ζ(ω)β(s)
1 + ζ(ω′)β(s)
=
{
1 if ω, ω′ ∈ [ω
¯
, ωˆ] or ω, ω′ ∈ (ωˆ, ω¯]
1
1+β(s)
if ω ∈ [ω
¯
, ωˆ] and ω′ ∈ (ωˆ, ω¯]
is (weakly) decreasing in s for all ω ≤ ω′ and, hence, the information structure
has the MLRP. Finally, to make sure that the signals ex ante are uniformly
distributed, the signals need to be normalized under both priors (compare
chapter 2). For this purpose deﬁne
s˜n := FS(s˜) and ˜¯s
n := F¯S(s˜),
where the marginal cdf’s of the signals, FS : S → [0, 1] and F¯S : S → [0, 1],
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are deﬁned as in equation (2.6).
Now consider the normalized signal realization sn = 0 = s¯n, which corre-
sponds to s = 0 = s¯. Equation (3.7) implies
FΩ|Sn(ω|s
n = 0) = FΩ|S(ω|s = 0) =
ω∫
ω
¯
fS|Ω(ω
′|s = 0)dω′
(3.7)
=
1
FΩ(ωˆ)
min{ω,ωˆ}∫
ω
¯
fΩ(ω
′)dω′ =
{
ρ(ω) if ω ≤ ωˆ
1 else
≥
{
ρ¯(ω) if ω ≤ ωˆ
1 else
=
1
F¯Ω(ωˆ)
min{ω,ωˆ}∫
ω
¯
f¯Ω(ω
′)dω′
(3.7)
=
ω∫
ω
¯
f¯S|Ω(ω
′|s¯ = 0)dω′ = F¯Ω|S(ω|s¯ = 0) = F¯Ω|Sn(ω|s¯
n = 0).
Hence, F¯Ω|Sn(·|s¯ = 0) strictly dominates FΩ|Sn(·|s
n = 0) in the sense of
ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance. This implies
EΩ [ω˜|s
n = 0]− EΩ [ω˜] < E¯Ω [ω˜|s¯
n = 0]− E¯Ω [ω˜] .
Thus, conditional on the lowest signal, the riskier distribution has a higher
expectation than the less risky one. This shows that E¯Ω [ω˜|˜¯s
n]− E¯Ω [ω˜] is not
a MPS of EΩ [ω˜|s˜
n]− EΩ [ω˜] and, hence, (fS|Ω, f¯Ω) 6%
w-inf
(fS|Ω, fΩ).
The intuition behind the result is that, conditional on the lowest signal,
the riskier distribution dominates the less risky distribution in the ﬁrst-order
sense. According to the information structure in (3.7), under the lowest
signal all conditional probability density is shifted proportionally towards
[ω
¯
, ω1]. By assumption, f¯Ω is increasing and fΩ is decreasing on [ω
¯
, ω1]. Under
f¯Ω, therefore, high states beneﬁt more from the conditional probability shift
than low states; and under fΩ, low states beneﬁt more than high states. This
explains why FΩ|Sn(·|0) dominates FΩ|Sn(·|0) in terms of ﬁrst-order stochastic
dominance.
The example shows that a MPS of the prior does not necessarily result
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in more MPS-dispersion of the conditional expectations and, hence, does
not result in an increase in terms of weak informativeness. The same holds
true with respect to sm-dispersion and strong informativeness, because sm-
dispersion and strong informativeness are stronger than MPS-dispersion and
weak informativeness, respectively.
Randomizing the Prior
The above example has shown that a more dispersed prior does not necessar-
ily translate into higher dispersion of the conditional expectation or higher
informativeness of an information system. In this section it will be shown that
some such transformations of the prior do have analogues in terms of disper-
sion and informativeness. Consider two information systems with the same
structure fS|Ω, and assume that these systems can be ranked with respect
to (weak or strong) informativeness. Below it is shown that ‘randomiza-
tion’ of the priors yields a new information system with intermediate (weak
or strong) informativeness and dispersion, respectively. To ensure that this
is a meaningful exercise, ﬁrst it is established that, for a ﬁxed information
structure, fS|Ω, the projection of Γ on the priors yields a convex set.
Lemma 3.2. The set
∆(fS|Ω) :=
{
fΩ ∈ ∆Ω|(fS|Ω, fΩ) ∈ Γ
}
of all priors of information systems in Γ with structure fS|Ω is convex.
For given fΩ, f¯Ω ∈ ∆(fS|Ω), fˆΩ := αfΩ + (1− α)f¯Ω is called ‘randomized’
prior.18 The next proposition shows that the process of randomizing the
prior of two ordered information systems with the same structure leads to an
intermediate level of informativeness.
Proposition 3.9. Let fΩ, f¯Ω ∈ ∆(fS|Ω), α ∈ [0, 1], and define fˆΩ := αfΩ +
(1 − α)f¯Ω. If (fS|Ω, fΩ) %
x
(fS|Ω, f¯Ω) then (fS|Ω, fΩ) %
x
(fS|Ω, fˆΩ) %
x
(fS|Ω, f¯Ω)
for x ∈ {w-inf, s-inf}.
18Such ‘randomized’ prior play an important role in the theory on Knigthian uncertainty.
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In combination with Proposition 3.7, Proposition 3.9 implies that the
system (fS|Ω, fˆΩ) with a randomized prior not only exhibits intermediate
informativeness but also intermediate dispersion of posterior conditional ex-
pectations.
Keeping the Prior ﬁxed
This section studies information structures that can be ordered in terms
of informativeness for ﬁxed priors. In economic applications, signals are
often generated from the states of nature by adding a noise term, i.e., s˜ =
ω + ǫ˜. In such a setting, the conditional dispersion of the signal coincides
with the dispersion of the noise term. The signal is fully informative, if
it has zero conditional dispersion (i.e., when the noise term is a constant).
Otherwise, higher conditional signal dispersion reduces the informativeness
of the system, because it makes the signal noisier. Thus, with an additive
information structure in mind, it seems that conditional signal dispersion is
inversely related to the informativeness of the signal.
Yet, in more general informational settings, this intuition is no longer ac-
curate. For instance, a system is uninformative whenever all states generate
the same conditional signal distribution. In that case, conditional signal dis-
persion and informativeness are unrelated. The following considers suitably
restricted classes of information structures within which informativeness and
conditional signal dispersion are, in fact, inversely related. These classes in-
clude all randomizations (i.e., convex combinations) of pairs of information
systems with identical priors that can be ranked in terms of informativeness.
Following similar lines as in the proof of lemma 3.2, it can be veriﬁed that
Γ(fΩ), the set of normalized information structures with MLRP, is a convex
set.
Lemma 3.3. For fixed prior fΩ ∈ ∆Ω, the set Γ(fΩ) of all normalized in-
formation structures with MLRP is convex.
By Lemma 3.3, if the prior is ﬁxed then the set of normalized structures
with MLRP is closed under ‘randomization’. Moreover, randomizing the
signals of any two systems (with structures in Γ(fΩ)) that can be ranked in
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terms of informativeness yields a new information system with intermediate
informativeness and intermediate dispersion.
Proposition 3.10. Let fS|Ω, f¯S|Ω ∈ Γ(fΩ), α ∈ [0, 1], and define fˆS|Ω :=
αfS|Ω+(1−α)f¯S|Ω. If (fS|Ω, fΩ) %
x
(f¯S|Ω, fΩ) then (fS|Ω, fΩ) %
x
(fˆS|Ω, fΩ) and
(fˆS|Ω, fΩ) %
x
(f¯S|Ω, fΩ) for x ∈ {w-inf, s-inf}.
In combination with Proposition 3.7, Proposition 3.10 implies that the
system with the randomized information structure exhibits intermediate dis-
persion. Moreover, as any system (fS|Ω, fΩ) is strongly more informative
than the uninformative system (f 0S0|Ω, fΩ), it follows from Proposition 3.10
that randomizing the structure of any information system with the uninfor-
mative strutcture f 0S0|Ω reduces both informativeness and dispersion of the
system. This holds true for both dispersion concepts in Deﬁnition 3.9 and
both informativeness concepts in Deﬁnition 3.10.
3.4 Concluding Remarks
This chapter presented some fundamental and desirable properties of infor-
mativenss criteria and introduced diﬀerent notions of informativeness. Black-
well’s suﬃciency criterion (Blackwell (1951, 1953)) is statistically motivated
and it is based on the idea of that a signal observation of a less informa-
tive system is equal to the distorted observation of a more informative sys-
tem. Suﬃciency is linked with the value of information through the strong
equivalence that an information system is suﬃcient for another one if and
only if every expected utility maximizer is better of under the ﬁrst system
than under the latter one. Since suﬃciency is very restrictive, Lehmann
(1988)/Persico (1996, 2000) and Kim (1995) proposed weaker criteria which
link informativeness with the value of information for smaller classes of ex-
pected utility maximizers. All these three criteria are from the traditional
literature on economics where the prior belief is typically kept ﬁxed. In con-
trast, in the second part of the chapter it is argued that informativeness is
jointly determined by an information structure and the prior belief. In or-
der to take this into account two new information criteria, weak and strong
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informativeness (Brandt et al. (2013, 2014)), are deﬁned which are based on
the idea, the more informative an information system the more spread out
are the posterior conditional state expectations. It is shown that, if the prior
is ﬁxed again, these criteria are more valuable for all decision makers with
supermodular preferences.
Chapter 4
The Value of Information
As mentioned earlier, a decision maker cares about an information system
only in so far as his wellbeing is aﬀected. This chapter studies the impact
of information on individual ex ante expected utility in diﬀerent economic
frameworks. In particular, the current chapter deals with the value of in-
formation. Recall from Deﬁnition 3.2 that an information system is more
valuable for a decision maker if it delivers him higher ex ante expected util-
ity. In particular, for a decision maker with indirect utility v : A × Ω → R
and prior belief fΩ is an information system (fS|Ω, fΩ) more valuable than an
information system (f¯S¯|Ω, fΩ) iﬀ
V ((fS|Ω, fΩ), a
∗, v) ≥ V ((f¯S¯|Ω, fΩ), a¯
∗, v),
where V ((fS|Ω, fΩ), a
∗, v) and V ((fS|Ω, fΩ), a
∗, v) denote the ex ante expected
utilities of an agent with indirect utility v under the systems (fS|Ω, fΩ) and
(f¯S¯|Ω, fΩ), respectively.
19 This notion of ‘more valuable’ deﬁnes a preorder
on the set of information structures.
It is quite intuitive that better information lead to higher welfare, because
better information reduces the risk to a larger extent and, hence, improves
decision making. Conversely, it is not so clear when more valuable (for a
certain class of decision makers) implies more informative in the some sense.
The current chapter studies this in two diﬀerent economic frameworks.
19Compare Def. 3.2.
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First, in section 4.1 the value of costly information is analyzed. In this
framework a more precise information system reduces the decision makers
budget. Therefore, increasing informativeness has two contrary eﬀects: a
precision eﬀect and a budget eﬀect. The precision eﬀect is that ‘better’
information improves the decision maker’s choice and, therefore, increases
his expected utility. The budget eﬀect decreases the decision maker’s budget
and, hence, has negative impact on the decision maker’s expected utility.
Secondly, section 4.2 studies the value of information in a complete risk
sharing market. For this purpose, section 4.2.1 presents conditions under
which risk avers consumers and ﬁrms fully insure. Building on this, section
4.2.2 shows that in the presence of eﬃcient and complete risk sharing markets
and if the the productivity is state-independent, then the value of information
is negative for all risk avers decision makers. This is a generalization of the
result by Schlee (2001) to an production economy with risky endowments.
These two environment have in common that the decision makers’ sets
of feasible actions are not independent of the underlying information sys-
tem. In the ﬁrst framework information are costly and, hence, the choice of
an information system reduces the decision makers’ budget which, in turn,
reduces the decision makers’ possible payoﬀs. In the second framework the
prices for state-contigent claims depent on both: the information system and
the particular signal realization which, in turn, changes the decision mak-
ers’ set of feasible consumption bundles. Consequently, information has a
direct impact on the decision makers’ budget and, hence, on his set of fea-
sible payoﬀs/consumption bundles in both frameworks under consideration.
Therefore, it is not clear whether the impact of information on individual ex
ante expected utility is positive or negative.
However, in a more simple framework where the set of possible actions
is independent of the information system itsself and the signal realizations,
Blackwell’s Theorem (Theorem 3.1, Blackwell (1951, 1953)) etablishes that
Blackwell’s suﬃciency criterion and the order by Bonnenblust et al. (1949)
are equivalent: An information structure is more suﬃcient for another if and
only if the former one is more valuable than the latter one for all expected
utility maximizers. For special classes of decision makers and information
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systems similar results are valid for the informativeness concepts of Lehmann
(1988)/Persico (1996) and Kim (1995). Crucial for these results is, that the
set of possible actions is independent of underlying information system and
the signal realization. Eckwert and Zilcha (2000) relax this assumption and
look at the value of information in production economies. In their model,
better information not only limits the risk sharing opportunities, i.e. the set
of possible actions, but also improves the input allocation in the economy.
Therefore, the impact of better information on welfare is ambigious - it could
be positive or negative. However, they show that in the absence of risk
sharing markets Blackwell’s Theorem remains valid in their framework.
In contrast, Hirshleifer (1971) was the ﬁrst who demonstrated that in
equilibrium information might make everybody worse oﬀ. He considers a
small exchange economy with a single consumption good, risk avers agents
and complete markets for state-contingent claims. Each agent is endowed
with a risky endowment of the consumption good. The agents can share
risks by trading state-contingent claims in complete markets before the state
of the world is realized. If they were perfectly informed about the state be-
fore the markets for state-contingent claims are open, no trade at all will
take place and the agents consume according to their endowments. There-
fore, from an ex ante perspective, perfect information make the agents worse
oﬀ by breaking down the risk sharing markets. Schlee (2001) generalized
Hirshleifer’s result to an exchange economy with one commodity and com-
plete and competitive risk sharing markets. Green (1981) examines a model
with futures markets (without production). And in partial-equilibrium mod-
els, the failure of Blackwell’s result has been shown by Schlee (1996) for a
monopoly with random demand and by Sulganik and Zilcha (1996) for an
exporting ﬁrm in the presence of a futures market for currency. The reasom
for failure of Blackwell’s theorem is, as in Hirshleifer (1971), that the sets of
feasible action are signal-dependent.
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4.1 Endogenous Risk in an Economy with In-
formation Markets
This section is based on Brandt and Szczutkowski (2012). I
am grateful to Dr. Andreas Szczutkowski for this collabora-
tion.
The purpose of this section is to study the market for information in a microe-
conomic framework. Information services are described by a set of possible
signals which are correlated to the state of the world.20 Agents demand infor-
mation services in order to reduce the uncertainty they face in their individual
decision problems. Information markets have special properties which cre-
ate diﬃculties in describing them theoretically (see e.g. Arrow (1978, 1999,
2003); Varian (2000)):
First, on the demand side, the willingness to pay for information depends
on its ‘informational content’, i.e. on how much the information accounts
for the reduction of risk.21 Agents who employ an information service derive
utility solely via the correlation of signals and states.22 A criterion is needed
which describes the informational content of an information system which
consists of an information service and a prior belief. In this section Black-
well’s suﬃciency criterion is used in order to compare the informativeness of
diﬀerent information systems.
Secondly, it is not clear how information are produced. Additionally, it is
problematic that the law of diminishing returns does not hold for the produc-
tion of information. Once an information is produced/known it can be copied
arbitrarily often which leads to linear costs in the ‘quantity of information’.
In the current section this problem does not play a role because it is assumed
that production costs (for information) are convex in informativeness (of the
20In the context of this section, it seems more appropriate to use the term information
service instead of information structure. Hence, in the rest of this section an information
service denotes an information structure.
21This is also true for firms which use information as a production factor (e.g. a news-
paper). On the one hand information may be necessary for certain production processes,
but on the other hand information will not be used up in the production process so that
the law of diminishing returns does not hold.
22An agent with prior belief fΩ who employs an information service fS|Ω, posses the
information system (fS|Ω, fΩ).
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service) and each decision maker demands an individual information service
which is useless for all other decision makers.23
Furthermore, information services often exhibit characteristics of a public
good. There is no rivalry in consumption, i.e. many agents can observe in-
formation signals simultaneously. This can e.g. be due to the informational
function of market prices, workers mobility or reverse engineering. This prob-
lem plays no role in the current analysis because, as mentioned before, each
decision maker demands an individual information service which is useless
for all other decision makers.
Marschak (1971) states two central problems which are still not yet com-
pletely resolved in the literature. The ﬁrst problem is to understand the
system of demand and supply of information goods. The second problem is
the question how social welfare is aﬀected by the manner in which resources
are allocated to information goods or services. This section addresses the
ﬁrst question.
An example economy is presented where agents demand information ser-
vices with prices which diﬀer according to their informational content. This
is modeled via a class of parametrized information systems which can be
ordered by Blackwell’s suﬃciency criterion (Blackwell (1953)). The focus
of the analysis lies on the demand for information, which is fully described
by the agents’ decision problems. In particular, the question is which is
the demanded level of informativeness? Supply is modelled by ﬁrms which
produce information services with costs of production which depend on the
informational content of the information services. The public good character
of information plays no role in the analysis as each agent’s decision problem
is assumed to be independent from the decision problems of others, i.e. state
spaces diﬀer and coordination via market prices only occurs on the market
for information services.
Each agent on the demand side plays a lottery where he has to guess the
right state of nature. If he is right, then his resources will increase, otherwise
they will remain constant. As an example one can think of the agents as
farmers in diﬀerent regions who forecast future, local weather conditions.
23As an example for such a situation consider screenings for cancer.
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Each state of the weather is related to a best farming strategy so that a
correct forecast is rewarded by a high crop.
The main results are driven by two simple eﬀects. On the one hand
better information leads to higher (ex ante) welfare as the chances of winning
improve (‘precision eﬀect’). But on the other hand better information leads
to less budget available for consumption as it exhibits a higher price (‘budget
eﬀect’). In an interior equilibrium these eﬀects cancel out. It is shown that
under these circumstances even risk neutral agents invest in information.
Furthermore, and perhaps more surprisingly, risk averse agents do not invest
in information if their degree of risk aversion is suﬃciently high. The main
result shows that the demand for information is negatively correlated to the
degree of (relative) risk aversion for a broad range of parameters. In this case
equilibrium risk in this economy is negatively linked to the agents’ degree of
risk aversion.
Closest to this study are the works of Kihlstrom (1974), Radner and Stiglitz
(1984) and Chade and Schlee (2002).
Kihlstrom (1974) models the demand for information in a setting with
normally distributed random variables and CES-utility. He shows, similar
to the present ﬁndings, that the demand for information depends positively
on the agents’ income and negatively depends on the information price. In
contrast to the present analysis, he restricts the analysis to the demand side
and does not analyze comparative statics with respect to the agents attitude
towards risk.
Radner and Stiglitz (1984) and Chade and Schlee (2002) analyze the value
of information in a much more general setting where, contrary to this ap-
proach, decision problems have sets of possible actions which are independent
of the realized information. Furthermore information is costless and a com-
plete, separable metric action space is assumed. Diﬀerent to this section’s
ﬁndings, small improvements of information (starting from no information)
are not welfare improving in their analysis.
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4.1.1 The Model
The model consists of an inﬁnite set of agents I who demand information
and an inﬁnite set of producers on the supply side. Each agent i ∈ I faces
uncertainty in his decision problem described by a probability distribution,
given by a probability mass function fΩi, over a ﬁnite and individual set of
states of nature Ωi = {ω1,i, . . . , ωn,i} with n > 1. The assumption of an
individual state space captures the idea of focussing on a market for private
information where the public good-character of information plays no role.
Even if an agent observes an information signal produced by an information
system owned by a diﬀerent agent this does not help him in reducing his own
uncertainty because it is assumed that individual states are uncorrelated
accross the decision makers. Formally, risk in this economy is described by
the product space of all individual state spaces, i.e. ΩEcon =
⊗
i∈I
Ωi. Moreover,
a priori the individual states are equally likely, i.e. fΩi(ωi) = 1/n for ωi ∈ Ωi
and all i ∈ I.
The supply of information
There is an inﬁnite number of producers who are able to produce information
services f ǫSi|Ωi with parameter levels ǫ ∈ [0, 1]. An information service f
ǫ
Si|Ωi
is only applicable to state space Ωi and produces a signal s ∈ Si = Ωi.
24
The statistical relationship between states and signals is thereby given by a
stochastic transformation which assigns a probability distribution over fore-
casts s to a given state of nature ω ∈ Ωi. In this section a speciﬁcation from
Nermuth (1982) is employed which is given by
f ǫSi|Ωi(s|ω) =
{
1− n−1
n
ǫ if s = ω
1
n
ǫ else,
where f ǫSi|Ωi(s|ω) denotes the probability of a produced signal realization s
given the state ω. n−1
n
ǫ then is the probability of an erroneous forecast, i.e.
24If the information service is used by agent i, he combines f ǫSi|Ωi with his prior fΩi .
This results in the information system (f ǫSi|Ωi , fΩi).
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for a signal s 6= ω. ǫ ∈ [0, 1] parametrizes the ‘accuracy’ of the forecast. In
case of ǫ = 0 the forecast is always perfect whereas ǫ = 1 stands for a useless
signal that has no eﬀect on the agents’ prior beliefs over Ωi. Nermuth (1982)
shows that this family of information services is ordered by ǫ with respect to
Blackwell’s suﬃciency criterion (Blackwell (1951), Blackwell (1953)). Higher
values of ǫ correspond to lower informativeness according to this criterion
and, hence, ǫ will be referred to as the ‘error level’ of an information structure
f ǫS|Ωi.
The costs of production of an information service negatively depend on
the error level ǫ by assumption. Since ǫ = 1 corresponds to an fully unin-
formative service it senseful to set c(1) = 0. Furthermore it is assumed that
c′(ǫ) < 0 and that c′′(ǫ) ≥ 0 for all error levels ǫ.
In this model the market for information services (for each given error
level) is competitive so that the price for an information service with error
level ǫ, P (ǫ), will be equal to c(ǫ) in equilibrium. Therefore, in the further
analysis it is P (1) = 0, P ′(ǫ) < 0 and P ′′(ǫ) ≥ 0.
The demand for information
Let I be a inﬁnite set of homogeneous, risk averse agents. As mentioned
above, each agent i ∈ I faces risk described by a set Ωi = {ω1,i, . . . , ωn,i} of
n > 1 future states of nature.
Each agent is endowed with a budget of m > 0 units of a consumption
good. In the ﬁrst stage (ex ante), this budget can be spend for exactly
one information structure with price P (ǫ) in order to reduce the risk in the
interim decision problem. Interim, the agent faces a (personal) lottery in
which the rest of the budget m − P (ǫ) is invested and where the agent has
to forecast the underlying state of nature. In particular, the set of possible
actions is equal to set of states of the world, i.e. Ai = Ωi. If the forecast
is right, then the lottery pays out a multiple α(m − P (ǫ)) (α > 1) of the
investment m − P (ǫ). In case of a wrong forecast the lottery simply pays
out the amount of the stake m− P (ǫ). Due to symmetry the parameter i is
dropped in the further description of the lottery and analysis of the model.
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In the following ωˆ denotes the agent’s forecast and ω stands for the prevailing
state of nature. Then each agent’s payoﬀ is formally given by
o(ωˆ, ω) :=
{
α(m− P (ǫ)) if ω = ωˆ
m− P (ǫ) else
,
where α > 1. Each agent faces a diﬀerent personal lottery so that the
aggregate payoﬀ (which is equal to the sum of individual payoﬀs) of the
economy as a whole is risky. Better forecasts in the economy increase the
individual expected payoﬀs and, therefore, the aggregate expected payoﬀ in
the economy.
Agents are Bayesian decision makers with preferences over consumption
described by a von Neumann–Morgenstern utility function u : R → R with
u′ > 0. Therefore, the indirect utility of an agent is equal to v : A ×
Ω→ R, (a, ω) 7→ u(o(a, ω)). As mentioned above, all agents have symmetric
prior beliefs so that an agent ex ante assigns probability fΩ(ω) = 1/n to any
ω ∈ Ω. Bayes’ Theorem then implies that the marginal distribution of the
signals produced by an information system is also given by f ǫS(s) = 1/n for all
s ∈ S. In order to forecast the correct state the agents calculate the posterior
probablities f ǫΩ|S of the states for a given signal:
f ǫΩ|S(ω|s) =
{
1− n−1
n
ǫ if ω = s
1
n
ǫ else.
Agent i’s interim forecast problem for a given signal realization s ∈ S then
is:
max
a∈A=Ω
∑
ω∈Ω
f ǫΩ|S(ω|s)v(a, ω) = max
a∈A=Ω
∑
ω∈Ω
f ǫΩ|S(ω|s)u (o(a, ω)) .
Since f ǫΩ|S(s|s) ≥ f
ǫ
Ω|S(ω|s) for any ω 6= s it is clear that
a∗(s) = s,
i.e. the agent always decides for the most probable state of nature.
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According to Deﬁnition 3.2, the ex ante expected utility of an agent is
W (ǫ) := V ((f ǫS|Ω, fΩ), a
∗, v) =
∑
s∈Ω
f ǫS(s)
∑
ω∈Ω
f ǫΩ|S(ω|s)u (o(a
∗(s), ω))
=
(
1−
n− 1
n
ǫ
)
u (α(m− P (ǫ))) +
n− 1
n
ǫu (m− P (ǫ)) . (4.1)
The agents now choose an information service with an error level which
maximizes their ex ante welfare. Changing the error level ǫ has two eﬀects
which can be seen by calculating the ﬁrst derivative with respect to ǫ:
W ′(ǫ) =
n− 1
n
[u (m− P (ǫ))− u (α(m− P (ǫ)))]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:PE(ǫ)<0
+
[
−P ′(ǫ)
[(
1−
n− 1
n
ǫ
)
αu′ (α(m− P (ǫ))) +
n− 1
n
ǫu′ (m− P (ǫ))
]]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:BE(ǫ)>0
.
The ﬁrst term will be called the ‘precision eﬀect’ PE(ǫ) which accounts
for the negative welfare eﬀect through a worse forecast induced by a higher
error level ǫ and holding utilities constant. A change of ǫ changes the success
and failure probabilities in a linear way.
The second term, BE(ǫ), will be called ‘budget eﬀect’ and describes the
positive eﬀect of higher error levels through a reduced information price
(when holding probabilities constant). Note that the budget eﬀect is de-
termined by marginal utilities and the shape of the price function.
This decision problem is formally given by
max
ǫ∈[ǫ¯,1]
W (ǫ), (4.2)
where ǫ¯ := P−1(m) denotes the error level which leads to zero consumption
and therefore is never optimal. Error levels below ǫ¯ do not lie in the agents’
budget set.
In order to understand the structure of the optimal error level as a func-
tion of the model parameters it is instructive to ﬁrst consider the case of risk
neutral agents.
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Risk neutrality
Let the agents’ preferences be represented by u(c) = c. From (4.1) ex ante
welfare then gets:
W (ǫ) =
(
1−
n− 1
n
ǫ
)
α(m− P (ǫ)) +
n− 1
n
ǫ(m− P (ǫ))
and it follows that the agents’ information demand is uniquely determined
by an interior solution of the problem (4.2), i.e. even risk neutral agents
demand information.
Proposition 4.1 (information demand of risk neutral agents). For finite
|P ′(1)| and m (budget) sufficiently high, risk neutral agents always demand
information.
Why do even risk neutral agents invest in information? To get an intu-
ition, note that the price for ‘null’ information (maximal error level ǫ = 1)
is zero and |P ′(1)| is small, that is, the budget eﬀect is relatively small at
ǫ = 1. In other words, small information improvements from ‘null’ are com-
parably cheap. Furthermore, changes of the error level aﬀect not only the
risk related to the lottery but expected welfare as well due to its eﬀect on
the probability of success. This precision eﬀect is maximal at ǫ = 1. Hence,
for m suﬃciently large, the precision eﬀect dominates the budget eﬀect at
ǫ = 1. Consequently, improvements in informativeness when starting from
no information (ǫ = 1) increase the agents expected payoﬀs and, hence, ǫ = 1
is not optimal. At the minimal error level ǫ¯, on the contrary, the precision
eﬀect is equal to zero as P (ǫ¯) equals m while the budget eﬀect is maximal
as P ′′(ǫ) ≥ 0. Hence, at ǫ = ǫ¯ the budget eﬀect dominates the precision
eﬀect. Consequently, reductions of informativeness when starting from full
information (ǫ = 0) and, hence, ǫ = ǫ¯ is not optimal. Therefore the optimal
error level is characterized by an interior solution.
Analyzing this interior solution shows that information always is a normal
good under the given speciﬁcations:
Cororally 4.1. The optimal error level ǫ∗ depends negatively on the number
of states n and the budget m.
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An increase in the number of states can be interpreted as an increase in
risk. Therefore, it should be intuitively clear that an increase in the number
of states, n, leads to an decrease of the optimal error level ǫ∗. The intuition
for an increase of the budget m is similar: An increase in m increases the
riskyness of the lottery o(·, ω˜). Therefore, an increase in m leads to an
decrease of the optimal error level. Formally, an increase in the number of
states or the budget strengthens the precision eﬀect (i.e. dPE(ǫ)/dn, dPE(ǫ)/dm <
0) while it keeps the budget eﬀect constant (i.e. dBE(ǫ)/dn, dBE(ǫ)/dm = 0)
and, hence, decreases the optimal error level. Moreover, this means that
information are normal goods in this economy.
Now consider a more general formulation of preferences accounting for
risk aversion. This is natural as the central characteristic of an information
signal is the reduction of uncertainty or indeterminacy. The main question is
how information trade is related to the agents’ attitude towards risk in such
an economy.
Constant relative risk aversion
Assume that the agents’ preferences are of the constant relative risk aversion
type (CRRA). The utility representation is given by
u(c) :=
{
c1−σ
1−σ
for σ > 0, σ 6= 1
ln(c) for σ = 1.
This leads to the following ex ante welfare function:
W (ǫ) =
(
1−
n− 1
n
ǫ
)
(α(m− P (ǫ)))1−σ
1− σ
+
n− 1
n
ǫ
(m− P (ǫ))1−σ
1− σ
.
It follows that the demand for information is well deﬁned for a broad range
of parameters:
Proposition 4.2 (Interior solution, uniqueness).
(i) For |P ′(1)| finite and m sufficiently high, the agents demand informa-
tion with error level ǫ∗ ∈ (ǫ¯, 1).
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(ii) The optimal error level ǫ∗ is uniquely determined for σ ∈ (0, 1].
(iii) For σ > 1 and P ′′′ = 0 the optimal error level ǫ∗ is uniquely determined.
Intuitively it should be clear that costly information will not be demanded
if the agents are endowed with a very small budget m.
Uniqueness of ǫ∗ is ensured if expected welfare is strictly concave in ǫ.
This curvature depends on the shape of u as well as on the shape of P in a
non-trivial way. It is easy to show that for relative risk aversion σ ∈ (0, 1] the
precision eﬀect as well as the budget eﬀect negatively depend on the error
level ǫ implying that welfare is indeed strictly concave in ǫ. For σ > 1 this
need not be true in general but e.g. in the case of quadratic P it is.
In order to obtain comparative statics results it is further assumed that
the agents’ information demand is characterized by an interior and uniquely
determined solution ǫ∗.
The next result shows that corollary 4.1 holds true in the more general
case of constant relative risk aversion, i.e. information is a normal good:
Proposition 4.3. (i) The optimal error level ǫ∗ depends negatively on the
number of possible future states of nature n and negatively on the budget
m.
(ii) ǫ∗ depends negatively on the premium α for a sufficiently high degree
of relative risk aversion.
As argued above, increasing the number of possible states or increasing
the budget increases the riskyness of the lottery o(·, ω˜) which naturally leads
to a higher information demand.
A higher α leads to a higher spread in the payoﬀs which increases the
riskiness of the lottery and strengthens the precision eﬀect. On the other
hand the impact on the budget eﬀect is ambigous. For suﬃciently high
degrees of risk aversion the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates and leads to a lower error
level in equilibrium.
In order to gain further intuition for the main result, consider the case of
a linear price function P . The relation between the error level and the level
of risk aversion may be non monotonic in this economy:
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Proposition 4.4 (Non-monotonicity of the error level in the degree of rela-
tive risk aversion). If prices for information are linear, i.e. P (ǫ) = b(1 −
ǫ), b ≥ m, the following holds true:
(i) For sufficiently high degrees of relative risk aversion, σ ≥ 2, the agents
keep uninformed, i.e. ǫ∗ = 1.
(ii) If α is sufficiently high, then there is a degree of relative risk aversion
0 < σ¯ < 2 such that
dǫ∗(σ)
dσ


< 0 if σ < σ¯
= 0 if σ = σ¯ or σ ≥ 2
> 0 if σ¯ < σ < 2
.
The chosen error level is convex in the degree of relative risk aversion, or,
put diﬀerently, information demand is convex in the degree of relative risk
aversion. For low levels of risk aversion the result is intuitive: higher risk
aversion leads to a smaller error level which increases the chances of winning
the prize α(m − P (ǫ)) and leads to higher expected payoﬀ. But for higher
degrees of agents’ risk aversion (but not too high, i.e. σ < 2) this relation
turns into a positive one. In order to get a better understanding of this eﬀect
it is instructive to reformulate the lottery in the following form:
o(ωˆ, ω) = m− P (ǫ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
fixed payment
+
{
(α− 1)(m− P (ǫ)) if ω = ωˆ
0 else.︸ ︷︷ ︸
uncertain payment
So the lottery prize consists of a certain and an uncertain component. In-
vesting in information decreases the certain component of the lottery. If risk
aversion is suﬃciently high but not too high, then the attractivity of the un-
certain payment decreases with the level of relative risk aversion and, hence,
the agents decrease their investment in information. This explains the posi-
tive relationship between the error level and risk aversion for medium degrees
of relative risk aversion. If reletive risk aversion then becomes large enough,
then the agents completely avoid the uncertain component and maximize
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their ﬁxed payment, i.e. they do not invest in information at all.
The agents’ information decisions endogenously determines the amount
of risk in this economy. In this interpretation the result reads as follows:
higher degrees of risk aversion may lead to higher risk.
4.1.2 Concluding Remarks
The uncertainty in this model is endogenously determined by the agents’
information decisions. Information services are costly with an equilibrium
price which depends on the informativeness. The main goal of the section is
to demonstrate that the demand for private information can be negatively
correlated to the level of risk aversion. Given a suﬃciently high level of risk
aversion agents do not demand any information at all. As the information
is related to the risky outcome component of the lottery, this maximizes the
certain component in the payoﬀ structure.
This eﬀect will also be present in more elaborated economies with risk
sharing, goods markets or an additional public signal. These extensions
would be valuable at the expense of possibly loosing the clear cut - nature of
the results.
4.2 The Value of Information in Economies with
Production
The eﬀects of better information in production economies are not clear: On
the one hand, as pointed out by Eckwert and Zilcha (2000), better informa-
tion might increase ex ante expected welfare by improving the input alloca-
tion. On the other hand, information might lower ex ante expected welfare
by destroying risk sharing opportunities.
The purpose of this section is to examine the value of information in a
many commodity production economy with risky (input) endowments and
eﬃcient risk sharing. Compared to a pure exchange economy (with only
one commodity) as analyzed by Schlee (2001), the risk sharing opportunities
are much richer in a many commodity production economy: First, if there
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is only one commodity, individuals can share risks only through shifting
consumption from one state to another. In contrast, if there are many com-
modities, then individuals can substitute consumption of some commodity in
some state by consuming some (potentially) other commodities in some other
states. Secondly, the introduction of production increases the risk sharing
opportunities even more. In particular, production introduces risk sharing
opportunities which are not present without production. For example, if the
aggregate endowment of a commodity is zero in some state, this can not be
insured without production. With production, it is possible to compensate
this by producing the commodity from others. And third, as pointed out by
Eckwert and Zilcha (2000), in production economies (with state dependent
productivity) better information might improve the allocation of commodi-
ties used as inputs which might overcome its negative eﬀect on risk sharing.
Nevertheless, the main result is that if risk sharing markets are complete and
eﬃcient, then information are harmful for all risk avers agents. The intuition
for this result is that since, in contrast to Eckwert and Zilcha (2000), the
productivity of the ﬁrms is state-independent, better information does not
lead to an improvement of the input allocation which might overcome its the
negative eﬀects on the risk sharing opportunities in the economy.
In particular, in this section a two-period model with many commodities
which can be used for consumption and production is considered. There are
two diﬀerent types of agents, risk avers consumers and risk neutral ﬁrms.
Both types of agents possess a risky endowment of commodities (inputs as
well as outputs). At date 0, after receiving information but before observing
the state of the world, the agents trade state-contingent claims in a com-
petitive market. After the state realization, at date 1, the agents consume
or produce according to their state-contingent claim. Moreover, since the
ﬁrms’ proﬁts are determined by the trade of state-contingent claims which
are traded before the state realization, the ﬁrms’ proﬁts independent of the
particular state relization.
CHAPTER 4. THE VALUE OF INFORMATION 82
4.2.1 The Model
Consider a competitive economy with I consumers, J ﬁrms, C ≥ 2 commodi-
ties and N states of the world. Denote by I the set of consumers, by J the
set of ﬁrms, by C ⊆ RC+ the commodity space and by Ω = {ω1, . . . , ωN} the
state space. Let the prior belief be given by the probability mass function
fΩ and assume w.o.l.g. ω1 < ω2 < . . . < ωN .
25 The space of commodity
c ∈ {1, . . . , C} is denoted by Cc ⊆ R+. Assume that C is convex and com-
pact. A commodity can be a physical good or a service and it can be used
for consumption as well as for production.
In the following an agent i can be a consumer i ∈ I or a ﬁrm i ∈ J .
In state ω ∈ Ω agent i is endowed with wc(ω, i) units of commodity c. The
vector
w(ω, i) := (w1(ω, i), . . . , wC(ω, i)) ∈ C
denotes agent i’s endowment vector in state ω. The agent’s tupel of endow-
ment vectors for each state is denoted by
w(i) := (w(ω1, i), . . . , w(ωN , i)) ∈ C
N .
Moreover, let
wc(ω) :=
∑
i∈I∪J
wc(ω, i)
be the aggregate endowment of commodity c in state ω and
w(ω) := (w1(ω), . . . , wC(ω)) ∈ C
the corresponding aggregate endowment vector in state ω.
Each ﬁrm j ∈ J has a non-empty, state-independent technology, or pro-
25I.e. Prob(ω˜ = ω) = fΩ(ω).
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duction set, given by
Yj :=
{
y ∈ RC |Tj ≤ 0
}
⊆ RC ,
where Tj : R
C → R denotes ﬁrm j’s transformation function. Throughout
this section Tj is assumed to be continuously diﬀerentiable, increasing in each
component and convex. A production vector,
y(ω, j) := (y1(ω, j), . . . , yC(ω, j) ∈ Yj,
describes ﬁrm j’s net outputs of the c commodities in state ω. Positive
numbers denote outputs while negative numbers denote inputs. Moreover,
state-independency of the ﬁrms’ technologies implies that the ﬁrms, as the
consumers, are exposed to endowment risk rather than productivity risk.
Since state-contingent commodity claims are traded before the state realiza-
tion and, hence, the ﬁrms’ proﬁts are not risky, the ﬁrms are assumed to be
pure proﬁt maximizers.
Each consumer i ∈ I has a twice (continuously) diﬀerentiable utility
function ui : C → R. ui is assumed to be increasing in each commodity, i.e.
∂ui(x1,...,xC)/∂xc ≥ 0 for all c ∈ {1, . . . , C}. Moreover, each consumer owns a
claim to a share θij ∈ [0, 1] of the proﬁts of ﬁrm j such that
∑
i∈I
θij = 1.
The model has two stages: stage 0 is before the state realization while
stage 1 is after the state realization. Before the state realization at stage 0,
the agents trade state-contingent commodity claims for each commodity in
a competitive market. Such a claim of commodity c for state ω pays exactly
one unit of commodity c in state ω and nothing in other states. In particular,
for the consumers this results in state-contingent consumption plans while
for ﬁrms this results in state-contingent production plans. Denote by
p := (p1,ω1 , . . . , pC,ω1, p1,ω2 , . . . , pC,ω2, . . . , p1,ωN , . . . , pC,ωN ) ∈
(
RC+
)N
the price vector for state-contingent claims, where pc,ω denotes the price
for one unit of commodity c in state ω. After the state realization, the
commodities are allocated according to the agents’ state-contigent claims and
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production takes place according to the ﬁrms’ state-contingent production
plans. For an overview of the timing see ﬁgure 4.1 below.
State of the world is realized and
agents consume/produce according
to their state-contingent claims.
Agents have common
prior belief and trade
state-contingent claims
in competitive markets
0 1
Figure 4.1: Timing of events.
Consumer i’s consumption vector in state ω is denoted by x(ω, i) ∈ C.
Equivalently, y(ω, j) ∈ Yj denotes ﬁrm j’s production vector in state ω. An
allocation in state ω,
(x(ω), y(ω)) := (x(ω, 1), . . . , x(ω, I), y(ω, 1), . . . , y(ω, J)) ∈ CI ×
⊗
j∈J
Yj
is a vector which assigns non-negative consumption levels xc(ω, i) of each
commodity c ∈ {1, . . . , C} to each consumer i ∈ I and a production plan
y(ω, j) ∈ Yj to each ﬁrm j ∈ J . An allocation in state ω is feasible if total
consumption of each commodity does not exceed its total endowment plus
its net output, i.e.
∑
i∈I
xc(ω, i) ≤
∑
i∈I
wc(ω, i) +
∑
j∈J
(yc(ω, j) + wc(ω, j))
for all ω ∈ Ω and c ∈ {1, . . . , C}. Denote by
x(i) := (x(ω1, i), . . . , x(ωN , i)) ∈ C
N
consumer i’s state-contingent consumption plan and by
y(j) := (y(ω1, j), . . . , y(ωN , j)) ∈ Y
N
j
ﬁrm j’s state-contingent production plan. An allocation of contingent com-
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modities,
(x, y) := (x(1), . . . , x(I), y(1), . . . , y(J)) ∈
(
CS
)I
×
⊗
j∈J
Y Nj ,
is a tupel which determines a commodity allocation for all states ω ∈ Ω. An
allocation of contingent commodities is feasible if (x(ω), y(ω)) is feasible for
all states ω ∈ Ω.
Using this, a Walrasian equilibrium for this economy is deﬁned as follows:
Definition 4.1. A Walrasian equilibrium with complete markets, (x∗, y∗, p∗) ∈(
CN
)I
×
⊗
j∈J
Y Nj ×
(
RC+
)N
, consists of a feasible allocation of contingent claims
(x∗, y∗) ∈
(
CN
)I
×
⊗
j∈J
Y Nj and a price system p
∗ ∈
(
RC+
)N
such that for all
firms j ∈ J
y∗(j) = arg max
y∈Y Nj
(p∗)T (y + w(j)) (proﬁt maximization)
and for all consumers i ∈ I
x∗(i) = argmax
x∈Bi
EΩ [ui(x(ω˜, i))] , (utility maximization)
where consumer i’s budget set is defined by
Bi :=
{
x ∈ CN | (p∗)T
(
x∗(i)− w(i)−
∑
j∈J
θij(y
∗(j) + w(j))
)
≤ 0
}
.
Moreover, risk aversion is deﬁned as usual: For any lottery on his con-
sumption set, a risk averse consumer prefers the certainty equivalent of an
lottery over the lottery itsself. Therefore, by Jensen’s inequality, if an con-
sumer is risk avers (neutral, aﬃn) his utility is strictly concave (linear, con-
vex) in x ∈ C. Moreover, ui is strictly concave (linear, convex) in each
component. Since ui is assumed to be twice diﬀerentiable this implies that
the second derivatives with respect to some xc, c ∈ {1, . . . , C}, are negative
(zero, positive).
If risk premia are zero it is intuitively clear that risk avers agents would
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like to insure fully. The next Proposition etablishes conditions under which
a full insurance is possible and optimal.
Proposition 4.5. Consider the competitive, private ownership economy de-
scribed above. If all consumers are risk averse and if there is
(i) either one risk neutral consumer who owns enough to insure all other
agents,
(ii) or one firm with constant marginal rate of transformation (MRT) which
owns enough to insure all others,
(iii) or no aggregate risk,
then in every Walrasian equilibrium with complete markets (if it exists) the
(risk avers) consumers fully insure in terms of consumption and all firms
(with non-constant MRT) fully insure in terms of production vectors. In
particular,
x∗(ω, i) = x∗(ω′, i) and y∗(ω, j) = y∗(ω′, j)
for all risk avers consumers i, all firms j with non-constant MRT and ω, ω′ ∈
Ω.
In equilibrium prices are fair. This means, the price for a state-contingent
claim is equal to the commodity price in the ‘certainty equivalent economy’
multiplied with the state probability, i.e. p∗c,ω = fΩ(ω)p¯
∗
c , where p¯
∗ ∈ RC>0
denotes the equilibrium price in the certainty equivalent economy.26 In par-
ticular, this means that there are no risk premia. Hence, in the absence of
aggregate risk (case (iii)), it is optimal for all agents to choose a full insur-
ance.27 In case (i) (or (ii)) the equilibrium price ratios are equal the risk
neutral consumer’s MRS (or to the MRT of that ﬁrm with constant MRT).
26The only difference of the certainty equivalent of this economy to this economy is that
the risky endowments are replaced by their expectations.
27In more detail: In the absence of aggregate risk, the agents’ optimal consump-
tion/production bundles are feasible in all states. Since prices are fair it follows that
the agents choose an full insurance which delivers the consumption bundle of the certainty
equivalent economy.
CHAPTER 4. THE VALUE OF INFORMATION 87
Therefore, the risk neutral consumer (or the ﬁrm with constant MRT) is in-
diﬀerent between consumption (production) of commodity c in state ω and
commodity c′ in state ω′, i.e. these are perfect substitutes. Hence, the risk
neutral consumer (ﬁrm with constant MRT) is willing and, by assumption,
also able to insure the other agents. Together with the observation that
risk premia are zero, this implies that it is optimal for risk averse consumers
to smooth their consumption to the optimal consumption bundle of the cer-
tainty equivalent. Similary, as production sets are state independent and risk
premia are zero, its optimal for ﬁrms (with non-constant MRT) to produce
the same production vector in each state. In particular, this means that in all
states, the optimal state-contingent production plan is equal to that in the
certainty equivalent. Moreover, fair prices and state-independent production
sets also imply that the optimal production plan and the ﬁrms proﬁts are
independent of the state distribution.
Cororally 4.2. If any of the conditions (i)-(iii) of Proposition 4.5 hold, then
the firm’s equilibrium state-contingent production plan is independent of the
state distribution.
As argued above, equilibrium prices have no risk premia and they are
determined by the (constant) MRS of the risk neutral consumer (or by the
constant MRT of the ﬁrm with this). Hence, each ﬁrm’s optimal state-
contingent production plan is state independent and equal to its optimal
production plan in the certainty equivalent economy. Therefore, also its
proﬁts are equal to its proﬁts in the certainty equivalent.
4.2.2 The Model with Information
This section studies an extension of the previous model. In particular, it is
additionally assumed that the agents may have access to some information
before the market for state-contigent claims is open. Therefore, let fΩ ∈ ∆(Ω)
as before and assume that the agents (consumers and ﬁrms) may have access
to a public information structure fS|Ω ∈ Γ(fΩ) that produces a signal s from
CHAPTER 4. THE VALUE OF INFORMATION 88
the signal set S = [0, 1].28 See ﬁgure 4.2 for an overview of the timing in this
model.
State of the world is realizes;
and the agents consume
according to their state-
contigent claims.
Agents have common
prior fΩ about the
state of the world.
A signal s realizes and
the agents update beliefs
via Bayes’ rule and trade
state-contingent claims in
competitive markets.
ex ante interim ex post
Figure 4.2: Timing with information.
The following analysis is based on a special informativeness concept. In
order to compare as much as possible information systems, the weakest infor-
mativeness notion (introduced in this work) is chosen as information concept.
By Proposition 3.3, this is, if the prior belief is ﬁxed, the weak informativeness
concept. Since the prior belief is ﬁxed, the deﬁnition of weak informativeness
becomes (compare Deﬁnition 3.10):
(fS|Ω, fΩ) %
w-inf
(f¯S|Ω, fΩ)⇔ FS,Ω(s, ω) ≥ F¯S,Ω(s, ω) for all (s, ω) ∈ S × Ω.
The equilibrium allocation after observing s from information system
(fS|Ω, fΩ) solely depends on the (updated) posterior state distribution and,
hence, on the information system (fS|Ω, fΩ) and the signal realization s. In or-
der to makes this clear let (x∗((fS|Ω, fΩ), s), y
∗((fS|Ω, fΩ), s), p
∗((fS|Ω, fΩ), s))
denote the equilibrium allocation after a signal realization s from information
system (fS|Ω, fΩ). Similar to Deﬁnition 3.2, the ex ante expected utility of
consumer i is deﬁned as follows:
V ((fS|Ω, fΩ), x
∗
i , ui) := ES
[
EΩ
[
u(x∗(ω˜, i; (fS|Ω, fΩ), s))
]]
,
28Recall that Γ(fΩ) denotes the set of all monotone and for the prior fΩ normalized infor-
mation structures and that Γ denotes the set of all monotone and normalized information
structures (compare page 49).
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where, analogously to the previous section, x∗(ω, i; (fS|Ω, fΩ), s) denotes agent
i’s (optimal) consumption bundle in state ω under information system (fS|Ω, fΩ)
after a signal observation equal to s.
Firms are owned by consumers, therefore, the following deﬁnition of
pareto eﬃciency (of information) restricts attention to consumers rather than
to ﬁrms. Information are pareto superior (inferior) if ‘better information’ in-
creases (decreases) the ex ante expected utility of at least one consumer with-
out lowering (increasing) the ex ante expected utility of any other consumer.
Formally,
Definition 4.2. Better information are pareto superior (inferior) iff for
(fS|Ω, fΩ), (f¯S|Ω, fΩ) ∈ Γ:
(fS|Ω, fΩ) %
w-inf
(f¯S|Ω, fΩ)
⇒

 V ((fS|Ω, fΩ), x∗i , ui) (≤)≥ V ((f¯S|Ω, fΩ), x∗i , ui) for all i ∈ I and
V ((fS|Ω, fΩ), x
∗
i′ , ui′)
(<)
> V ((f¯S|Ω, fΩ), x
∗
i′ , ui′) for at least one i
′ ∈ I

 .
As seen in section 4.2.1, in equilibrium, the prices for state-contingent
commodity claims depend on the state distribution. Therefore, from ex
ante perspective, the improvement of information increases security price
risk which makes risk averse consumers worse oﬀ.
Proposition 4.6. If all consumers are risk avers and have monotone en-
dowments and if there is
(i) either one risk neutral consumer who owns enough to insure all other
agents,
(ii) or one firm with constant marginal rate of substitution which owns
enough to insure all others,
then information are pareto inferior in every Walrasian equilibrium with com-
plete markets.
The intuition is similar to that of the result by Schlee (2001): Although
better information reduces interim risk, from ex ante perspective, it also
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introduces or increases price risk making each risk averse consumer worse
oﬀ. Since, in contrast to Eckwert and Zilcha (2000), production sets are
state-independent, better information cannot improve the input allocation
in such a way such that the improvement overcomes these negative eﬀects.
In equilibrium, the price for a state-contingent claim for commodity c
in state ω is p∗c,ω((fS|Ω, fΩ), s) = fΩ|S(ω|s)p¯
∗
c, where p¯
∗ ∈ RC+ is the equilib-
rium price vector in the certainty equivalent economy (where each agent is
endowed with his conditional expected endowment). This price vector is de-
termined through the consumers’ MRSs and the ﬁrms’ MRTs which, in the
certainty equivalent, are independent of the of the underlying state distribu-
tion, i.e. these are independent of the particular signal realization and the
underlying information system. Hence, consumer i’s conditional expected
utility after a signal realization s from (fS|Ω, fΩ) is equal his utility in the
certainty equivalent economy, i.e.
EΩ
[
ui(x
∗(ω˜, i; (fS|Ω, fΩ), s))|s
]
= ui(x¯
∗(i, p¯∗, p¯∗TEΩ [w(ω˜, i)|s])),
where x¯∗(, i, p¯∗, p¯∗TEΩ [w(ω˜, i)|s]) ∈ C denotes agent i’s optimal consumption
bundle in the certainty equivalent economy.29 Now, risk aversion implies that
ui(x¯
∗(i, p¯∗, m)) is concave as a function ofm and, hence, it follows that better
information makes every risk avers consumer worse oﬀ.
The theorem by Schlee (2001) presents three conditions conditions under
which information are pareto inferior in a single good, exchange economy
with complete risk-sharing markets: ﬁrst, all agents are risk avers and there
is no aggregate risk. Secondly, all agents are risk averse and there exists
one risk neutral who owns enough to insure all other. This condition is
equivalent to the conditions (i) and (ii) above. And last, all agents are risk
averse and the economy has a representative agents who satisﬁes the expected
utility hypothesis with a concave, diﬀerentiable vNM-utility function. In
contrast to the second condition, the ﬁrst and the last conditions are not
caputered here for the following reason: As under conditions (i) and (ii) of
29In particular, x¯∗(i, ·, ·) : RC>0 × R≥0 → C denotes agent i’s Marshallian demand
function, i.e. if agent i’s budget is m ≥ 0 and prices are p ∈ RC>0 then agent i’s optimal
consumption bundle is x¯∗(i, p,m).
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Prop. 4.5, consumer i’s interim conditional expected utility is equal to his
utility in the certainty equivalent economy. But under Schlee’s ﬁrst and third
condition there might be no agent with constant MRSs or MRTs. Hence, it
follows that the price system of the certainty equivalent economy might not
be independent of the signal realization, i.e. p¯∗((fS|Ω, fΩ), s) might not be
constant in s. Hence, the agents conditional expected utility,
EΩ
[
ui(x
∗(ω˜, i; (fS|Ω, fΩ), s))|s
]
=ui(x¯
∗(i, p¯∗((fS|Ω, fΩ), s), p¯
∗T ((fS|Ω, fΩ), s)EΩ [w(ω˜, i)|s])),
might not be concave in s which implies that the value of information might
not necessarily be negative.
Cororally 4.2 implies that ﬁrm j’s optimal, state-contingent production
plan, y∗(j; (fS|Ω, fΩ), s), is independent of the information system and the
particular signal realization. More precisely, y∗(ω, j; (fS|Ω, fΩ), s) is equal
to the optimal production plan in the certainty equivalent which in turn is
independent of the underlying state distribution, i.e. y∗(ω, j; (fS|Ω, fΩ), s) =
y¯∗(j) ∈ Yj for all ω ∈ Ω, where y¯
∗(j) ∈ Yj is the equilibrium production plan
of ﬁrm j in the certainty equivalent economy. These two observations imply
that the proﬁt of ﬁrm j after a signal realization equal to s is equal to the
ﬁrm’s proﬁt in the certainty equivalent economy:
Πj((fS|Ω, fΩ), s) =
∑
ω∈Ω
C∑
c=1
p∗c,ω((fS|Ω, fΩ), s)
(
y∗c (j; (fS|Ω, fΩ), s) + wc(ω, j)
)
=
C∑
c=1
p¯∗c (y¯
∗
c (j) + EΩ [wc(ω˜, j)|s]) ,
where p¯∗c ∈ R+ denotes the equilibrium price of commodity c in the certainty
equivalent economy. Because of the law of iterated expectation this implies
the the ex ante expected proﬁts of each ﬁrm are independent of the underlying
information system:
Proposition 4.7. Under any of the condition (i)-(ii) of Proposition 4.6 and
for any information system (fS|Ω, fΩ) ∈ Γ, the firms’ ex ante expected profits
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are equal the their profits in the certainty equivalent economy. Formally,
ES
[
Πj((fS|Ω, fΩ), s˜)
]
= (p¯∗)T (y¯∗(j) + EΩ [w(ω˜, j)]) for all (fS|Ω, fΩ) ∈ Γ.
On one hand, the ﬁrms’ technologies are by assumption independent of
the state of the world and the state distribution. Therefore, and by Coro-
rally 4.2, the optimal production plans are independent of the underlying
information system. On the other hand, prices depend on the state distribu-
tion and, therefore, on the signal realization and the underlying information
system. Hence, the ﬁrms’ interim proﬁts depent on the signal realization
and information system. But since prices are fair, the ex ante expected prof-
its are always equal to that of the certainty equivalent independent of the
underlying information structure.
4.2.3 Concluding Remarks
This section studied the value of information in a production economy with
many commodities and complete risk sharing markets. Altough the risk
sharing opportunities are much richer in an economy with many commodities
and production possibilities than in a pure exchange economy with only one
single good, it is shown that in the presence of complete risk sharing markets,
information make every risk avers agent worse oﬀ. The intuition of this result
is that from ex ante perspective better information increases price risk which
makes risk avers agents worse oﬀ. This a generalization of the results by
Hirshleifer (1971) and Schlee (2001).
Chapter 5
The Role of the Strategy Space in
a Setting with Asymmetric
Information
This chapter is based on a joint work with Dr. Dennis Heit-
mann.
Up to now this work has focused on event risk rather than on market risk
which will be done in the current section. As mentioned in the introduction,
market risk is related to the limited knowldge about endogenous variables
as for instance other market participants’ actions. Hence, market risk might
origin from an asymmetric allocation of information. Information is asym-
metric if some market participants know more than others. An example for
such a situation is the Stackelberg game (Stackelberg (1934)). The Stack-
elberg game is a standard model in oligopoly theory, which is one of the
most intensively discussed topics in mathematical economics and based on
the pioneering works of Cournot (1838) and Betrand (1883). In the former
one the ﬁrms simultaneously choose quantities while in the latter prices are
the strategic variables. Despite these classical simultaneous move games, the
model of Stackelberg (1934), as already mentioned above, describes a situa-
tion with asymmetric information in which one ﬁrm, the leader, decides at
ﬁrst and the follower observes this before deciding about an optimal strategy.
There exist a huge literature on these models for homogeneous and as well as
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for horizontal diﬀerentiated goods (see e.g. Amir and Jin (2001), Dastidar
(2004), Kreps and Scheinkman (1983), Vives (1985) and Vives (2005)). It is
well established in the literature that for the goods being perfect substitutes
and the ﬁrms being quantity setters, the leader is better oﬀ than the fol-
lower because the cross-eﬀect is positive. The opposite is true for Bertrand
competition.
In most of the literature on industrial organization the strategy space is
exogenously given whereas the endogenous determination of roles and strat-
egy spaces is rarely discussed. Based on a horizontally diﬀerentiated duopoly
model by Dixit (1979), Singh and Vives (1984) considered a model in which
the strategy space (price or quantity) is endogenously determined by the
ﬁrms. The ﬁrms are allowed to oﬀer two types of binding contracts to the
consumers, i.e. a price or quantity contract in the ﬁrst stage and in the sec-
ond stage, the market stage, the ﬁrms compete simultaneously contingent on
the type of contract. They showed that it is a dominant strategy for a ﬁrm
to set strategically the quantity (price) if the goods are substitutes (comple-
ments). Boyer and Moreaux (1987) transferred the endogenously determined
strategy spaces into the leader-follower model and compared consumer, pro-
ducer and total surplus with the related values for the Nash equilibrium of
the simultaneous move game. Using a very restrictive demand structure30
they showed that it is always more proﬁtable to be a quantity (price) setter
if the goods are substitutes (complements). Concerning total and consumer
surplus they proved that price competition is dominant for all degrees of
product diﬀerentiation. Furthermore, they derived a unique ranking of the
leader’s and follower’s prices, quantities and proﬁts depending on the type
of competition and the products being complements or substitutes.31
The purpose of this chapter is to provide these comparisons for a more
general demand structure introduced by Dixit (1979) with diﬀerent cross-
eﬀects and reservation prices for the goods. It is shown that some of Boyer
and Moreaux’s results are still valid in this more general framework, while
30In this setting the degree of product differentiation and reservation prices are corre-
lated.
31For further details see Boyer and Moreaux (1987) Propositions 1 and 2.
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others are not.
5.1 The Model
Consider an economy with a monopolistic sector and two ﬁrms, each one
producing a horizontal diﬀerentiated good, and a competitive numeraire sec-
tor as introduced by Dixit (1979). Following Singh and Vives (1984) and
Boyer and Moreaux (1987) assume that each ﬁrm can select whether to be-
have as a price or quantity setter. Furthermore, assume a duopoly with
asymmetric information in which ﬁrm 1 is the market leader and ﬁrm 2 the
follower, i.e. a Stackelberg setting with endogenous strategy space. Contin-
gent on the strategy space decision, the price or quantity is chosen optimally.
The game structure and some notations are summarized in ﬁgure 5.1. In
particular, if ﬁrm 1 sets a price and ﬁrm 2 sets a quantity then πpqi (q
pq
i , p
pq
i )
denotes ﬁrm i’s proﬁt (quantity, price). The subgame perfect equilibrium
Firm 1
Firm 2
(πpp1 , π
pp
2 )
(qpp1 , q
pp
2 )
price setting
price setting
(ppp1 , p
pp
2 )
(πpq1 , π
pq
2 )
(qpq1 , q
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pq
2 )
bb bb
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quantity setting
price setting
quantity setting quantity setting
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qp
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(qqp1 , q
qp
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(pqp1 , p
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(πqq1 , π
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2 )
(qqq1 , q
qq
2 )
(pqq1 , p
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Figure 5.1: The game structure and notations.
of this two-stage game will be derived.
The utility function of the representative consumer is assumed to be
quadratic and strictly concave and given by
u(q1, q2) = α1q1 + α2q2 −
β1q
2
1 + 2γq1q2 + β2q
2
2
2
−
2∑
i=1
piqi
with αi, βi ∈ R+, i = 1, 2, β1β2 − γ
2 > 0 (concavity condition) and αiβj −
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αjγ > 0 (positive market size). For arbitrary αi, βi ∈ R+ this leads to the
following domain of γ:(
−
√
β1β2,min
{√
β1β2,
α1β2
α2
,
α2β1
α1
})
.
Moreover, utility maximization of the representative consumer gives rise to
a linear demand structure
q˜i(pi, pj) = ai − bipi + cpj, i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j, (5.1)
with ai =
αiβj−αjγ
β1β2−γ2
> 0, bi =
βj
β1β2−γ2
> 0 and c = γ
β1β2−γ2
. The corresponding
inverse demand system is
p˜i(qi, qj) = αi − βiqi − γqj , i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j. (5.2)
The degree of product diﬀerentiation is determined by γ: The goods are com-
plements, independent or substitutes according to whether γ S 0. Demand
for good i is downward sloping in its own price and increasing (decreasing)
in the competitor’s price if the goods are substitutes (complements). The
goods are perfect substitutes whenever α1 = α2 and β1 = β2 = γ. Moreover,
for α1 = α2 =
1
1+α
β1 = β2 =
1
1−α2
and γ = − α
1−α2
, the demand structure is
equal to that which is considered by Boyer and Moreaux (1987).
Firms have constant marginal costs, C1, C2 ≥ 0. W.o.l.g. it is assumed
that prices are net of marginal costs.32 Then, proﬁts of ﬁrm i are given by
πi = piqi. In order to maximize proﬁts, the ﬁrms can oﬀer two diﬀerent
types of contracts with the consumers: a price and a quantity contract. If a
ﬁrm chooses to oﬀer the price contract, then the ﬁrm will have to supply that
amount which the consumers demand at a predetermined price independently
of the competitor’s action. If a ﬁrm chooses to oﬀer the quantity contract,
then the ﬁrm have to supply a predetermined quantity independently of the
competitor’s action. Moreover, still following Singh and Vives (1984), it is
assumed that the costs associated with changing the type of contract are
32Since Ci ≥ 0 one may replace αi and ai by αi − Ci and ai − bimi + cmj , i, j = 1, 2,
i 6= j, respectively.
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extremely high such that ﬁrms make the decision about the type contract
once and then stick to it. Hence, ﬁrst the ﬁrms decide about the type of
contract oﬀered to the consumers, and afterwards they compete contingent
on their chosen types of contract.
In case of pure quantity competition equation (5.2) is used for the proﬁt
maximization of the ﬁrms, whereas equation (5.1) is used in case of pure
price competition. If one ﬁrm is a price setter and the other ﬁrm chooses the
quantity, a third system is introduced, which easily can be derived by using
equations (5.1) and (5.2):
qˆi(pi, qj) =
αi − γqj − pi
βi
(5.3)
pˆj(pi, qj) =
aj + cpi − qj
bj
, i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j.
The demand system (5.3) is used if ﬁrm i sets the price and ﬁrm j chooses
strategically the quantity.
Without loss of generality ﬁrm 1 is assumed to be the Stackelberg leader
and before ﬁrm 1 decides about price setting or quantity setting, he computes
all possible reactions of the follower ﬁrm 2. This leads to the following four
cases:
Case 1: firm 1 sets a price
1. If ﬁrm 2 is also a price setter, this leads to the classical Stackelberg-
Betrand competition and with equation (5.1) the proﬁt of ﬁrm 2 is
given by
πpp2 (p1, p2) = p2 q˜2(p2, p1).
The ﬁrst order condition
∂πpp2
∂p2
= 0 leads to the standard Bertrand re-
action function
p2 = R
pp
2 (p1) =
a2 + cp1
2b2
=
α2β1 − α1γ + γp1
2β2
. (5.4)
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2. If ﬁrm 2 sets quantity, its proﬁts are derived by using equation (5.3).
This yields
πpc2 (p1, q2) = q2 pˆ2(p1, q2).
The ﬁrst order condition
∂πpc2 (p1,q2)
∂q2
= 0 leads to the following reaction
function of ﬁrm 2
q2 = R
pq
2 (p1) =
a2 + cp1
2
=
α2β1 − γα1 + γp1
2(β1β2 − γ2)
. (5.5)
Case 2: firm 1 sets a quantity
1. If ﬁrm 2 sets the price, then equation (5.3) implies for its proﬁts
πqp2 (q1, p2) = p2 qˆ2(p2, q1)
which leads to the reaction function
p2 = R
qp
2 (q1) =
α2 − γq1
2
. (5.6)
2. For the case that ﬁrm 2 sets a quantity the ﬁrms compete in the stan-
dard Stackelberg quantity competition and the proﬁt of ﬁrm 2 is given
by
πqq2 (q1, q2) = q2 p˜2(q2, q1).
This leads to the standard Cournot reaction function
q2 = R
qq
2 (q1) =
α2 − γq1
2β2
. (5.7)
Until now the followers best reply functions were derived. Now these are
used for the derivation of the Stackelberg leader’s optimal strategy.
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Analysis of case 1 - the market leader sets a price
Case 1.a: firm 2 sets a price
In this case both ﬁrms, the leader and the follower, set prices. The leader
uses the reaction function of the follower to maximize his proﬁt given by
π˜pp1 (p1) : = π
pp
1
(
p1, R
pp
2 (p1)
)
= p1 q˜1
(
p1, R
pp
2 (p1)
)
(5.8)
=
2a2b2p1 + ca2p1 − 2b1b2p
2
1 + c
2p21
2b2
.
The ﬁrst order condition
∂π˜pp1
∂p1
= 0 gives rise to the optimal price
ppp1 =
2a1b2 + ca2
2(2b1b1 − c2)
=
2β1β2α1 − β1α2γ − α1γ
2
2(2β1β2 − γ2)
> 0 (5.9)
which induces the price of the other good that ﬁrm 2 selects by using equation
(5.4)
ppp2 = R
pp
2 (p
pp
1 ) =
(3α2β1 − α1γ)(β1β2 − γ
2) + β1β2(α2β1 − α1γ)
4β1(2β1β2 − γ2)
> 0. (5.10)
Using this prices it follows for the quantities and proﬁts
qpp1 =
2β1β2α1 − β1α2γ − α1γ
2
4β1(β1β2 − γ2)
> 0,
qpp2 =
(3α2β1 − α1γ)(β1β2 − γ
2) + β1β2(α2β1 − α1γ)
4(β1β2 − γ2)(2β1β2 − γ2)
> 0,
πpp1 =
(2β1β2α1 − β1α2γ − α1γ
2)2
8β1(β1β2 − γ2)(2β1β2 − γ2)
> 0,
πpp2 =
((3α2β1 − α1γ)(β1β2 − γ
2) + β1β2(α2β1 − α1γ))
2
16β1(β1β2 − γ2)(2β1β2 − γ2)2
> 0.
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Case 1.b: firm 2 sets the quantity
In this case the leader sets prices while the follower reacts with quantity
setting. The leader uses the reaction function of the follower in order to
maximize his proﬁt
π˜pq1
(
p1
)
: = πpq1
(
p1, R
pq
2 (p1)
)
= p1 qˆ1
(
p1, R
pq
2 (q1)
)
=
(2a1 − 2b1p1 + 2cα2 + cγa1)p1 − (2b1 + cγb1)p
2
1
2(1 + γc)
. (5.11)
Maximizing with respect to p1 yields the optimal price for good 1 which
coincides with ppq1 in (5.9), i.e. p
pq
1 = p
pp
1 . By using the best reply of ﬁrm 2
given in (5.4) this implies qpq2 = q
pp
2 .
Now consider the case in which ﬁrm 1 is a quantity setter.
Analysis of case 2 - the market leader sets the quantity
Case 2.a: firm 2 sets the price
In this case the follower reacts with price setting and the proﬁt of the leader
is given by
π˜qp1
(
q1
)
: = πqp1
(
q1, R
qp
2 (q1)
)
= q1 pˆ1(q1, R
qp
2 (q1))
=
(2α1 − γa2 + cα1γ)q1 − β1(2 + γc)q
2
1
2(1 + γc)
. (5.12)
The optimality condition
∂πqp1
∂q1
= 0 leads to the optimal quantity of ﬁrm 1
qqp1 =
2β2α1 − α2γ
2(2β1β2 − γ2)
.
And by using equation (5.6) it is
pqp2 = R
qp
2 (q
qp
1 ) =
4β1β2α2 − α2γ
2 − 2β2α1γ
4(2β1β2 − γ2)
. (5.13)
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The remaining values of the variables are given by
pqp1 =
2β2α1 − α2γ
4β2
,
qqp2 =
4β1β2α2 − α2γ
2 − 2β2α1γ
4β2(2β1β2 − γ2)
,
πqp1 =
(2β2α1 − α2γ)
2
8β2(2β1β2 − γ2)
,
πqp2 =
(4β1β2α2 − α2γ
2 − 2β2α1γ)
2
16β2(2β1β2 − γ2)2
.
Case 2.b: firm 2 sets the quantity
This is the standard Stackelberg competition and the proﬁt of ﬁrm 1 is given
by
π˜qq1 (q1) : = π
qq
1 (q1, R
qq
2 (q1)) = q1 p˜1
(
q1, R
qq
2 (q1)
)
=
(2β2α1 − γα2)q1 − (2β1β2 − γ
2)q21
2β2
(5.14)
from which the optimal quantity follows as qqq1 = q
qp
1 .
In order to solve for the leader’s optimal choice, these four cases need to
be compared. It follows that equilibrium prices, quantities and proﬁts are
predetermined by the leader’s choice. In particular,
Proposition 5.1. Independently of the follower’s decision, the prices, quan-
tities and profits of both firms are predetermined by the leader’s decision. If
the leader chooses to set a price then the following holds true:
pppi = p
pq
i , q
pp
i = q
pq
i and π
pp
i = π
pq
i , i = 1, 2.
If the leader chooses to set a quantity, then the following holds true:
pqqi = p
qp
i , q
qq
i = q
qp
i and π
qq
i = π
qp
i , i = 1, 2.
The economic interpretation is as follows: After the decision of the leader
on the ﬁrst stage, the follower acts as a monopolist on the remaining market
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and, hence, price and quantity setting by the follower yield the same outcome.
This result also shows that the maximal proﬁt of the follower is predetermined
by the action of the market leader, who is able to anticipate the follower’s
best replies to the diﬀerent types of contracts.
Proposition 5.1 implies that two distinct types of values for the variables
are possible depending on the leader’s choice. One is for the case in which
ﬁrm 1 chooses price competition denoted by the upper index p. Whereas the
upper index q denotes the case in which ﬁrm 1 chooses quantity competition.
In particular,
(πp1 , π
p
2) := (π
pp
1 , π
pp
2 ) = (π
pq
1 , π
pq
2 )
(qp1 , q
p
2) := (q
pp
1 , q
pp
2 ) = (q
pq
1 , q
pq
2 )
(pp1, p
p
2) := (p
pp
1 , p
pp
2 ) = (p
pq
1 , p
pq
2 )
(πq1, π
q
2) := (π
qq
1 , π
qq
2 ) = (π
qp
1 , π
qp
2 )
(qq1, q
q
2) := (q
qq
1 , q
qq
2 ) = (q
qp
1 , q
qp
2 )
(pq1, p
q
2) := (p
qq
1 , p
qq
2 ) = (p
qp
1 , p
qp
2 ).
In order to solve for the leaders optimal decision on the type of contract, these
two scenarios need to be compared. It follows that the leader’s decision on
the type of contract solely depends on the degree of product diﬀerentiation,
i.e. wheter the goods are complements or substitutes. In particular, it is:
Proposition 5.2. For the goods being substitutes (complements) the leader’s
price, quantity and corresponding profits are higher under quantity (price)
setting than under price (quantity) setting. Under quantity (price) leadership
also the follower’s profit and price is higher than that under price (quantity)
leadership of firm 1, while its quantity under quantity leadership is always
lower than under price leadership.
The comparison of all variables is summarized in ﬁgure 2.2. A direct im-
plication of Proposition 5.2 is that if goods are substitutes (complements),
then producers’ surplus33 is higher in the quantity (price) leader model than
33 Producers’ surplus in this case is defined as the sum of profits.
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in the price (quantity) model. Only if goods are independent, i.e. γ = 0 ,and
both ﬁrms are monopolists, the ﬁrms are indiﬀerent between the strategic
variables.
Firm 1
price setting
bb
quantity setting
πp1
πp2
qp1
qp2
pp1
pp2
πq1
πq2
qq1
qq2
pq1
pq2
>
=
<
if γ
<
=
>
0
>
=
<
if γ
<
=
>
0
if γ
<
=
>
0
>
=
<
> for all γ
< for all γ
>
=
<
if γ
<
=
>
0
Figure 5.2: Comparison of case 1 and 2
As mentioned above, if α1 = α2 =
1
1+α
, β1 = β2 =
1
1−α2
and γ = − α
1−α2
then the current demand structure is equal to that which was analyzed by
Boyer and Moreaux (1987). Hence, their demand structure is a special case
of that by Dixit (1979) which is also used in the current work. Moreover,
it is easy to see that for the parameterization the reservation prices and the
degree of product diﬀerentiation are correlated. Therefore, there exist unique
ranking of the leader’s and follower’s prices, quantities and proﬁts depend-
ing on the type of competition (price or quantity) and the property of the
goods (complements or substitutes).34 The following examples show that
these rankings do not hold for the more general demand structure used here.
34For the price leader model Boyer and Moreaux (1987) show: pp1 > p
p
2 and q
p
1 < q
p
2
for all γ and πp1
{
>
<
}
πp2 if and only if γ
{
<
>
}
0. And for the quantity leader model:
pq1 < p
q
2 and q
q
1 > q
q
2 for all γ and π
q
1
{
>
<
}
πq2 if an only if γ
{
>
<
}
0.
CHAPTER 5. ROLE OF STRATEGY SPACE 104
Example 6 (price leader). Set α1 = β1 = 1.
1. Prices: For β2 = 4 and α2 = 2 it is p
p
1 < p
p
2 ∀ γ.
2. Quantities: For β2 = 1 and α2 =
1
2
it is qp1 > q
p
2 ∀ γ.
3. Proﬁts: (a) For β2 = 1/4 and α2 = 1/2 it is π
p
1 > π
p
2 ∀ γ.
(b) For β2 = 4 and α2 = 2 it is π
p
1 < π
p
2 ∀ γ.
Example 7 (quantity leader). Set α1 = β1 = 1.
1. Prices: For β2 =
1
4
and α2 =
1
2
it is pq1 > p
q
2 ∀ γ.
2. Quantities: For β2 = 1 and α2 = 2 it is q
q
1 < q
q
2 ∀ γ.
3. Proﬁts: (a) For β2 = 1 and α2 = 2 it is π
q
1 < π
q
2 ∀ γ.
(b) For β2 = 1 and α2 =
1
2
it is πq1 > π
q
2 ∀ γ.
These examples suggest that the ordering of the reservation prices (or
market size) is crucial for the ordering of the leader’s and follower’s proﬁts.
The last result in this section compares the consumers’ and total surplus
under price and quantity leadership:35
Proposition 5.3. Total and consumers’ surplus are always higher in the
price leader model than in the quantity leader model, whether the goods are
complements or substitutes. Only if the goods are independent quantity com-
petition is as good as price competition in terms of total and consumer sur-
plus.
This result conﬁrms and generalizes the result of Boyer and Moreaux
(1987) who showed that consumers’ and total surplus are higher under price
leadership than under quantity leadership independently of the goods beeing
substitutes or complements. The same holds true in the simulanous move
game by Singh and Vives (1984): Independent of the goods beeing substi-
tutes or complements, consumers’ and total surplus are always higher under
price competition than under quantity competition.
35Here total surplus is equivalent to welfare, i.e. the sum of profits and consumer surplus.
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5.2 Comparison between sequential and simul-
taneous move game
The previous section has shown that some but not all of the results by
Boyer and Moreaux (1987) can be conﬁrmed in the current model. In partic-
ular, the previous section compared the two possivle Stackelberg equilibria,
given by ppi , q
p
i and π
p
i in case of price leadership and p
q
i , q
q
i and π
q
i under
quantity leadership. Still following Boyer and Moreaux (1987) this section
provides a comparison of these Stackelberg equilibria and the Nash equilibria
of the underlying simultaneous move games as introduced by Singh and Vives
(1984). Therfore, the analysis again has to distinguish between four diﬀerent
cases: both set quantities, both set prices and two cases in which ﬁrm i sets
the price and ﬁrm j sets the quantity. Following Singh and Vives (1984) it is:
1. case: both firms are price setters
Using equation (5.1) the equilibrium prices and quantities of the simultaneous
move game can be derived as
pBBi =
2aibj + caj
4bibj − c2
=
2αiβiβj − αiγ
2 − βiαjγ
4βiβj − γ2
, i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j
and
qBBi = bip
B
i =
βj (2αiβiβj − βiαjγ − αiγ
2)
4β2i β
2
j − 5βiβjγ
2 + γ4
, i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j.
The proﬁts can easily be derived as πBBi = p
BB
i q
BB
i .
2. case: both firms are quantity setters
Proﬁt maximization under consideration of the inverse demand system (5.2)
leads to the following equilibrium prices and quantities
qCCi =
2αiβj − αjγ
4βiβj − γ2
, i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j
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and
pCCi =
βi(2αiβj − αjγ)
4βiβj − γ2
, i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j
Clearly, the proﬁts are πCCi = p
CC
i q
CC
i .
3. case: firm 1 sets the price and firm 2 sets the quantity
The equilibrium is characterized by
pBC1 =
2a1b1 + a2c
4b1b2 − 3c2
=
2α1β1β2 − α1γ
2 − α2β1γ
4β1β2 − 3γ2
, (5.15)
pBC2 =
2a2b1 + a1c−
a2c2
b2
4b1b2 − 3c2
=
(2α2β1 − α1γ) (β1β2 − γ
2)
β1 (4β1β2 − 3γ2)
and
qBC1 =
b1b2−c2
b2
pBC1 =
2α1β1β2−α2β1γ−α1γ2
β1(4β1β2−3γ2)
,
qBC2 = b2p
BC
2 =
2α2β1−α1γ
4β1β2−3γ2
,
(5.16)
with corresponding proﬁts πBCi = p
BC
i q
BC
i .
4. case: firm 1 sets the quantity and firm 2 sets the price
By arguments of symmetry just interchange indices i and j and the super-
scripts BC to CB in (5.15), (5.16) in order to get the equilibrium values.
The comparison if these equilibrium values of the simultanous move game
and the equilibrium values of the Stackelberg-game conﬁrms Boyer and More-
aux’s result that the equilibrium prices and quantities of the Stackelberg-
game are bounded from above and below by the equilibrium prices and quan-
tities of the simulanuous move game, respectively. In particular,
Proposition 5.4. 1. Under price leadership in the Stackelberg-game the
following holds
pBB1 < p
p
1 < p
BC
1 and q
BC
1 < q
p
1 < q
BB
1 ∀ γ, (5.17)
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pBB2
(>)
< pp2
(>)
< pBC2 and q
BB
2
(>)
< qp2
(>)
< qBC2 for γ
(<)
> 0 (5.18)
πBC1 < π
BB
1 < π
p
1 , (5.19)
πBB2
(>)
< πp2
(>)
< πBC2 for γ
(<)
> 0. (5.20)
2. Quantity leadership implies
qCC1 < q
q
1 < q
CB
1 and p
CB
1 < p
q
1 < p
CC
1 , (5.21)
pCC2
(<)
> pq2
(<)
> pCB2 and q
CC
2
(<)
> qq2
(<)
> qCB2 for γ
(<)
> 0 (5.22)
πCB1 < π
CC
1 < π
q
1 ∀ γ, (5.23)
πCB2
(>)
< πq2
(>)
< πCC2 for γ
(<)
> 0. (5.24)
This result conﬁrms Boyer and Moreaux (1987) but under weaker con-
ditions in which no correlations between cross-eﬀects and market size exist.
Moreover, since the leader’s proﬁts are larger than the proﬁts of the simulanu-
ous move game (compare equation (5.19) and (5.23)), i.e. the (informational)
advantage of beeing the leader (compared to the situation in the simulanuous
move game) is also reﬂected the leader’s proﬁts.
For an illustration of Proposition 5.4 consider the following example.
Example 8. Consider α1 = α2 = 4, β1 = β2 = 2. This implies that
γ2
β1β2
= γ
2
4
> 0 measures the degree of product diﬀerentiation. For this
parameter constellation the equations (5.17), (5.18), (5.19) and (5.20) 36
yield the following ﬁgures 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5.
36Examples for (5.21), (5.22), (5.23) and (5.24) is omitted.
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R
−2 0 2
qq1
qCB1
qCC1
R
−2 0 2
pq1
pCB1
pCC1
Figure 5.3: Quantity and price of ﬁrm 1.
R
−2 0 2
qq2
qCB2
qCC2
R
−2 0 2
pq2
pCB2
pCC2
Figure 5.4: Quantity and price of ﬁrm 2.
R
−2 0 2
πq1
πCB1
πCC1
R
−2 0 2
πq2
πCB2
πCC2
Figure 5.5: Proﬁts of ﬁrm 1 and 2.
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A direct consequence of Proposition 5.4 is that if the goods are substitutes
(complements), then producers’ surplus is higher in the Stackelberg-game
under price (quantity) leadership than in the Bertrand (Cournot) equilibrium
of the simultanuous move game.
Next, the last result compares total and consumers’ surplus in the Stack-
elberg game with those of the simultanuous move game. Loosely speaking it
is shown that consumers’ and total surplus are increasing in the number of
price-setting ﬁrms.
Proposition 5.5. Total and consumer surplus is always highest in the Bertrand
equilibrium and lowest in the Cournot equilibrium. In between the price
(quantity) Stackelberg is always better (worse) than the mixed Nash in which
firm 1 sets a price (quantity)37.
This generalizes the results of Boyer and Moreaux (1987), i.e. total and
consumer surplus are increasing in the number of price-setting ﬁrms. More-
over, both, Proposition 5.5 and the result of Vives (1985), imply that simul-
taneous Bertrand competition is optimal in terms of welfare and consumer
surplus.
5.3 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter the model by Boyer and Moreaux (1987) was generalized by
using a less restrictive utility function which was introduced by Dixit (1979).
The implications of this more general utility function are twofold: First, the
demands for the two goods as a function of prices do not coincide and second
the cross-eﬀects are diﬀerent. In contrast to Boyer and Moreaux (1987) it
is shown that the leader’s price (quantity) in the price Stackelberg model is
not necessarily higher (lower) than the follower’s one. Moreover, it is shown
that price setting of at least one ﬁrm is preferable in terms of welfare and
consumers’ surplus independently of the game structure (simultaneous or
sequential).
37The ranking of the mixed Nash in which firm 1 sets a price (quantity) and the quantity
(price) Stackelberg depends on the exact parameter constelation.
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Last, in contrast to Boyer and Moreaux (1987), the orderings of prices,
quantities and proﬁts of the diﬀerent simultaneous move (Cournot, Bertrand,
mixed) and leader-follower games by Boyer and Moreaux (1987) are veriﬁed
only for ﬁrm 1. For ﬁrm 2 these orderings depend on both: the market size
and the nature of the goods (substitutes or complements).
Chapter 6
Summary and Concluding
Remarks
In general a decision maker’s knowledge about future states of the world
is imperfect and, hence, he faces risk when making a decision. However,
the sourcing of additional information may increase the decision maker’s
knowledge and reduce the riskyness in the decision problem. A novel concept
of information systems has been introduced in Chapter 2. In contrast to the
traditional literature on economics where the prior is typically kept ﬁxed, this
new approach allows for diﬀerent priors. Similar to the traditional literature,
it formalizes the idea that information are revealed through the observation
of a signal that is correlated with the state of the world. In particular, an
information system consists of an information structure and a prior belief.
Intuitively, the correlation of signals and states is jointly determined by the
information structure and the prior belief.
Building on this, some fundamental and desirable properties of informa-
tiveness concepts have been discussed in Chapter 3 and two novel informa-
tiveness concepts, weak and strong informativeness, have been introduced.
These two informativeness concepts take the impact of the prior on infor-
mativeness into account. Moreover, it is shown how these concepts relate to
informativeness concepts of Blackwell (1951, 1953), Lehmann (1988)/Persico
(1996) and Kim (1995): If the prior belief is ﬁxed, then weak informative-
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ness is weaker than any other informativeness concept considered in this work
while strong informativeness is neither stronger nor weaker than the tradi-
tional concepts. Furthermore, an information system is more valuable for
all decision makers with supermodular preferences if and only if the former
information system is weakly more informative than the latter one and if
additionally the information systems have equal underlying prior beliefs.
The following Chapter 4 analyzed the value of information in two diﬀerent
economic environments. The main result of the ﬁrst model is that the demand
for costly information is decreasing in the degree of (relative) risk aversion for
broad range of parameters. The main result of the second model generalizes
parts of the result by Schlee (2001) showing that the value of information is
negative in a production economy with many commodities as well as complete
and eﬃcient risk-sharing markets.
Finally, Chapter 5 studies the role of information in a Stackelberg game.
In particular, the value of information about the competitor’s strategy space
is zero. The intuition for this result is that after observing the leader’s choice,
the follower acts as a monopolist on the remaining market and, hence, it
does not matter whether he sets a quantity or a price because his proﬁts
are predetermined by the leader’s choice. Consequently, it does not matter
for the leader whether the follower sets a price or a quantity and, hence,
information about the follower’s strategy space are worthless.
Some interesting research questions are not considered here. First, the
production and supply of information. Suppose, for instance, the model of
Chapter 4.1. How are the information systems produced? And, how does
the production cost put together? Second, what about the equilibrium value
of information in an economy where the consumers’ preferences and/or the
ﬁrms’ production sets are state-dependent? And third, how are weak and
strong informativeness characterized in terms of their value? Is it possible
to characterize these concepts in terms of ex ante expected utility also for
diﬀerent prior beliefs? I am currently working on these questions in a joint
project with Prof. Dr. Bernhard Eckwert and Dr. Felix Várdy. Our prelim-
inary result is, loosely speaking, that a system is weakly more informative
than another one if and only if it is more valuable for all decision makers
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with quasi-linear preferences who are indiﬀerent (in a certain sense) without
information.
Appendix A
Notation
Information systems: States and signals
• Ω - state space; F - σ-algebra of subsets in Ω;
ω˜ - state variable; ω - realization of state variable;
FΩ, fΩ - cdf and pdf (or probability mass function) of prior belief on Ω;
∆(Ω) - set of pdfs (or probability mass functions) on Ω.
• S - signal space; S - σ-algebra of subsets in S;
s˜ - signal variable; s - signal realization;
FS, fS - cdf and pdf (or probability mass function) of (marginal) signal
distributions.
• FS,Ω, fS,Ω - cdf and pdf of joint distribution of signals and states.
• FΩ|S, fΩ|S - cdf and pdf of the posterior/conditional state distribution.
• F 0S0|Ω, f
0
S0|Ω - fully uninformative information structure;
F 1S1|Ω, f
1
S1|Ω - full informative information structure.
• %inf - arbitrary informativeness concept;
%b - Blackwell’s suﬃciency criterion;
%a - Accuracy;
%l-inf - Local informativeness;
I
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%mps - MPS-precision;
%sm - SM-precision;
%w-inf - weak informativeness;
%s-inf - strong informativeness.
APPENDIX A. NOTATION III
• M - set of information structures with MLRP;
D - set of information structures which conditional signal densities
are twice continuously diﬀerentiable with respect to ω.
Γ(fΩ) - set of information structures with MLRP and normalized signals
given the prior fΩ;
Γ - set of all information systems with MLRP and normalized signals.
Decisions and utility
• A - action set.
• O - set of outcomes.
• u - (fundamental) utility;
U(a, ω˜) - expected utility;
v(a, ω) - indirect utility (from an action and an state of world);
V ((fS|Ω, fΩ), ·, v) - ex ante expected utility under information system
(fS|Ω, fΩ) for an agent with indirect or direct utility v.
Chapter 4
Section 4.1
• I - set of consumers;
• n - number of individual states;
• ǫ - error level;
• f ǫSi|Ω - information service with error level ǫ;
• c(ǫ) - cost of producing an information service with error level ǫ;
• P (ǫ) - price for an information service with error level ǫ;
Section 4.2
• N - number of states;
• J - set of ﬁrms;
J - number of ﬁrms;
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• I set of consumers;
I - number of consumers;
• C ⊆ RC+ - commodity space;
C - number of diﬀerent commodities;
Cc ⊆ R+ - space of commodity c ∈ {1, . . . , C}.
• w(ω, i) ∈ C - endowment vector of agent i ∈ I ∪ J in state ω;
wc(ω, i) - endowment of commodity c of agent i in state ω;
w(i) ∈ CN - agent i’s tupel of endowment vectors for each state;
wc(ω) ∈ Cc - aggregate endowment of commodity c in state ω;
• Yj - ﬁrm j’s technology/production set;
y(ω, j) ∈ Yj - ﬁrm j’s production vector (positive=output; negative=input);
y(j) - ﬁrm j’s state-contingent production plan;
• x(ω, i) ∈ C - consumer i’s consumption vector in state ω;
x(i) ∈ CN - consumer i’s state-contingent consumption plan;
Bi - consumer i’s budget set;
• (x(ω), y(ω)) ∈ CI ×
⊗
j∈J
Yj - allocation in state ω;
(x, y) ∈
(
CS
)I
×
⊗
j∈J
Y Nj - allocation of state-contingent commodities;
• p ∈
(
RC+
)N
- price vector for state-contingent claims.
In particular, pc,ω denotes the price for a claim which pays one unit
of commodity c if the state is ω and nothing otherwise.
Chapter 5
• πpqi (q
pq
i , p
pq
i ) - ﬁrm i’s proﬁt (quantity, price) if ﬁrm 1 sets a price and
ﬁrm 2 sets a quantity;
πqpi (q
pq
i , p
pq
i ) - ﬁrm i’s proﬁt (quantity, price) if ﬁrm 1 sets a quantity
and ﬁrm 2 sets a price;
πppi (q
pp
i , p
pp
i ) - ﬁrm i’s proﬁt (quantity, price) if both ﬁrms set a price;
πqqi (q
qq
i , p
qq
i ) - ﬁrm i’s proﬁt (quantity, price) if both ﬁrms set quantities.
Appendix B
Proofs of Chapter 3
Proof of Lemma 3.1 (P0′): Deﬁne fˆ 0S0|S : S
0×S, (s0, s) 7→ f 0S0(s
0). Then,
ES
[
fˆ 0S0|S(s
0|s˜)|ω
]
= ES
[
f 0S0(s
0)|ω
]
= f 0S0(s
0) = f 0S0|Ω(s
0|ω) ∀ s0 ∈ S0, ω ∈ Ω.
This implies fS|Ω %
b
f 0S0|Ω for all information structures fS|Ω.
(P1′): Consider f 1S1|Ω. Deﬁne implicitly
ω1 : S1 → Ω, s1 7→ ω1(s1),
such that s1 ∈ C1(ω(s1)). This implies
s1 ∈ C1(ω)⇒ ω1(s1) = ω. (B.1)
For an information structure fS|Ω deﬁne
fˆS|S1 : S × S
1, (s, s1) 7→ fˆS|S1(s|s
1) = fS|Ω(s|ω(s
1)). (B.2)
Then
ES1
[
fˆS|S1(s|s˜
1)|ω
]
(B.2)
= ES1
[
fS|Ω(s|ω
1(s˜1))
] (??),(B.1)
= fS|Ω(s|ω)
for all s ∈ S, ω ∈ Ω. This implies f 1S1|Ω %
b
fS|Ω for all information structures
fS|Ω.
V
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(P2): Consider information structures f¯S¯|Ω, fS|Ω and fˇSˇ|Ω such that f¯S¯|Ω %
b
fS|Ω
and fS|Ω %
b
fˇSˇ|Ω. Therefore,
fS|Ω(s|ω) = E¯S¯
[
ˆ¯fS|S¯(s|˜¯s)|ω
]
∀ s ∈ S, ω ∈ Ω (B.3)
and
fˇSˇ|Ω(sˇ|ω) = ES
[
ˆˇfSˇ|S(sˇ|s˜)|ω
]
∀ sˇ ∈ Sˇ, ω ∈ Ω. (B.4)
Now deﬁne
¯ˇfSˇ|S¯ : Sˇ × S¯ → R+, (sˇ, s¯) 7→ ES
[
ˆˇfSˇ|S(sˇ|s˜)|s¯
]
.
Then,
E¯S¯
[
¯ˇfSˇ|S¯(sˇ|˜¯s)|ω
]
= E¯S¯
[
ES
[
ˆˇfSˆ|S(sˇ|s˜)|˜¯s
]
|ω
]
=
∫
S¯
∫
S
ˆˇfSˇ|S(sˇ|s)
ˆ¯fS|S¯(s|s¯)f¯S¯|Ω(s¯|ω)dsds¯
Fubini,(B.3)
=
∫
S
ˆˇfSˇ|S(sˇ|s)fS|Ω(s|ω)ds
(B.4)
= fˇSˇ|Ω(sˇ|ω)
for all sˇ ∈ Sˇ, ω ∈ Ω.
(P3): Deﬁne fˆS|S(s|s
′) = 1{s′}(s), where δ{s′} denotes the indicator func-
tion of the set {s′} ∈ S.38 Then
ES
[
fˆS|S|ω
]
= fS|Ω(s|ω) ∀ s ∈ S, ω ∈ Ω
shows fS|Ω %
b
fS|Ω for all information structures fS|Ω.
(IS): Suppose fS|Ω %
b
f¯S¯|Ω and let t : Ω → Ω
′ be bijective. Hence, there
exists an information structure fˆS¯|S such that
f¯S¯|Ω(s¯|ω) = ES
[
fˆS¯|S(s¯|s˜)|ω
]
∀ s¯ ∈ S¯, ω ∈ Ω.
38Remember: 1{s′}(s) =
{
1 if s = s′
0 else.
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Since fS|t(Ω)(s|ω
′) = fS|Ω(s|t
−1(ω′)) and f¯S¯|t(Ω)(s¯|ω
′) = f¯S¯|Ω(s¯|t
−1(ω′)) for all
s ∈ S, s¯ ∈ S¯ and ω′ ∈ t(Ω), this implies
f¯S|t(Ω)(s¯|ω
′) = f¯S¯|Ω(s¯|t
−1(ω′)) = ES
[
fˆS¯|S(s¯|s˜)|t
−1(ω′)
]
∀ s¯ ∈ S¯, ω′ ∈ t(Ω).
Hence, fS|t(Ω) %
b
f¯S¯|t(Ω). 
Proof of Proposition 3.1 Deﬁne
γS|(S¯,S) : S × S¯ × S, (s, s¯, s
′) 7→
{
1 if s = s′
0 else.
Then,
E(Sˆ,S)
[
γS|(S¯,S)(s, ˜ˆs, s˜
′)|ω
]
=
∫
S¯
∫
S
γS|(S¯,S)(s, s¯, s
′)f(S,S¯)|Ω(s¯, s
′|ω)ds′ds¯
=
∫
S¯
f¯S¯|Ω(s¯|ω)fS|Ω(s|ω)ds¯ = fS|Ω(s|ω).

The proof of Proposition 3.3 makes use of the following Lemma:
Lemma B.1. (i) fS|Ω ∈M =⇒ FS|Ω(s|ω) ≥ FS|Ω(s|ω
′) for all ω, ω′ ∈ Ω,
ω′ ≥ ω, and all s ∈ S.
(ii) fS|Ω ∈ M =⇒ F
−1(p|ω) ≤ F−1(p|ω′) for all ω, ω′ ∈ Ω and all
p ∈ [0, 1].
Proof: (i) Let fS|Ω ∈M. The MLRP is equivalent to
fS|Ω(s
′|ω′)fS|Ω(s|ω) ≥ fS|Ω(s|ω
′)fS|Ω(s
′|ω) for all ω′ ≥ ω and s′ ≥ s. (B.5)
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Integration of (B.5) over s from s to s′ delivers
fS|Ω(s
′|ω′)FS|Ω(s
′|ω) ≥ fS|Ω(s
′|ω)FS|Ω(s
′|ω′) for all ω′ ≥ ω and s′ ∈ S
⇐⇒
fS|Ω(s
′|ω′)
fS|Ω(s|ω)
≥
FS|Ω(s
′|ω′)
FS|Ω(s′|ω)
for all ω′ ≥ ω and s′ ∈ S. (B.6)
Next, integration of (B.5) over s′ from s to s¯ delivers
(1− FS|Ω(s|ω
′))fS|Ω(s|ω) ≥ fS|Ω(s|ω
′)(1− FS|Ω(s|ω)) for all ω
′ ≥ ω and s ∈ S
⇐⇒
1− FS|Ω(s|ω
′)
1− FS|Ω(s|ω)
≥
fS|Ω(s|ω
′)
fS|Ω(s|ω)
for all ω′ ≥ ω and s ∈ S. (B.7)
Combining equations (B.6) and (B.7) gives
1− FS|Ω(s|ω
′)
1− FS|Ω(s|ω)
≥
FS|Ω(s|ω
′)
FS|Ω(s|ω)
for all ω′ ≥ ω and s ∈ S
⇐⇒
1− FS|Ω(s|ω
′)
FS|Ω(s|ω′)
≥
1− FS|Ω(s|ω)
FS|Ω(s|ω)
for all ω′ ≥ ω and s ∈ S.
Hence, FS|Ω(s|ω
′) ≤ FS|Ω(s|ω) for all ω ≤ ω
′ and s ∈ S.
(ii) Part (i) implies that FS|Ω(s|ω) is decreasing in ω for all ω ∈ Ω. Therefore,
F−1S|Ω(p|ω) := inf
{
s ∈ S|FS|Ω(s|ω) ≥ p
}
must be increasing in ω for all p ∈
[0, 1]. 
Proof of Proposition 3.3 (P0′): Let f 0S0|Ω, fS|Ω ∈ M. Since f
0
S0|Ω is fully
uninformative it follows f 0S0|Ω(s
0|ω) = f 0S0|Ω(s
0|ω′) for all ω, ω′ ∈ Ω and all
s0 ∈ S0. This implies that F 0S0|Ω(s
0|ω) is constant in ω for all s0 ∈ S0. Since
fS|Ω has the MLRP, Lemma B.1 (ii) now implies that
T : S0 × Ω, (s0, ω) 7→ F−1S|Ω(F
0
S0|Ω(s
0|ω)|ω)
is nondecreasing in ω for all s0 ∈ S0 which shows fS|Ω %
a
f 0S0|Ω.
(P1′): Now consider f 1S1|Ω, fS|Ω ∈ M. First, observe that the deﬁnition of
f 1S1|Ω implies F
1−1
S1|Ω(p|ω) ∈ C
1(ω) for all p ∈ [0, 1]. Next observe that for
APPENDIX B. PROOFS OF CHAPTER 3 IX
an information structure with MLRP, f 1S1|Ω ∈ M, the following holds: Let
s ∈ C1(ω) and s′ ∈ C1(ω′). Since C1(ω) ∩ C1(ω′), ω′ ≥ ω implies s ≤ s′.
These two observations imply that
T : S × Ω→ S1, (s, ω) 7→ F 1
−1
S1|Ω(F (s|ω)|ω)
is nondecreasing in ω for all s ∈ S.
(P2): Let fS|Ω, f¯S|Ω, fˆSˆ|Ω ∈ M such that fS|Ω %
a
f¯S¯|Ω and f¯S¯|Ω %
a
fˆSˆ|Ω. Hence,
T¯ : S¯ × Ω→ S, (s¯, ω) 7→ F−1S|Ω(F¯S¯|Ω(s¯|ω)|ω)
and
ˆ¯T : Sˆ × Ω→ S¯, (sˆ, ω) 7→ F¯−1
S¯|Ω
(FˆSˆ|Ω(sˆ|ω)|ω)
are nondecreasing in ω for all s¯ ∈ S¯ and sˆ ∈ Sˆ, respectively. Since the
composition of two nondecreasing functions is in turn nondecreasing, this
implies that
Tˆ : Sˆ × Ω→ S, (sˆ, ω) 7→ F−1S|Ω(FˆSˆ|Ω(sˆ|ω)|ω) = T¯ ◦
ˆ¯T (sˆ, ω)
is nondecreasing in ω for all sˆ ∈ Sˆ.
(P3): Let fS|Ω ∈M. Then,
T : S × Ω→ S, (s, ω) 7→ F−1S|Ω(FS|Ω(s|ω)|ω) = s
is the projection of (s, ω) on s and, hence, constant in ω for all s ∈ S.
(OS): First, observe that for fS|Ω ∈ M and a strictly increasing state trans-
formation t : Ω → R it is obvious that fS|t(Ω) ∈ M.
39 Moreover, for
39In particular: fS|Ω(s|ω)/fS|Ω(s|ω′) is decreasing in s for all ω, ω′ ∈ Ω such that ω′ ≥ ω
t strictly increasing
⇐⇒ fS|t(Ω)(s|ω¯)/fS|t(Ω)(s|ω¯′) = fS|Ω(s|t
−1(ω¯))/fS|Ω(s|t−1(ω¯′) is decreasing in s for all
ω¯, ω¯′ ∈ t(Ω) such that ω¯′ ≥ ω¯.
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fS|Ω, f¯S¯|Ω ∈M and t : Ω→ R strictly increasing, it is
T : S¯ × t(Ω)→ S, (s, ω) 7→ F−1S|t(Ω)(F¯S¯|t(Ω)(s¯|ω)|ω) = F
−1
S|Ω(F¯S¯|Ω(s¯|t
−1(ω))|t−1(ω))
Since t is strictly increasing this implies that if F−1S|Ω(F¯S¯|Ω(s¯|ω)|ω) is nonde-
creasing in ω for all s¯ ∈ S¯, then F−1S|t(Ω)(F¯S¯|t(Ω)(s¯|ω
′)|ω′) is nondecreasing in
ω′ for all s¯ ∈ S¯. 
Proof of Proposition 3.4 (P0): Consider f 0S0|Ω, fS|Ω ∈ D. Since f
0
S0|Ω is
state independent it follows that ∂f0S0|Ω(s
0|ω)/∂ω = 0 for all s0 ∈ S0 and ω ∈ Ω.
Hence, ES
[
∂f0
S0|Ω/∂ω
f0
S0|Ω
(s˜|ω)|ω
]
= 0 for all ω ∈ Ω and
Lf0
S0|Ω
(x, ω) =
{
0 , if x < 0,
1 , if x ≥ 0.
for all ω ∈ Ω.
• Case A: Suppose there is ω ∈ Ω such that ES
[
∂fS|Ω/∂ω
fS|Ω
(s˜|ω)|ω
]
6= 0.
Then, whether Lf0
S0|Ω
(·, ω) is a MPS of LfS|Ω(·, ω) nor LfS|Ω(·, ω) is a
MPS of Lf0
S0|Ω
(·, ω). Hence, fS|Ω 6%
l-inf
f¯S¯|Ω and f¯S¯|Ω 6%
l-inf
fS|Ω.
• Case B: Suppose ES
[
∂fS|Ω/∂ω
fS|Ω
(s˜|ω)|ω
]
= 0 for all ω ∈ Ω. In particular,
this implies the following: If
∂fS|Ω
∂ω
(s|ω) 6= 0 for some ω ∈ Ω and s ∈
S (i.e. fS|Ω is not fully uninformative), then there exist x < 0 s.t.
LfS|Ω(x, ω) > 0. Hence,
x∫
−∞
Lf0
S0|Ω
(x′, ω)− LfS|Ω(x
′, ω)dx′ = −
x∫
−∞
LfS|Ω(x
′, ω)dx′ < 0.
This implies that LfS|Ω(·, ω) is not a MPS of Lf0
S0|Ω
(·, ω), i.e. fS|Ω 6%
l-inf
f 0S0|Ω.
(P2): Let fS|Ω, f¯S|Ω, fˆSˆ|Ω ∈ D such that fS|Ω %
l-inf
f¯S¯|Ω and f¯S¯|Ω %
l-inf
fˆSˆ|Ω. In
particular, this implies that LfS|Ω(·, ω) is a MPS of Lf¯S¯|Ω(·, ω) for all ω ∈ Ω
and that Lf¯S¯|Ω(·, ω) is a MPS of LfˆSˆ|Ω
(·, ω) for all ω ∈ Ω. Consequently,
LfS|Ω(·, ω) and Lfˆ
Sˆ|Ω
(·, ω) have equal mean for all ω ∈ Ω. And since the
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convex order is transitive this implies fS|Ω %
l-inf
fˆSˆ|Ω.
(P3): Obvious.
(wOS): This part of the proof makes use of the following equality: For any
fS|Ω ∈ D and for any strictly increasing, (twice) continuously diﬀerentiable
function t : Ω→ R the following holds
LfS|t(Ω)(x, ω) =Prob
(
∂fS|t(Ω)/∂ω
fS|t(Ω)
(s˜|ω′) ≤ x
)
=Prob
(
∂fS|Ω/∂ω
fS|Ω
(s˜|t−1(ω′))
(
t−1
)′
(ω′) ≤ x
)
=LfS|Ω
(
x
(t−1)′ (ω′)
, t−1(ω′)
)
. (B.8)
Now consider fS|Ω, f¯S¯|Ω ∈ D such that fS|Ω %
l-inf
f¯S¯|Ω and let t : Ω → R
be strictly increasing and twice continuously diﬀerentiable. First, observe
that this implies that LfS|t(Ω)(·, ω
′) and Lf¯S¯|t(Ω)(·, ω) have equal mean for all
ω′ ∈ t(Ω), i.e.
ES
[
∂fS|t(Ω)/∂ω
fS|t(Ω)
(s˜|ω′)|ω′
]
= ES
[
∂fS|Ω/∂ω
fS|Ω
(s˜|ω′)|t−1(ω′)
]
=ES
[
∂f¯S|Ω/∂ω
f¯S|Ω
(s˜|ω′)|t−1(ω′)
]
= ES
[
∂f¯S¯|t(Ω)/∂ω
f¯S¯|t(Ω)
(s˜|ω′)|ω′
]
for all ω′ ∈ t(Ω). Then, the inequality
x∫
−∞
LfS|t(Ω)(x
′, ω′)dx′ =
(
t−1
)′
(ω′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
const.
x
(t−1)′(ω′)∫
−∞
LfS|Ω(x
′, t−1(ω′))dx′
≤
(
t−1
)′
(ω′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
const.
x
(t−1)′(ω′)∫
−∞
Lf¯S¯|Ω(x
′, t−1(ω′))dx′ =
x∫
−∞
Lf¯S¯|t(Ω)(x
′, ω′)dx′
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holds for all x ∈ R and ω′ ∈ t(Ω). The equalities follow from equation (B.8)
and the transformation theorem while the inequality follows by assumption
(fS|Ω %
l-inf
f¯S¯|Ω). Summing up, it follows fS|t(Ω) %
l-inf
f¯S¯|t(Ω). 
Proof of Proposition 3.6 (P0′): Consider f 0S|Ω ∈ Γ(f
0
Ω), the normalized,
fully uninfomative information structure, and fS|Ω ∈ Γ(fΩ). Then the MLRP
implies that
ω∫
ω
¯
fS,Ω(s, ω
′)− f 0S,Ω(s, ω
′)dω′ = FΩ|S(ω|s)− FΩ(ω).
is decreasing in s and, hence, (fS|Ω, fΩ) %
s-inf
(f 0S|Ω, f
0
Ω) and (fS|Ω, fΩ) %
w-inf
(f 0S|Ω, f
0
Ω).
(P1): Let f 1S|Ω denote the for the prior f
1
Ω normalized, fully informative
information structure with MLRP (i.e. f 1S|Ω ∈ Γ(f
1
Ω) and f
1
S|Ω fully informa-
tive) and let fS|Ω ∈ Γ(fΩ). Now consider
D(s, ω) :=
ω∫
ω
¯
fS,Ω(s, ω
′)− f 1S,Ω(s, ω
′)dω′ =
{
FΩ|S(ω|s) if ω < ω
1(s)
FΩ|S(ω|s)− 1 if ω ≥ ω
1(s)
D(s, ω) :=
ω∫
ω
¯
fS,Ω(s, ω
′)− f 1S,Ω(s, ω
′)dω′ =
{
FΩ|S(ω|s) if ω < ω
1(s)
FΩ|S(ω|s)− 1 if ω ≥ ω
1(s)
where ω1(s) : S → Ω is implicitly deﬁned by s ∈ C1(ω1(s)). The MLRP im-
plies that ω1(s) is non-decreasing in s. Next ﬁx ωˆ ∈ Ω such that FΩ|S(ωˆ|sˆ) < 1
where sˆ := inf(C1(ω′)). If fS,Ω 6≡ f
1
S,Ω,
40 then exists s′ < sˆ with ωˆ < ω1(s′)
and D(s′, ωˆ) = FΩ|S(ωˆ|s
′)−1 < 0. Since for any s′′ ≥ sˆ it is ωˆ ≥ ω1(sˆ), which
implies D(s′′, ωˆ) = FΩ|S(ωˆ|s
′′) ≥ 0, it follows that D(s, ωˆ) is increasing in sˆ.
This shows (fS|Ω, fΩ) 6%
s-inf
(f 1S|Ω, f
1
Ω) and (fS|Ω, fΩ) 6%
w-inf
(f 1S|Ω, f
1
Ω).
(P2): Consider (fS|Ω, fΩ), (f¯S|Ω, f¯Ω), (fˆS|Ω, fˆΩ) ∈ Γ such that (fS|Ω, fΩ) %
x
(f¯S|Ω, f¯Ω)
40 fS,Ω ≡ f
1
S,Ω, then both systems are fully informative.
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and (f¯S|Ω, f¯Ω) %
x
(fˆS|Ω, fˆΩ) for x ∈ {s-inf, w-inf}. For x = s-inf it follows that
ω∫
ω
¯
fS,Ω(s, ω
′)− fˆS,Ω(s, ω
′)dω′
=
ω∫
ω
¯
fS,Ω(s, ω
′)− f¯S,Ω(s, ω
′)dω′ +
ω∫
ω
¯
f¯S,Ω(s, ω
′)− fˆS,Ω(s, ω
′)dω′
is non-increasing in s for all ω ∈ Ω, i.e. (fS|Ω, fΩ) %
s-inf
(fˆS|Ω, fˆΩ).
x = w-inf implies
FS,Ω(s, ω)− sFΩ(ω) ≥ F¯S,Ω(s, ω)− sF¯Ω(ω) ≥ FˆS,Ω(s, ω)− sFˆΩ(ω) ∀ (s, ω) ∈ S × Ω
and, hence, (fS|Ω, fΩ) %
w-inf
(fˆS|Ω, fˆΩ).
(P3): Obvious.
(OS): Consider a strictly increasing, diﬀerentiable state transformation t : Ω→
R and deﬁne x˜ := t(ω˜). For an information system (fS|Ω, fΩ) ∈ Γ, equations
(3.1) and (3.2) imply for the joint distribution of x˜ = t(ω˜) and s
fS,t(Ω)(s, x) =
fS,Ω(s, t
−1(x))
t′(t−1(x))
.
Hence,
x∫
x
¯
fS,t(Ω)(s, x
′)dx′ =
x∫
x
¯
fS,Ω(s, t
−1(x′))
t′(t−1(x′))
dx′ =
t−1(x)∫
ω
¯
fS,Ω(s, ω)dω (B.9)
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and
FS,t(Ω)(s, x)− sFt(Ω)(x) =
s∫
0
x∫
x
¯
fS,t(Ω)(s
′, x′)− ft(Ω)(x
′)dx′ds′
=
s∫
0
t−1(x)∫
ω
¯
fS,Ω(s
′, ω)− fΩ(ω
′)dωds′
=FS,Ω(s, t
−1(x))− sFΩ(t
−1(x)). (B.10)
The claim follow from Deﬁnition 3.10 and equations (B.9) and (B.10). 
The proof of Proposition 3.7 makes use of the following Lemma which is a
variation of Theorem (3.A.5) in Shaked and Shantbikumar (2007).
Lemma B.2. Let s˜ be uniformly distributed on S = [0, 1] and let gi : [0, 1]→
R, i = 1, 2, be integrable and increasing functions with ES [g1(s˜)] = ES [g2(s˜)].
Then x˜1 := g1(s˜) is a MPS of x˜2 := g2(s˜), iff
s∫
0
g1(s
′)− g2(s
′)ds′ ≤ 0 ∀ s ∈ [0, 1]
⇐⇒
1∫
s
g1(s
′)− g2(s
′)ds′ ≥ 0 ∀ s ∈ [0, 1]
Proof of Proposition 3.7 Integration by parts yields for any fS|Ω ∈ Γ(fΩ),
any fΩ ∈ ∆(Ω) and any (strictly) increasing state transformation t : Ω→ R
EΩ [t(ω˜)|s] = t(ω¯)−
∫
Ω
ω∫
ω
¯
fS,Ω(s, ω
′)t′(ω)dω′dω = t(ω¯)−
∫
Ω
FΩ|S(ω|s)t
′(ω)dω.
(B.11)
First, consider the strong informativeness criterion. The weak information
criterion will be dealt with subsequently.
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(i) "⇒": Let fS|Ω ∈ Γ(fΩ), f¯S|Ω ∈ Γ(f¯Ω) and assume (fS|Ω, fΩ) %
s-inf
(f¯S|Ω, f¯Ω).
Using equation B.11 yields
EΩ [t(ω˜)|s]− E¯Ω [t(ω˜)|s]
=−
∫
Ω
ω∫
ω
¯
[
fS,Ω(s, ω
′)− f¯S,Ω(s, ω
′)
]
t(ω′)dω′dω (B.12)
(fS|Ω, fΩ) %
s-inf
(f¯S|Ω, f¯Ω) implies that
ω∫
ω
¯
fS,Ω(s, ω)−f¯S,Ω(s, ω) is non-increasing
in s for all ω ∈ Ω. Therefore, the LHS of B.12 is non-decreasing in s. Together
with OS this shows (fS|t(Ω), ft(Ω)) %
sm
(f¯S|t(Ω), ft(Ω)) for all (strictly) increasing
state transformations t : Ω→ R.
"⇐": This direction is shown by contradiction: (fS|Ω, fΩ) %
sm
(f¯S|Ω, f¯Ω)
and (fS|Ω, fΩ) 6%
s-inf
(f¯S|Ω, f¯Ω) =⇒∃ t : Ω→ R s.t. (fS|t(Ω), ft(Ω)) 6%
sm
(f¯S|t(Ω), f¯t(Ω)).
Therefore, suppose (fS|Ω, fΩ) %
sm
(f¯S|Ω, f¯Ω) and (fS|Ω, fΩ) 6%
s-inf
(f¯S|Ω, f¯Ω).
Now deﬁne
D(s, ω) :=
ω∫
ω
¯
fS,Ω(s, ω
′)− f¯S,Ω(s, ω
′)dω′. (B.13)
Since (fS|Ω, fΩ) 6%
s-inf
(f¯S|Ω, f¯Ω) for some s
′, s′′ ∈ S = S, s′ > s′′, there exists
Ω0(s, s
′) ⊂ Ω (with positive measure) such that
D(s′, ω)−D(s′′, ω) > 0 for any ω ∈ Ω0(s
′, s′′). (B.14)
Choose ǫ > 0 and deﬁne a state transformation such that
t′(ω) =
{
1 if ω ∈ Ω0(s
′, s′′),
ǫ if ω 6∈ Ω0(s
′, s′′).
(B.15)
This yields
EΩ [t(ω˜)|s]− E¯Ω [t(ω˜)|s]
(B.12),(B.21)
= −
∫
Ω
D(s, ω)t′(ω)dω. (B.16)
APPENDIX B. PROOFS OF CHAPTER 3 XVI
Thus,
(
EΩ(t(ω˜)|s
′)− E¯Ω [t(ω˜)|s
′]
)
−
(
EΩ(t(ω˜)|s
′′)− E¯Ω [t(ω˜)|s
′′]
)
(B.15),(B.16)
= −
∫
Ωo(s′,s′′)
(D(s′, ω)−D(s′′, ω)) t′(ω)dω −
∫
Ω\Ω0(s′,s′′)
(D(s′, ω)−D(s′′, ω)) t′(ω)dω
(B.15)
≤ −
∫
Ωo(s′,s′′)
(D(s′, ω)−D(s′′, ω))dω + ǫ
∫
Ω\Ω0(s′,s′′)
|D(s′, ω)−D(s′′, ω)|dω
which is by (B.14) negatice for ǫ suﬃciently small. Hence, (fS|t(Ω), ft(Ω)) 6%
sm
(f¯S|t(Ω), f¯t(Ω)).
(ii) "⇒": Suppose (fS|Ω, fΩ) %
w-inf
(f¯S|Ω, f¯Ω). From the Deﬁnition of the
weak informativeness criterion follows
0 ≥
∫
Ω
[
F¯S,Ω(s, ω)− sF¯Ω(ω)
]
− [FS,Ω(s, ω)− sFΩ(ω)]dω (B.17)
Fubini
=
s∫
0
∫
Ω
[
F¯Ω|S(ω|s)− F¯Ω(ω)
]
−
[
FΩ|S(ω|s)− FΩ(ω)
]
dωds (B.18)
(B.11)
=
s∫
0
[
E¯Ω|S [ω˜|s]− E¯Ω [ω˜]
]
−
[
EΩ|S [ω˜|s]− EΩ [ω˜]
]
ds (B.19)
Together with Lemma B.2 and OS this implies (fS|t(Ω), ft(Ω)) %
mps
(f¯S|t(Ω), f¯t(Ω))
for all strictly increasing t : Ω→ R.
"⇐": Along the same lines as the "⇐"-part of (i) above. 
Proof of Theorem 3.4 "⇒": First suppose there is ω0 ∈ Ω such that
FΩ(ω0) > F¯Ω(ω0). Then there exists t1 : Ω → R, t1 strictly increasing, such
that EΩ [t1(ω˜)] > E¯Ω [t1(ω˜)]. Now deﬁne vt1 : A× Ω → R, (a, ω) 7→ −t1(ω).
Obviously, vt1 is (weakly) supermodular in (a, ω) and
V ((fS|Ω, fΩ), a
∗, vt1) = −EΩ [t(ω˜)] < −E¯Ω [t(ω˜)] = V ((f¯S¯|Ω, fΩ), a¯
∗, vt1)
Secondly, suppose the opposite, there exists ω0 ∈ Ω such that FΩ(ω0) <
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F¯Ω(ω0). Then there exists t2 : Ω → R, t2 strictly increasing, such that
EΩ [t2(ω˜)] < E¯Ω [t2(ω˜)]. Now deﬁne vt2 : A × Ω → R, (a, ω) 7→ t(ω). Obvi-
ously, ut2 is (weakly) supermodular in (a, ω) and
V ((fS|Ω, fΩ), a
∗, vt2) = EΩ [t(ω˜)] < E¯Ω [t(ω˜)] = V ((f¯S¯|Ω, f¯Ω), a¯
∗, vt2)
This shows[
V ((fS|Ω, fΩ), a
∗, v) ≥ V ((f¯S¯|Ω, fΩ), a¯
∗, v)
for all supermodular v : A× Ω→ R
]
⇒ FΩ(ω) = F¯Ω(ω) ∀ ω ∈ Ω.
Next suppose (fS|Ω, fΩ) 6%
w-inf
(f¯S¯|Ω, f¯Ω) and FΩ(ω) = F¯Ω(ω) ∀ ω ∈ Ω.
41
Then, by Prop. 2 in Brandt et al. (2014), there exists a strictly increasing
function t : Ω→ R such that EΩ [t(ω˜)|s˜] is not a MPS of E¯Ω [t(ω˜)|s˜].
42 Hence,
Lemma 1 implies that there is sˆ ∈ [0, 1] such that
EΩ [t(ω˜)|s˜ ≥ sˆ] < E¯Ω [t(ω˜)|s˜ ≥ sˆ] . (B.20)
For arbitrary aˆ ∈ A deﬁne
vt,sˆ(a, ω) :=
{
C if a < aˆ
t(ω) if a ≥ aˆ
where C := EΩ [t(ω˜)|sˆ] is constant. For a
′, a ∈ A such that a′ ≥ a it is
v(a′, ω)− v(a, ω) =
{
0 if a ≤ a′ < aˆ or aˆ ≤ a ≤ a′
t(ω) if a < aˆ ≤ a′.
Since t : Ω → R is strictly increasing this implies that vt,sˆ : A × Ω → R is
41The assumption of equal priors, i.e. FΩ(ω) = F¯Ω(ω) ∀ ω ∈ Ω, is only for simplification.
Along similar lines as follows it is possible to show the necessarity of weak informativeness
without this restriction.
42FΩ(ω) = F¯Ω(ω) ∀ ω ∈ Ω implies EΩ [t(ω˜)] = E¯Ω [t(ω˜)] for all t : Ω→ R.
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supermodular in (a, ω). Moreover, for a′′ ≥ aˆ > a′ the MLRP implies
EΩ [v(a
′′, ω˜)|s] = EΩ [t(ω˜)|s]
≥
≤
EΩ [t(ω˜)|sˆ] = EΩ [v(a
′, ω˜)|s]
MLRP
⇔ s
≥
≤
sˆ.
Hence, under information system (fS|Ω, fΩ) it is optimal to choose an action
a < aˆ if s < sˆ and to choose an action a ≥ aˆ whenever s ≥ sˆ.43 Formally,
a∗ : S → A, s 7→
{
a′ if s < s1
a′′ if s ≥ s1
for some a′ < aˆ ≤ a′′. The optimal ex ante expected utility under information
system (fS|Ω, fΩ) is given by
V ((fS|Ω, fΩ), a
∗, ut,sˆ) = sˆEΩ [t(ω˜)|sˆ] + (1− sˆ)EΩ [t(ω˜)|s˜ ≥ sˆ]
(B.20)
< sˆEΩ [t(ω˜)|sˆ] + (1− sˆ)E¯Ω [t(ω˜)|s˜ ≥ sˆ]
= V ((f¯S¯|Ω, f¯Ω), a
∗, ut,sˆ)
optimality
≤ V ((f¯S¯|Ω, f¯Ω), a¯
∗, ut,sˆ)
This implies that V ((fS|Ω, fΩ), a
∗, v) ≥ V ((f¯S¯|Ω, f¯Ω), a¯
∗, v) does not hold for
all supermodular functions v : A× Ω→ R and, hence,[
V ((fS|Ω, fΩ), a
∗, v) ≥ V ((f¯S¯|Ω, fΩ), a¯
∗, v)
for all supermodular v : A× Ω→ R
]
⇒
[
(fS|Ω, fΩ) %
w-inf
(f¯S¯|Ω, f¯Ω) and
FΩ(ω) = F¯Ω(ω) ∀ ω ∈ Ω
]
.
"⇐": (fS|Ω, fΩ) %
w-inf
(f¯S¯,Ω, f¯Ω) plus FΩ(ω) = F¯Ω(ω) ∀ ω ∈ Ω imply FS,Ω(s, ω) ≥
F¯S,Ω(s, ω) for all (s, ω) ∈ S × Ω. Since FΩ(ω) = F¯Ω(ω) ∀ ω ∈ Ω and
FS(s) = F¯S¯(s) ∀ s ∈ S = S¯ = [0, 1] this is the concordance order as pro-
posed by Joe (1990). By Müller and Scarsini (2000) the concordance order
43Remark: This is one optimal strategy, there might be others.
APPENDIX B. PROOFS OF CHAPTER 3 XIX
is equivalent to the supermodular stochastic order.44 Hence,
[
(fS|Ω, fΩ) %
w-inf
(f¯S¯|Ω, f¯Ω)
and FΩ(ω) = F¯Ω(ω) ∀ ω ∈ Ω
]
=⇒

 ES,Ω [u(a(s˜), ω˜)] ≥ E¯S¯,Ω [u(a(s˜), ω˜)]for all supermodular u and monotone
increasing a : S → A.


(B.21)
Additionally, from Theorem 2 in Athey (2002) it follows that if v : A×Ω→ R
is supermodular and fS|Ω has the MLRP, then the optimal strategy a
∗ : S →
A is non-decreasing in s. Therefore, if v : A×Ω→ R is supermodular, then
v : S × Ω, (s, ω) 7→ v(a∗(s), ω) is supermodular in (s, ω). Hence,
V ((f¯S¯|Ω, f¯Ω), a¯
∗, v)
(B.21)
≤ V ((fS|Ω, fΩ), a¯
∗, v)
optimality
≤ V ((fS|Ω, fΩ), a
∗, v)
for all supermodular functions v : A× Ω→ R. 
Proof of Proposition 3.8 Proposition 1(ii) in Ganuza and Penalva (2010)
together with Proposition 3.7 show that ‘suﬃciency’ does not imply ‘strongly
more informative’. Now suppose equation (3.6) would hold for some arbitrary
class of payoﬀ functions U . Then, by Blackwell’s theorem, ‘suﬃciency’ would
imply ‘strong informativeness’ which is a contradiction to the observation
above. 
Proof of Lemma 3.2 Let (fS|Ω, f¯Ω), (fS|Ω, fˆΩ) ∈ Γ and for α ∈ [0, 1] deﬁne
fˇΩ := αf¯Ω + (1− α)fˆΩ. Since fS|Ω has the MLRP, it suﬃes to show that the
signals under (fS|Ω, fˇΩ) are normalized, i.e. fˇS(s) = 1 ∀ s ∈ [0, 1]:
fˇS(s) =
∫
Ω
fS|Ω(s|ω)fˇΩ(ω)dω =
∫
Ω
fS|Ω(s|ω)
[
αf¯Ω(ω) + (1− α)fˆΩ(ω)
]
dω
=αf¯S(s) + (1− α)fˆS(s) = 1

44A random vector x˜ = (x˜1, . . . , x˜n) is said to be smaller than the random vector
y˜ = (y˜1, . . . , y˜n) in the supermodular (stochastic) order iff E [f(x˜)] ≤ E [f(y˜)] for all
supermodular functions f : Rn → R. Remark: A function Rn → R is supermodular, iff
f(x ∨ y) + f(x ∧ y) ≥ f(x) + f(y) for all x, y ∈ Rn.
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Proof of Proposition 3.9 Let (fS|Ω, f¯Ω), (fS|Ω, fˆΩ) ∈ Γ such that (fS|Ω, f¯Ω) %
x
(fS|Ω, fˆΩ),
x ∈ {w-inf, s-inf}, and for α ∈ [0, 1] deﬁne fˇΩ := αf¯Ω + (1− α)fˆΩ. Straight-
forward calculation shows
ω∫
ω
¯
fˇS,Ω(s, ω
′)dω′ = α
ω∫
ω
¯
f¯S,Ω(s, ω
′)dω′ + (1− α)
ω∫
ω
¯
fˆS,Ω(s, ω
′)dω′ (B.22)
and
FˇS,Ω(s, ω)− sFˇΩ(ω) = α
[
F¯S,Ω(s, ω)− sF¯Ω(ω)
]
− (1− α)
[
FˆS,Ω(s, ω)− sFˆΩ(ω)
]
(B.23)
Equation (B.22) implies
ω∫
ω
¯
f¯S,Ω(s, ω
′)− fˇS,Ω(s, ω
′)dω′ =(1− α)
ω∫
ω
¯
f¯S,Ω(s, ω
′)− fˆS,Ω(s, ω
′)dω′ (B.24)
ω∫
ω
¯
fˇS,Ω(s, ω
′)− fˆS,Ω(s, ω
′)dω′ =α
ω∫
ω
¯
f¯S,Ω(s, ω
′)− fˆS,Ω(s, ω
′)dω′. (B.25)
For x = w-inf the claim follows from equation (B.23) while for x = s-inf the
claim follows from equations (B.24) and (B.25). 
Proof of Lemma 3.3 Let fΩ ∈ ∆(Ω), f¯S|Ω, fˆS|Ω ∈ Γ(fΩ) and for α ∈ [0, 1]
deﬁne fˇS|Ω := αf¯S|Ω + (1− α)fˆS|Ω.
(i) The signals under (fˇS|Ω, fΩ) are normalized:
fˇS(s) =
∫
Ω
fˇS|Ω(s|ω)fΩ(ω)dω =
∫
Ω
[
αf¯S|Ω(s|ω) + (1− α)fˆS|Ω(s|ω)
]
fΩ(ω)dω
=αf¯S(s) + (1− α)fˆS(s) = 1
(ii) fˇS|Ω has the MLRP: To see this consider the posterior, conditional
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cumulative state distribution under (fˇS|Ω, fΩ). That is
FˇΩ|S(ω|s)
fˇS(s)=1
=
ω∫
ω
¯
fS,Ω(s, ω
′)dω′ =
ω∫
ω
¯
αf¯S,Ω(s, ω
′) + (1− α)fˆS,Ω(s, ω
′)dω′
=αF¯Ω|S(ω|s) + (1− α)FˆΩ|S(ω|s).
Since f¯S|Ω and fˆS|Ω have the MLRP, this together with proposition 3.2
imply
FˇΩ|S(ω|s
′) =αF¯Ω|S(ω|s
′) + (1− α)FˆΩ|S(ω|s
′)
≥αF¯Ω|S(ω|s
′′) + (1− α)FˆΩ|S(ω|s
′′) = FˇΩ|S(ω|s
′′)
for all s′, s′′ ∈ S, s′ ≤ s′′, and for all fΩ ∈ ∆(Ω). Hence, again by
proposition 3.2, fˇS|Ω has the MLRP.

Proof of Proposition 3.10 Let fΩ ∈ ∆(Ω), f¯S|Ω, fˆS|Ω ∈ Γ(fΩ) such that
(f¯S|Ω, fΩ) %
x
(fˆS|Ω, fΩ), x ∈ {w-inf, s-inf}, and for α ∈ [0, 1] deﬁne fˇS|Ω :=
αf¯S|Ω + (1− α)fˆS|Ω. Straightforward calculation shows
ω∫
ω
¯
fˇS,Ω(s, ω
′)dω′ = α
ω∫
ω
¯
f¯S,Ω(s, ω
′)dω′ + (1− α)
ω∫
ω
¯
fˆS,Ω(s, ω
′)dω′ (B.26)
and
FˇS,Ω(s, ω)− sFˇΩ(ω) = α
[
F¯S,Ω(s, ω)− sF¯Ω(ω)
]
− (1− α)
[
FˆS,Ω(s, ω)− sFˆΩ(ω)
]
(B.27)
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Equation (B.26) implies
ω∫
ω
¯
f¯S,Ω(s, ω
′)− fˇS,Ω(s, ω
′)dω′ =(1− α)
ω∫
ω
¯
f¯S,Ω(s, ω
′)− fˆS,Ω(s, ω
′)dω′ (B.28)
ω∫
ω
¯
fˇS,Ω(s, ω
′)− fˆS,Ω(s, ω
′)dω′ =α
ω∫
ω
¯
f¯S,Ω(s, ω
′)− fˆS,Ω(s, ω
′)dω′. (B.29)
For x = w-inf the claim follows from equation (B.27) while for x = s-inf the
claim follows from equations (B.28) and (B.29).

Appendix C
Proofs of Chapter 4
Proof of Proposition 4.1 Calculating the ﬁrst and second order conditions
for (4.2):
W ′(ǫ) =
n− 1
n
(1− α)(m − P (ǫ)) − P ′(ǫ)
[(
1−
n− 1
n
ǫ
)
α+
n− 1
n
ǫ
]
W ′′(ǫ) =2
n − 1
n
P ′(ǫ)(α − 1)− P ′′(ǫ)
[(
1−
n− 1
n
ǫ
)
α+
n− 1
n
ǫ
]
< 0. (C.1)
This implies that W is strictly concave with respect to ǫ. Regarding the
limits it follows:
lim
ǫ→ǫ¯
W ′(ǫ) =− P ′(ǫ¯)
[(
1−
n− 1
n
ǫ¯
)
α+
n− 1
n
ǫ¯
]
> 0
lim
ǫ→1
W ′(ǫ) =
n− 1
n
(1− α)m− P ′(1)
α + (n− 1)
n
< 0,
where last inequality holds for ﬁnite |P ′(1)| and m (or n) suﬃciently high.
Then there is a unique ǫ∗ ∈ (ǫ¯, 1) which maximizes W (ǫ) on [ǫ¯, 1]. 
Proof of Cororally 4.1
dW ′(ǫ)
dn
= 1−α
n2
[m− P (ǫ)− ǫP ′(ǫ)] < 0 due to
P ′ < 0 and α > 1. Together with equation (C.1) this implies:
dǫ∗
dn
= −
dW ′(ǫ)/dn
W ′′(ǫ)
∣∣∣∣
ǫ=ǫ∗
< 0.
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Similarly: dW
′(ǫ)
dm
= n−1
n
(1− α) < 0. Using (C.1):
dǫ∗
dm
= −
dW ′(ǫ)/dm
W ′′(ǫ)
∣∣∣∣
ǫ=ǫ∗
< 0.

Proof of Proposition 4.2 The proof for σ = 1 is straightforward and
therefore omitted here. Now assume σ ∈ R>0, 6=1.
(i) The FOC of the maximization problem is
W ′(ǫ) =
n− 1
n(1− σ)
(1− α1−σ)(m− P (ǫ))1−σ
− P ′(ǫ)(m− P (ǫ))−σ
[(
1−
n− 1
n
ǫ
)
α1−σ +
n− 1
n
ǫ
]
= 0 (C.2)
⇐⇒−
m− P (ǫ)
P ′(ǫ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:LS(ǫ)
=
n(1− σ)
α1−σ − 1
·
(
1− n−1
n
ǫ
)
α1−σ + n−1
n
ǫ
n− 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:RS(ǫ)
. (C.3)
RS(ǫ) is aﬃne linear in ǫ, i.e. RS(ǫ) = A(σ) +B(σ)ǫ with
A(σ) :=
nα1−σ(1− σ)
(α1−σ − 1)(n− 1)
, B(σ) := σ − 1. (C.4)
Moreover, we get
RS ′(ǫ) =σ − 1
{
> 0 if σ > 1
< 0 if σ < 1
RS ′′(ǫ) =0
RS(ǫ¯) =
n(1− σ)
α1−σ − 1
·
(
1− n−1
n
ǫ¯
)
α1−σ + n−1
n
ǫ¯
n− 1
> 0 (C.5)
RS(1) =
n(1− σ)
n− 1
(
1
n
+
1
α1−σ − 1
)
(C.6)
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Similarly, for LS(ǫ):
LS ′(ǫ) =1 +
(m− P (ǫ))P ′′(ǫ)
(P (ǫ))2
> 0
LS ′′(ǫ) = (P ′(ǫ))
2
[−P ′(ǫ)P ′′(ǫ) + (m− P (ǫ))P ′′′(ǫ)] (C.7)
LS(ǫ¯) =0 (C.8)
LS(1) =−
m
P ′(1)
> 0 (C.9)
Using the equations (C.5), (C.6), (C.8) and (C.9) yields:
LS(ǫ¯) <RS(ǫ¯)
LS(1) >RS(1) for m suﬃciently high (and |P ′(1)| small);
which shows (i).
ǫ
LS,RS
ǫ¯
LS(ǫ)
RS(ǫ) für σ < 1
RS(ǫ) für σ > 1
1
Figure C.1:
(ii) Follows from strict concavity:
W ′′(ǫ) =− 2
n− 1
n
(1− α1−σ)(m− P (ǫ))−σP ′(ǫ)
−
[
P ′′(ǫ) + σ (P ′(ǫ))
2
] [(
1−
n− 1
n
ǫ
)
α1−σ +
n− 1
n
ǫ
]
(m− P (ǫ))−σ−1
< 0 for σ < 1
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(iii) Equation (C.7) implies that LS ′′(ǫ) is convex for P ′′′ = 0 which im-
plies uniqueness. It should be clear at this point that this is true for many
other cases as well. 
Proof of Proposition 4.3 The proof is straightforward for σ = 1. In the
following consider the case σ > 0, σ 6= 1.
(i) Diﬀerentiating W ′(ǫ) with respect to n gives:
dW ′(ǫ)
dn
=
(m− P (ǫ))−σ
n2
[
1− α1−σ
1− σ
(m− P (ǫ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
< 0
+ P ′(ǫ)ǫ(α1−σ − 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0 if σ<1
]
< 0.
This shows the claim for σ < 1. To verify the claim for σ > 1 we rewrite the
derivative in the following way:
dW ′(ǫ)
dn
=
(α1−σ − 1) (m− P (ǫ))−σ
(σ − 1)n2︸ ︷︷ ︸
< 0
[
(m− P (ǫ))− P ′(ǫ)ǫ(σ − 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0 if σ>1
]
< 0.
Diﬀerentiating W ′(ǫ) with respect to m yields:
dW ′(ǫ)
dm
∣∣∣∣
ǫ=ǫ∗
=
n− 1
n
· (m− P (ǫ∗))−σ (1− α1−σ)
+ σP ′(ǫ) (m− P (ǫ∗))−σ−1
[(
1−
n− 1
n
ǫ∗
)
α1−σ +
n− 1
n
ǫ∗
]
=
W ′(ǫ∗)
m− P (ǫ∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+(1 + σ)P ′(ǫ) (m− P (ǫ))−σ−1
·
[(
1−
n− 1
n
ǫ∗
)
α1−σ +
n− 1
n
ǫ∗
]
< 0.
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(ii) Diﬀerentiating W ′(ǫ) with respect to α gives:
dW ′(ǫ)
dα
=−
n− 1
n
(m− P (ǫ))1−σ α−σ
− P ′(ǫ) (m− P (ǫ))−σ
(
1−
n− 1
n
ǫ
)
(1− σ)α−σ︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0 if σ>1 since P ′(ǫ)<0
< 0.

Proof of Proposition 4.4 (i) Determination of the minimal ﬁnanciable
error level ǫ¯: Since m ≤ b the minimal ﬁnanciable error level solves P (ǫ¯) =
b(1− ǫ¯) = m⇔ ǫ¯ = 1− m
b
. Hence, ǫ¯ := 1− m
b
. Since P (ǫ) is linear it follows
from Prop. 4.2 that ǫ∗ is uniquely determined. Moreover, σ ≥ 2 > 1 implies
lim
ǫ→ǫ¯
W (ǫ) = −∞ and, hence, ǫ∗ = ǫ¯ cannot be optimal. Moreover, equations
(C.3) and (C.4) imply that an interior optimal ǫ∗ holds:
LS(ǫ∗) =
m− b(1− ǫ∗)
b
!
= A(σ) +B(σ)ǫ∗ = RS(ǫ∗). (C.10)
This yields
ǫ∗ =
A(σ)− LS(0)
2− σ
{
> ǫ¯ if σ < 2
< ǫ¯ if σ > 2,
where the last inequalities hold because
α1−σ
α1−σ − 1
{
> 1 if σ < 1
< 0 if σ > 1
ǫ¯∈[0,1)
=⇒
n
n− 1
α1−σ
α1−σ − 1
{
> ǫ¯ if σ < 1
< ǫ¯ if σ > 1
=⇒ A(σ) > (1− σ)ǫ¯
=⇒
A(σ) + ǫ¯
2− σ
{
> ǫ¯ if σ < 2
< ǫ¯ if σ > 2.
This implies that for σ ≥ 2 there is no ǫ∗ ∈ (ǫ¯, 1) which solves the optimality
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condition (C.10). This implies ǫ∗ = 1 whenever σ ≥ 2. Moreover, ǫ∗ can be
characterized as a function of σ by
ǫ∗(σ) =
{
min
{
A(σ)+ǫ¯
2−σ
, 1
}
if σ < 2
1 if σ ≥ 2
, (C.11)
which shows (i).
(ii) Diﬀerentiating ǫ∗(σ) as given in equation (C.11) with respect to σ
gives (for σ < 2)
dǫ∗(σ)
dσ
=
A′(σ)(2− σ) + A(σ) + ǫ¯
(2− σ)2
.
For the limit follows
lim
σ→0
dǫ∗
dσ
=
1
4
[
ǫ¯+
n
n− 1
·
α(1− α + 2ln(α))
(α− 1)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:H(α)
]
.
This expression is less than zero for α suﬃciently high, because
lim
α→∞,σ→0
dǫ∗(σ)
dσ
=
1
4
(
ǫ¯−
n
n− 1
)
= −
1
4
·
(n− 1)m+ nb
(n− 1)b
< 0
and H ′(α) = n
n−1
· 3(α−1)−2ln(α)(α+1)
(α−1)3
< 0 for all α > 1. To see that H ′(α) < 0
consider
h(α) := 3(α− 1)− 2ln(α)(α+ 1).
Its ﬁrst and second derivatives are
h′(α) = 1−
2
α
− ln(α), h′′(α) =
2(1− α)
α2
< 0.
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It follows:
h′(α) < h′(1) = − 1 < 0 ∀α > 1
=⇒ h(α) < h(1) = 0 ∀α > 1
=⇒ H ′(α) < 0 ∀ α > 1.
Now deﬁne I(σ) := A′(σ)(2− σ) +A(σ) + ǫ¯.45 If A′′(σ) > 0 for all σ > 0
(which will be shown below) the following holds true:
I ′(σ) = A′′(σ)(2− σ) > 0 for σ < 2.
Since dǫ
∗(σ)
dσ
= I(σ)
(2−σ)2
and since dǫ
∗(σ)
dσ
∣∣∣
σ=0
< 0 (for α large enough) follows
that I(0) < 0. In combination with I ′(σ) > 0 for σ < 2 and I(2) > 0 this
implies that there is a unique σ¯ ∈ (0, 2) such that
I(σ)


< 0 if σ < σ¯
= 0 if σ = σ¯ or σ ≥ 2
> 0 if σ¯ < σ < 2
,
which shows (ii).
It remains to show that A′′(σ) > 0 for all σ > 0. To see this consider
A′′(σ) =
n
n− 1
·
α1−σln(α)
(α1−σ − 1)3︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:g(σ)
[
(1− σ)ln(α)(α1−σ + 1) + 2(1− α1−σ)
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:h(σ)
.
It is
g(σ), h(σ)
{
> 0 if σ < 1
< 0 if σ > 1
and hence A′′(σ) = n
n−1
g(σ)h(σ) > 0 ∀ σ.
45I.e. dǫ
∗(σ)
dσ
= I(σ)(2−σ)2 .
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Details for the analysis of h(σ):
h(σ1) > h(1) = 0 > h(σ2)
for σ1 < 1 < σ2 holds because
h′(σ) =ln(α)
(
α1−σ − 1 + (1− σ)(α1−σ + 1) + 2(1− α1−σ)
)
h′′(σ) =ln(α)(1− σ)ln(α)2α1−σ


> 0 if σ < 1
= 0 if σ = 1
< 0 if σ > 1.
(C.12)
By equation (C.12) follows:
h′(σ2) > h
′(1) = 0 > h′(σ1) ∀ σ1 < 1 < σ2
=⇒ h(σ1) >h(1) = 0 > h(σ2) ∀ σ1 < 1 < σ2

Proof of Proposition 4.5
(i) In order to characterize the Walrasian equilibrium deﬁne (x¯∗, y¯∗, p¯∗) ∈
CI×
⊗
j∈J
Yj×R
C
+ as the Walrasian equilibrium of the certainty equivalent
economy (where each agent is endowed with his expected endowment).
The FOC of the risk neutral consumer determines the equilibrium price
ratios (in this certainty equivalent economy). In particular, p¯∗c/p¯∗
c′
=
ac/ac′ , where ac = ∂ui(x)/∂xc is the risk neutral agent’s marginal utility of
commodity c. In equilibrium x¯∗(i) solves
max
x∈C
ui(x) s.t. (p¯
∗)T

x− EΩ [w(ω˜, i)]−∑
j∈J
θij(y¯
∗(j) + EΩ [w(ω˜, j)])

 ≤ 0
(C.13)
while y¯∗(j) solves
max
y∈Yj
(p¯∗)T (y + EΩ [w(ω˜, j)]) . (C.14)
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Now turn back to the uncertain economy and deﬁne consumer i’s state-
contingent consumption vector by
x∗(ω, i) := x¯∗(i) ∀ ω ∈ Ω,
each ﬁrm j’s production plan by
y∗(ω, j) := y¯∗(j) ∀ ω ∈ Ω
and the state-contingent commodity prices by
p∗ := (fΩ(ω1)p¯
∗, . . . , fΩ(ωN)p¯
∗) ∈ RC×N+
where fΩ denotes the prior belief in the risky economy. Then (x
∗, y∗, p∗)
is a Walrasian equilibrium of the original economy with risky endow-
ment and complete markets. To see this, ﬁrst observe that the price
ratios p∗c,ω/p∗
c′,ω′
are equal to the risk neutral consumer’s MRS for con-
sumption of commodity c in state ω and consumption of commodity c′
in state ω′, i.e.
p∗c,ω
p∗c′,ω′
=
fΩ(ω)ac
fΩ(ω′)ac′
for all ω, ω′ ∈ Ω and c, c′ ∈ {1, . . . , C} . (C.15)
This implies that the risk neutral consumer is indiﬀerent between con-
sumption of commodity c in state ω and consumption of commodity c′
in state ω′.
Secondly, observe that x∗(i) solves the (original) optimization problem
of a risk avers consumer i. This is given by
max
x∈Bi
EΩ [ui(x(ω˜, i))] ,
with Bi :=
{
x ∈ CS | (p∗)T
(
x(i)− w(i)−
∑
j∈J
θij(y
∗(j) + w(j))
)
≤ 0
}
.46
46Compare Definition 4.1.
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The corresponding FOC is
fΩ(ω)
∂ui(x(ω,i))
∂xc(ω,i)
fΩ(ω′)
∂ui(x(ω′,i))
∂xc′(ω
′,i)
!
=
p∗c,ω
p∗c′,ω′
(C.15)
=
fΩ(ω)ac
fΩ(ω′)ac′
∀ ω, ω′ ∈ Ω; c, c′ ∈ {1, . . . , N}
⇐⇒
∂ui(x(ω,i))
∂xc(ω,i)
∂ui(x(ω′,i))
∂xc′(ω
′,i)
!
=
ac
ac′
for all ω, ω′ ∈ Ω; c, c′ ∈ {1, . . . , N} . (C.16)
This is equal to the FOC of (C.13) and, hence, if x¯∗(i) ∈ C is opti-
mal in the certainty equivalent economy, then, if ﬁnanciable, x∗(i) =
(x¯∗(i), . . . , x¯∗(i)) ∈ CN is optimal in the risky economy. Financiability
follows by plugging (x∗, y∗, p∗) into consumer i’ budget constraint Bi:
(p∗)T (x∗(i)− w(i) −
∑
j∈J
(θijy
∗(j) + w(j))
Def.
=
∑
ω∈Ω
fΩ(ω) (p¯
∗)T

x¯∗(i) −w(ω, i) −∑
j∈J
(θij y¯
∗(j) + w(j))


=(p¯∗)T

x¯∗(i)− EΩ [w(ω˜, i)]−∑
j∈J
(θij y¯
∗(j) + w(j))

 (C.13)≤ 0 .
This implies x∗(i) ∈ Bi, i.e. x
∗(i) is ﬁnanciable, and since the con-
sumers’ FOCs (C.13) and (C.16) of the certainty equivalent and the
risky economy, respectively, coincide this implies x∗(i) = argmax
x∈Bi
EΩ [x(ω˜, i)].
Next, observe that y∗(j) solves ﬁrm j’s optimization problem in the
original, risky economy with complete markets. This is given by
max
y(j)∈Y Nj
(p∗)T (y(j) + w(j))
with corresponding FOC
fΩ(ω)
∂Tj(y(ω,j))
∂yc(ω,j)
fΩ(ω′)
∂Tj(y(ω′,j))
∂yc′(ω
′,j)
!
=
p∗c,ω
p∗c′,ω′
(C.15)
=
fΩ(ω)ac
fΩ(ω′)ac′
∀ ω, ω′ ∈ Ω; c, c′ ∈ {1, . . . , C} .
⇐⇒
∂Tj(y(ω,j))
∂yc(ω,j)
∂Tj(y(ω′,j))
∂yc′(ω
′,j)
=
ac
ac′
∀ ω, ω′ ∈ Ω; c, c′ ∈ {1, . . . , C} . (C.17)
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This is equal to the FOC of (C.14) and, hence, y∗(j) = (y¯∗(j), . . . , y¯∗(j)) =
arg max
y(j)∈Y Nj
(p∗)T (y(j) + w(j)).
Last, by assumption, the risk neutral consumer owns enough to fully
insure all others, i.e. (x∗, y∗) is feasible. This completes the proof of
part (i).
(ii) Analogue to that of part (i). The only diﬀerence is that the equilib-
rium price ratios are determined by the ﬁrm with constant marginal
rates of transformation. This ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between production of
commodity c in state ω or c′ in state ω′. Additionally, by assumption,
this ﬁrm also owns enough to insure the consumers and all other ﬁrms.
Therefore, (x∗, y∗) as deﬁned in part (i) is also feasible.

Proof of Cororally 4.2 The optimal production vector is determined
by equating a ﬁrm’s MRTs with the price ratios. Since prices are fair, the
state distribution cancels out of these FOCs (compare (C.17)) and, hence,
the optimal production plan is independent of the underlying state distribu-
tion. 
The proof of Proposition 4.6 makes use of the following Lemmata:
Lemma C.1. Let (fS|Ω, fΩ), (f¯S|Ω, fΩ) ∈ Γ such that (fS|Ω, fΩ) %
w-inf
(f¯S|Ω, fΩ)
and Ω = {ω1, . . . , ωN} ⊆ R with ω1 < ω2 < . . . , ωN . Then the following is
true for all weakly monotone functions t : Ω→ R:
s∫
0
EΩ [t(ω˜)|s
′] ds′ ≤
s∫
0
E¯Ω [t(ω˜)|s
′] ds′.
By Theorem (3.A.5) in Shaked and Shantbikumar (2007) this implies that
EΩ [t(ω˜)|s˜] is a MPS of E¯Ω [t(ω˜)|s˜].
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Proof: Let (fS|Ω, fΩ), (f¯S|Ω, fΩ) ∈ Γ such that (fS|Ω, fΩ) %
w-inf
(f¯S|Ω, fΩ)
and Ω = {ω1, . . . , ωN} ⊆ R with ω1 < ω2 < . . . , ωN . First, observe that for
any weakly increasing function t : Ω→ R the following holds:
EΩ [t(ω˜)|s] =
N∑
n=1
fΩ|S(ωn|s)t(ωn)
fΩ|S(ωn+1|s)=FΩ|S(ωn+1|s)−FΩ|S(ωn|s)
= t(ωN )−
N−1∑
n=1
FΩ|S(ωn|s)(t(ωn+1)− t(ωn)).
(C.18)
Now, if (fS|Ω, fΩ) %
w-inf
(f¯S|Ω, fΩ) it follows for s ∈ [0, 1]:
s∫
0
EΩ [t(ω˜)|s
′]− E¯Ω [t(ω˜)|s
′]ds′
(C.18)
= −
s∫
0
N−1∑
n=1
(
FΩ|S(ωn|s
′)− F¯Ω|S(ωn|s
′)
)
(t(ωn+1)− t(ωn))ds
′
=−
N−1∑
n=1
(t(ωn+1)− t(ωn))
s∫
0
FΩ|S(ωn|s
′)− F¯Ω|S(ωn|s
′)ds′
=−
N−1∑
n=1
(t(ωn+1)− t(ωn))︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
(
FS,Ω(s, ωn)− F¯S,Ω(s, ωn
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
≤ 0
This implies that EΩ [t(ω˜)|s˜] is a MPS of E¯Ω [t(ω˜)|s˜] for all weakly increasing
functions t : Ω → R. Theorem 3.A.12 in Shaked and Shantbikumar (2007)
now implies that EΩ [−t(ω˜)|s˜] is a MPS of E¯Ω [−t(ω˜)|s˜] for all weakly in-
creasing functions t : Ω→ R, which proof the claim for all weakly decreasing
function. 
Lemma C.2. Let fS|Ω, f¯S|Ω ∈ Γ(fΩ). For i = 1, . . . , n, n ∈ N, let gi :
R → R be monotone (increasing or decreasing). If EΩ [gi(ω˜)|s˜] is a MPS of
E¯Ω [gi(ω˜)|s˜] for all i = 1, . . . , n, then is
n∑
i=1
λiEΩ [gi(ω˜)|s˜] a MPS of
n∑
i=1
λiEΩ [gi(ω˜)|s˜]
for all λi ≥ 0.
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Proof: EΩ [gi(ω˜)|s˜] is a MPS of E¯Ω [gi(ω˜)|s˜] implies
s∫
0
EΩ [gi(ω˜)|s
′] ds′ ≤
s∫
0
E¯Ω [gi(ω˜)|s
′]ds′
=⇒
s∫
0
n∑
i=1
λiEΩ [gi(ω˜)|s
′] ds′ ≤
s∫
0
n∑
i=1
λiE¯Ω [gi(ω˜)|s
′] ds′
which shows the claim. 
Proof of Proposition 4.6 State-contingent claims are traded after the
signal realization. Therefore, the equilibrium allocation (of state-contingent
claims) depends on the posterior state distribution conditional on the signal
realization from the information system (fS|Ω, fΩ). Denote by
(x∗((fS|Ω, fΩ), s), y
∗((fS|Ω, fΩ), s), p
∗((fS|Ω, fΩ), s)) ∈
(
CN
)I
×
⊗
j∈J
Y Nj × (R
C
+)
N
the Walrasian equilibrium after a signal realization equal to s when the in-
formation system is (fS|Ω, fΩ).
Next observe that under any of the conditions (i)-(ii) the equilibrium price
system, p¯∗, of the certainty equivalent economy (after a signal realization
equal to s)47 is independent of s.48
Moreover, Proposition 4.5 implies that under any of the conditions (i) or
(ii), in equilibrium each risk avers consumer i smooth her consumption, i.e.
x∗(ω, i; (fS|Ω, fΩ), s) = x¯
∗(i, p¯∗, p¯∗
T
EΩ [w(ω˜, i)|s]) ∀ i = 1, . . . , I;
where x¯∗(i, p¯∗, p¯∗
T
EΩ [w(ω˜, i)]) denotes agent i’s optimal consumption bundle
in the certainty equivalent economy.49 This implies that the conditional
47I.e. that economy in which the agents random endowments are replaced by their
expected endowments E [w(ω˜, a)|s] for a = 1, . . . , I or a = 1, . . . , J .
48In case (i) it is determined by the risk neutral consumer’s MRSs. In case (ii) by the
MRT of the firm with constant MRTs.
49In particular, x¯∗(i, ·, ·) : RC>0 × R≥0 → R denotes agent i’s Marshallian demand
function, i.e. if agent i’s budget is m ≥ 0 and prices are p ∈ RC>0 then agent i’s optimal
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expected utility after a signal realization equal to s is
EΩ
[
ui(x
∗(ω˜, i; (fS|Ω, fΩ), s))|s
]
= ui(x¯
∗(i, p¯∗, p¯∗
T
EΩ [w(ω˜, i)|s])).
Risk aversion implies that ui(x¯
∗(i, p¯, m)) is concave as a function of m ∈ R≥0
for all price vectors p¯ ∈ RC+.
50 Hence, by Lemma C.1 and Lemma C.2, it is
V ((fS|Ω, fΩ), a
∗, ui) = ES
[
EΩ
[
ui(x
∗(ω˜, i; (fS|Ω, fΩ)))|s˜
]]
= ES
[
ui(x¯
∗(i, p¯∗, p¯∗
T
EΩ [w(ω˜, i)|s˜]))
] concavity & MPS
≤ ES
[
ui(x¯
∗(i, p¯∗, p¯∗
T
E¯Ω [w(ω˜, i)|s˜]))
]
= ES
[
E¯Ω
[
ui(x
∗(ω˜, i; (f¯S|Ω, fΩ)))|s˜
]]
= V ((f¯S|Ω, fΩ), a¯
∗, ui)
which proofs the claim. 
Proof of Proposition 4.7 Cororally 4.2 implies
y∗(ω, j; (fS|Ω, fΩ), s) = y¯
∗(j) ∈ Yj ∀ ω ∈ Ω,
where y¯∗(j) ∈ Yj is the equilibrium state-contingent production plan of ﬁrm
j in the certainty equivalent economy. Since equilibrium prices are fair, i.e.
p∗c,ω((fS|Ω, fΩ), s) = fΩ|S(ω|s)p¯
∗
c, where p¯
∗
c is the equilibrium price in the cer-
tainty equivalent, this implies the claim. 
consumption bundle is x¯∗(p,m).
50For a reference of this statement consider Quah (2000) on page 921.
Appendix D
Proofs and algebraic
manipulations of Chapter 5
Proof of Proposition 5.2 Simple algebraic calculations lead to the follow-
ing diﬀerences in prices, quantities and proﬁts of case 1 and 2:
∆π1 := π
p
1 − π
q
1 = γ
3
<0︷ ︸︸ ︷
β1α
2
2γ + β2α
2
1γ − 2β1β1α1α2
8β1β2(β1β2 − γ
2)(2β1β2 − γ
2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
,
∆π2 := π
p
2 − π
q
2 = γ
5
<0︷ ︸︸ ︷
β1α
2
2γ + β2α
2
1γ − 2β1β1α1α2
16β1β2(β1β2 − γ
2)(2β1β2 − γ
2)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
,
∆p1 := p
p
1 − p
q
1 = γ
3
<0︷︸︸︷
−α2
4β2(2β1β2 − γ
2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
,
∆p2 := p
p
2 − p
q
2 = γ
2
<0︷ ︸︸ ︷
α1γ − 2α2β1
4β1(2β1β2 − γ
2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
,
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∆q1 := q
p
1 − q
q
1 = γ
3
<0︷ ︸︸ ︷
α1γ − α2β1
β1(β1β2 − γ
2)(2β1β2 − γ
2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
,
∆q2 := q
p
2 − q
q
2 = γ
2
>0︷ ︸︸ ︷
2β1β2α2 − β2α1γ − α2γ
2
4β2(2β1β2 − γ
2)(β1β2 − γ
2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
.
By using this it follows
∆π1


< 0 for γ > 0
= 0 for γ = 0
> 0 for γ < 0,
∆π2


< 0 for γ > 0
= 0 for γ = 0
> 0 for γ < 0,
∆p1


< 0 for γ > 0
= 0 for γ = 0
> 0 for γ < 0,
∆p2 < 0 for all γ,
∆q1


< 0 for γ > 0
= 0 for γ = 0
> 0 for γ < 0,
∆q2 > 0 for all γ.
The results stated in Proposition 5.2 follow immediately. 
Proof of Proposition 5.3 Consumers’ surplus: The idea of the proof is
to show that the diﬀerence in consumers’ surplus u("price equilibrium") −
u("quantity equilibrium"), as a function of γ has a global minimum at γ = 0.
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Hence, for l ∈ {p, q} deﬁne
ul(γ) := u
(
ql1, q
l
2
)∣∣
p1=pl1, p2=p
l
2
.
For l = p (l = q), then up(γ) (up(γ)) describes the consumer’s utility in
equilibrium as a function of γ if ﬁrm 1 acts as price (quantity) setter. Now,
by using the equilibium values it follows
up(γ) =
1
32β1(2β1β2 − γ2)2(β1β2 − γ2)
[
− 3α21γ
6 + 2α1α2β1γ
5 + (16α21β1β2 + 5α
2
2β
2
1)γ
4
− 4α1α2β
2
1β2γ
3 − (28α21β
2
1β
2
2 + 20α
2
2β
3
1β2)γ
2 + 16(α21β
3
1β
3
2 + α
2
2β
4
1β
2
2)
]
and
uq(γ) =
1
32
1
(2β1β2 − γ2)2β2
[
5α22γ
4 + 4α1α2β2γ
3 − (20α22β1β2 + 12α
2
1β
2
2)γ
2
+ 16(α21β1β
3
2 + α
2
2β
2
1β
2
2)
]
.
The ’utility-diﬀerence-function’ is deﬁned by
d(γ) :=up(γ)− uq(γ)
=
γ2
32
1
β1β2(2β1β2 − γ2)2(β1β2 − γ2)
[
(5α22β1 − 3α
2
1β2)γ
4 + 6α1α2β1β2α
3
+ (4α21β1β
2
2 − 20α
2
2β
2
1β2)γ
2 − 8α1α2β
2
1β
2
2γ + 16α
2
2β
3
1β
2
2
]
. (D.1)
The ﬁrst and second derivatives are equal to
d′(γ) =
γ
16
1
(β1β2 − γ2)2(2β1β2 − γ2)3
[
− 3α1α2γ
7 + 11(β1α
2
1 − 5β1α
2
2)γ
6
− 9β1β2α1α2γ
5 + (38β21β2α
2
2 − 26β1β
2
2α
2
1)γ
4 + 34β21β
2
2α1α2γ
3
+ (16β21β
3
2α
2
1 − 64β
3
1β
2
2α
2
2)γ
2 − 24β31β
3
2α1α2γ + 32β
4
1β
3
2α
2
2
]
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and
d′′(γ) =
1
16(β1β2 − γ2)3(2β1β2 − γ2)4
[
6α1α2γ
11 + (15α22β1 − 33α
2
1β2)γ
10 + 66α1α2β1β1γ
9
+ (53α21β1β
2
2 − 155α
2
2β
2
1β2)γ
8 − 216α1α2β
2
1β
2
2γ
7 + (68α21β
2
1β
3
2 + 340α
2
2β
3
1β
2
2)γ
6
+ 152α1α2β
3
1β
3
2γ
5 − (228α22β
4
1β
3
2 − 180α
2
1β
3
1β
4
2)γ
4 + 80α1α2β
4
1β
4
2γ
3
+ (96α21β
4
1β
5
2 − 32α
2
2β
5
1β
4
2)γ
2 − 96α1α2β
5
1β
5
2γ + 64α
2
2β
6
1β
5
2
]
.
Since d′(0) = 0 and d′′(0) =
α22
4β1β22
> 0 it follows that d(0) = 0 is a local
minimum of d(γ), i.e. ∃ǫ > 0 s.t. up(γ) > uq(γ) ∀ γ ∈ (−ǫ, ǫ).
Moreover, since α1, α2, β1, β2, γ ∈ R equation (D.1) implies
d(γ) = 0 ⇔ up(γ) = uq(γ) ⇔ γ = 0.
This implies that at γ = 0 is also a global minimum of d(γ) which proofs the
claim.
Total surplus: Analog to the proof for consumers’ surplus. 
Proof of Proposition 5.4 First, consider the equations (5.17), (5.18),
(5.19) and (5.20). The proﬁt of ﬁrm 1 for the case if ﬁrm 2 chooses also price
competition is given by equation (5.8):
π˜pp1 (p1) := π
pp
1
(
p1, R
pp
2 (p1)
)
= p1 q˜1
(
p1, R
pp
2 (p1)
)
= p1 (a1 − b1p1 + cR
pp
2 (p1))
with Rpp2 (p1) given in equation (5.4). The ﬁrst order condition can be written
to
∂π˜pp1
∂p1
=
∂πpp1
∂p1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Direct effect
+
∂π1
∂p2
∂Rpp2
∂p1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Strategic effect
=
∂πpp1
∂p1
+
γ
β1β2 − γ2
γ
2β1
p1.
The strategic eﬀect is positive for all feasible γ. In the equilibrium of the
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simultaneous Bertrand game on the second stage it holds that
∂πpp1
∂p1
(pBB1 ) = 0
which implies that
∂π˜pp1
∂p1
(pBB1 ) =
γ2
2β1 (β1β2 − γ2)
pBB1 > 0 for all γ.
As the proﬁt function is concave it follows directly
pBB1 < p
p
1. (D.2)
The proﬁt of ﬁrm 1 for the case if ﬁrm 2 chooses quantity competition is
given by (5.11), i.e.
π˜pq1
(
p1
)
: = πpq1
(
p1, R
pq
2 (p1)
)
= p1 qˆ1
(
p1, R
pq
2 (q1)
)
= p1
α1 − γR
pq
2 (q1)− p1
β1
with Rpq2 (p1) given in (5.5). The ﬁrst order condition can be written to
∂π˜pq1
∂p1
=
∂πpq1
∂p1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Direct effect
+
∂π1
∂q2
∂Rpq2
∂p1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Strategic effect
=
∂πpq1
∂p1
−
γp1
β1
γ
2(β1β2 − γ2)
.
The strategic eﬀect is negative for all feasible γ. In the equilibrium of the
simultaneous move it holds that
∂πpq1
∂p1
(pBC1 ) = 0 which implies that
∂π˜pq1
∂p1
(pBC1 ) = −
γ2
2β1 (β1β2 − γ2)
pBC1 < 0 for all γ.
It follows directly by concavity of the proﬁt function that
pBC1 > p
p
1 (D.3)
holds. Together with equation (D.2) this implies inquality (5.17). The other
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inequalities follow directly by using simple algebraic manipulations which are
omitted here.
It remains to prove the equations (5.21), (5.22), (5.23) and (5.24). The
proﬁt of ﬁrm 1 for the case if both ﬁrms select quantity competition is given
in equation (5.14):
π˜qq1 (q1) : = π
qq
1 (q1, R
qq
2 (q1))
= q1 p˜1
(
q1, R
qq
2 (q1)
)
with Rqq2 (q1) given in equation (5.7). The ﬁrst order condition can be written
to
∂π˜qq1
∂q1
=
∂πqq1
∂q1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Direct effect
+
∂π1
∂q2
∂Rqq2
∂q1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Strategic effect
=
∂πqq1
∂q1
+
γ2
2β2
q1.
The strategic eﬀect is positive for all feasible γ. In the equilibrium of the
simultaneous Cournot game it holds that
∂πqq1
∂q1
(qCC1 ) = 0 which implies that
∂π˜qq1
∂q1
(qCC1 ) =
γ2
2β2
qCC1 > 0 for all γ.
Concavity of the proﬁt function implies
qCC1 < q
q
1. (D.4)
The proﬁt of ﬁrm 1 for the case if ﬁrm 2 chooses price competition is given
in equation (5.12)
π˜qp1
(
q1
)
: = πqp1
(
q1, R
qp
2 (q1)
)
= q1 pˆ1(q1, R
qp
2 (q1))
with Rqp2 (q1) given in equation (5.6). The ﬁrst order condition can be written
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to
∂π˜qp1
∂q1
=
∂πqp1
∂q1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Direct effect
+
∂π1
∂p2
∂Rqp2
∂q1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Strategic effect
=
∂πqp1
∂q1
−
γ2
2β2
q1.
Obviously, the strategic eﬀect is negative for all feasible γ. In the equilibrium
of the simultaneous move it holds that
∂πqp1
∂q1
(pCB1 ) = 0 which implies that
∂π˜pq1
∂q1
(qCB1 ) = −
γ2
2β2
qCB1 < 0 for all γ.
It follows directly by concavity of the proﬁt function that
qCB1 > q
q
1. (D.5)
Together with equation (D.4) this implies the second inequality of equation
(5.17). The other inequalities follow analogoulsy. 
The explicit algebraic expressions of figures 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5 in Ex-
ample 8:
qq1 =
16− 4γ
2(8− γ2)
, qCC1 =
16− 4γ
16− γ2
, qCB1 =
16− 4γ
16− 3γ2
,
pq1 =
4− γ
2
, pCC1 =
8
4 + γ
, pCB1 =
2(4− γ)(4− γ2)
16− 3γ2
,
qq2 =
16− 4γ − γ2
2(8− γ2)
, qCC2 =
16− 4γ
16− γ2
, qCB2 =
2(8− 2γ − γ2)
16− 3γ2
,
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pq2 =
16− 4γ − γ2
8− γ2
, pCC2 =
8
4 + γ
, pCB2 =
4(8− γ2)− 8γ
16− 3γ2
,
πq1 =
(4− γ)2
8− γ2
, πCC1 =
32
(4 + γ)2
, πCB1 =
8(4− γ)2(4− γ2)
2(16− 3γ2)2
,
πq2 =
(4− γ)2
8− γ2
, πCC2 =
32
(4 + γ)2
, πCB2 =
8(8− 2γ − γ2)2
(16− 3γ2)2
.
Proof of Proposition 5.5 Analog to the proof of Proposition 5.3. 
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